


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THESIS

TERRORISM AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATION:
A Comparative Analysis
of the Zionist and the Palestinian Terrorist Campaigns

by

Curtis D. Boyd

March 24, 1994

Thesis Advisor:

Maria Moyano

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A Comparative Analysis of the Zionist and the Palestinian Terrorist Campaigns

by

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Captain, United States Army
B.A., Norwich University, 1984

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of the requirements for the degree of


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
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
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

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ABSTRACT

Terrorism is a quintessential psychological operation, involving the use of violence to convey a message to multiple audiences. As a psychological operation, terrorism produces two effects; one propaganda and the other psychological warfare. The propaganda effects are informative, persuasive, or compelling among neutral, friendly or potentially friendly target audiences. The psychological warfare effects are provocative, disruptive, and coercive among enemy or hostile target audiences. By comparing the Zionist and the Palestinian terrorist campaigns, this thesis demonstrates how terrorism produces psychological warfare and propaganda effects on multiple audiences and the consequences of each. The success of the Jewish resistance resulted from a strategy of terrorism that identified the psychological vulnerabilities of certain audiences, controlled for the psychological warfare and propaganda effects on those audiences, and anticipated audience response. By comparison, the Palestinian resistance did not control for the psychological warfare and propaganda effects on multiple audiences. Palestinian terrorism was exclusively psychological warfare, which failed to propagandize their cause beyond their national constituency. In either case, the success or failure of terrorism should be understood in part by viewing their campaigns of terror through the prism of psychological operations.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	TERRORISM IN PERSPECTIVE	3
B.	TERRORISM DEFINED.....	7
C.	THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY OF TERRORISM.....	14
D.	THE ORGANIZATION OF THIS STUDY.....	21
II.	THE ENVIRONMENT.....	26
A.	TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND ITS IMPACT ON TERRORISM	31
B.	TERRORISM ON LOCATION.....	36
C.	NATIONALIST JUSTIFICATION AND TOLERANCE OF TERRORISM.....	38
D.	TRANSNATIONAL TERROR.....	56
E.	SUMMARY.....	68
III.	CONSIDERING THE SOURCE.....	70
A.	THE INDIVIDUAL TERRORISTS.....	70
B.	THE TERRORIST GROUP.....	74
C.	MILITANT MINORITY.....	80
D.	SUMMARY.....	88

IV. METHODOLOGY.....	89
A. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND.....	89
B. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK.....	113
V. THE JEWISH RESISTANCE.....	120
A. THE ZIONIST MAINSTREAM.....	122
B. THE JEWISH DISSIDENTS.....	130
C. TARGET AUDIENCES.....	135
VI. THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE.....	155
A. THE PALESTINIAN MAINSTREAM.....	156
B. THE PALESTINIAN DISSIDENTS.....	163
C. TARGET AUDIENCES.....	166
VI. CONCLUSION.....	191
APPENDIX A.....	204
APPENDIX B.....	227
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	258
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST.....	271

ABBREVIATIONS

ALF.....	Arab Liberation Front
ANM.....	Arab National Movement
BSO.....	Black September Organization
ETZEL.....	Irgun
FLN.....	Front de Liberation Nationale (Algeria)
ICAO.....	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICO.....	Islamic Conference Organization
IFALPA.....	International Federation of Airline Pilots Associations
IRA.....	Irish Republican Army
IZL.....	Irgun
LEHI.....	Stern Gang
NZO.....	New Zionist Organization
PDFLP.....	Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PFLP.....	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PFLP-GC.....	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command
PLO.....	Palestine Liberation Organization
PNC.....	Palestine National Council
UN.....	United Nations
UNRWA.....	United Nations Relief Works Agency
WZO.....	World Zionist Organization

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is the quintessential psychological operation, involving the use of violence to convey a message to multiple audiences. As a psychological operation, terrorism produces two effects. The first is the propaganda effect, whereby neutral or friendly audiences are informed, persuaded, or compelled to support the terrorist's cause. The second is the psychological warfare effect, whereby enemy audiences are deterred, disrupted, or provoked to respond in manner consistent with the terrorist's desires. Each of these effects parallels the conventional wisdom's instrumental and organizational perspectives of terrorism. The instrumental perspective is essentially oriented toward psychological warfare; the disruptive, disorienting, demonstrative, provocative, and vengeance related functions of terrorism. The organizational perspective relates to the propaganda impact of terrorist violence: the morale building, competitive, coercive, and persuasive, group-centric functions of terrorism. The following analysis synthesizes these two perspectives into a framework that considers the psychological warfare and the propaganda effects of terrorism on neutral, friendly, and hostile audiences.

This line of reasoning serves as the theoretical basis for the following analysis of terrorism as a psychological operation. Basically, I am challenging the conventional wisdom's claim that terrorism is fundamentally "propaganda of the deed." While I don't deny that terrorism has a propaganda component and a very important one at

that, I do deny that propaganda is the only component. If the essential function of propaganda is to win friends, then how can an act of terror that victimizes an individual or group win friends among that same group--not likely. The victims of terrorist violence are not propagandized toward the terrorist's cause--the effects are psychological warfare. Yet, terrorism has contributed to some remarkable achievements. It facilitated the creation of the Jewish state in May 1948 and it got Yasir Arafat to the United Nations in November 1974. I ask then, what was unique about their campaigns' of terror or the historical circumstances that allowed these terrorists to become politicians. How does the psychological impact of terrorist violence induce changes in the attitudes or political behavior of multiple audiences consistent with the terrorist's political objectives?

Considering the individuals mentioned above and the questions posed, the following will comparatively analyze the Zionist and the Palestinian campaigns of terror in an attempt to find an answer. Specifically, the analysis will examine Jewish terrorism from 1944 to 1947 and Palestinian terrorism from 1968 to 1973. Considering terrorism as a psychological operation will bring into focus the unique features of the Zionist campaign of terror that ultimately facilitated the creation of a Jewish state on the one hand, and on the other failed to achieve a similar result regarding the Palestinian case. Furthermore, the purpose of this analysis is not to disregard the political and social climate that operated independently of Jewish and Palestinian terrorism. In other words, it is not my intent to argue that terrorism by itself was successful, or to separate it from its historic condition. I intend to demonstrate that

terrorism operates in an environment rich with psychological forces exploitable within the confines of the historic moment. The success of terrorism hinges on strategy that identifies the psychological vulnerabilities of certain audiences, controls for the psychological warfare and propaganda effects on those audiences, and anticipates audience response.

A. TERRORISM IN PERSPECTIVE

In order to keep this analysis within the realm of theoretical reason, I have decided to synthesize the strengths of the conventional wisdom's instrumental and organizational perspectives. This will accomplish two things. First, it will demonstrate that the basis of Jewish and Palestinian terrorism was instrumental reason. Both groups used terrorism as a means to achieve a logical political end--statehood. And second, as a strategy of a minority, terrorism compensated for the inherent organizational weaknesses of the two resistance movements. In both cases, the representative elite were disadvantaged by the dispersion (e.g., displaced person camps and refugee camps) of their national communities, the lack of less violent means to articulate the Palestine question, the shortage of logistical and military assets necessary to engage the target regime in a conventional contest, and lastly, the repressive tendencies of the occupying authority. Consequently, Jewish and Palestinian terrorism served as a means to organizationally arouse the revolutionary spirit of their oppressed and dispersed constituents. Like the propaganda effect, the organizational function of terrorism focuses on friendly, potentially friendly and neutral audiences, whereas the

instrumental function generally produces a psychological warfare effect on hostile audiences.

The instrumental perspective assumes the terrorist is a rational actor, making strategic and tactical choices based on an assessment of his operational environment and the response by other political forces to his behavior (see Table 1-1, below). He possesses a logic that enables him to calculate the necessary means to achieve the desired ends. By contrast, the organizational perspective assumes the terrorist is irrational, operating on impulse within a group that is conflict laden. In the organizational terrorist's model, choices are motivated by the group's psychological dynamics, which translate into unpredictable acts without a basis in logic or instrumental reasoning that fail to reflect a balance between means and ends.

Table 1-1.
THE TWO COMPETING PERSPECTIVES.

<i>The Instrumental Perspective</i>	<i>The Organizational Perspective</i>
1. The act of terrorism represents a strategic choice.	1. The act of terrorism is the outcome of internal group dynamics.
2. The organization using terrorist acts as a unit, on the basis of collective values.	2. Individual members of an organization disagree over ends and means.
3. The means of terrorism are logically related to ends and resources; surprise compensates for weakness.	3. The resort to terrorism reflects the incentives leaders provide for followers and competition with rivals.
4. The purpose of terrorism is to bring about change in an actor's environment.	4. The motivations for participation in terrorism include personal needs as much as ideological goals.
5. The pattern of terrorism follows an action-reaction process; terrorism responds to what the government does.	5. Terrorist actions often appear inconsistent, erratic, and unpredictable.
6. Increasing the cost of terrorism makes it less likely; decreasing cost or increasing reward makes it more likely.	6. External pressure may strengthen group cohesion; rewards may create incentives to leave the group.
7. Terrorism fails when its practioners do not obtain their stated political objectives.	7. Terrorism fails when the organization disintegrates; achieving long-term goals may not be desirable.

Source: Martha Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches," In David C. Rapoport (ed.) *Inside Terrorist Organizations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), p. 27.

In order to combine these two perspectives, I begin with the premise that terrorism is a rational political choice. Both the Jewish and the Palestinian terrorists' decisions to use terrorism as a means to oppose the occupying authority was based on their relative military potential, the dispersion of their potential constituencies, and their disillusionment with political and diplomatic effects to achieve a similar result by less violent means. In other words, terrorism compensated for their military weakness, communicated a message to their oppressed diaspora greater in than non-violent acts could emit, informed the occupying authority that a challenge to their claim to a territory existed, and announced to international constituencies that the Palestine question had not been resolved. However, while Martha Crenshaw's contention that an analysis of terrorist behavior as "rational" must assume that "terrorist organizations possess internally consistent sets of values, beliefs, and images of the environment," is valid in theory, it is not necessarily the case in practice.¹ Although the basis of Jewish and Palestinian terrorist campaigns was rational political choice, it is not entirely clear that a coherent set of beliefs motivated all acts of violence or all members and factions. Acts of terror were not exclusively reserved for the occupying authority or the enemy population. The Stern Gang waged an anti-collaboratorist campaign against fellow Jews, which led to a spiral of reprisal operations by the mainstream Haganah and the British. In 1969, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine waged a similar campaign of terror against fellow West Bank Palestinians in order to intimidate

¹Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," *Comparative Politics*, 13 (July 1981), p. 385.

them against voting in the local elections. Consequentially, both the Jewish and the Palestinian campaigns of terror manifested organizational and instrumental dynamics, the former focused on maintaining group cohesion and proper function and the latter aimed at the undermining the legitimate authority of the occupying power.

There is almost universal agreement that terrorism by itself is ineffective. Austin Turk contends that "terror is likely to provoke counter-terror instead of conformity, and to deter potential support more than potential opposition."² Similarly, Paul Wilkinson adds that "by itself terrorism has been regularly unsuccessful in winning strategic objectives such as the destruction of a whole regime and presumably its replacement by a regime congenial to the terrorists."³ Yehezkel Dror puts a different twist on the ineffectiveness of terrorism. He argues that terrorism serves a positive function, that of solidifying the forces of counter-terror, promoting innovation, and mobilizing support for the government. Furthermore, Dror suggests that terrorism breaks down the government's monopoly on violence and may institutionalize the use of violence by a disenfranchised minority as a political tool.⁴ While terrorism may provide a target government with a means to increase solidarity among the populace, it is doubtful that any such government would prefer to sustain terrorism for that reason.

²Austin T. Turk, "Social Dynamics of Terrorism," In Marvin E. Wolfgang (ed.), *Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science*, 463 (December 1982), p. 128.

³Paul Wilkinson, "The Real World Problems of Terrorist Organizations and Problem of Propaganda," In Ariel Merari (ed.), *On Terrorism and Combating Terrorism* (MD: University Publications of America, 1985), p. 71.

⁴Yehezkel Dror, "Terrorism as a Challenge to the Democratic Capacity to Govern," In Martha Crenshaw (ed.), *Terrorism, Legitimacy, & Power* (CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1983), pp. 65-90.

Nonetheless, terrorism was in some capacity effective at getting the Jewish resistance a state and the Palestinian resistance to the United Nations.

B. TERRORISM DEFINED

Terrorism conjures up different literal meaning and mental images during different periods in history.⁵ For instance, prior to 1968, terrorism was undistinguishable from other subversive activities against the state.⁶ During that period, terrorism was often associated with pre-19th century anarchists, whom committed acts of political violence (e.g., assassination) that were designed more to upset the balance of elite power structures than to destabilize the entire social and political system.⁷ Accordingly, E.V. Walter examined the role of terrorism as a means of state control and popular resistance within the context of traditional societies. He argues that terrorism includes the state, whereby terrorism was considered to be a process

⁵Crenshaw states that until the late 1960s terrorism was not usually employed to make specific demands on a governments. Instead it was a one-shot deal--a simple direct form of political communication: Martha Crenshaw, "How Terrorists Think: What Psychology Can Contribute to Understanding Terrorism," In Lawrence Howard (ed.), *Terrorism: Roots, Impact, Responses* (NY: Praeger, 1992), p. 76.

⁶The League of Nations Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism (1937) defined acts of terrorism: "All criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public." According to the Convention and equally ambiguous, the category of terrorism includes all acts as well as attempts that cause death or bodily harm to Heads of State or Government, their sponsors, and other public figures; that cause damage to public property; that endanger the lives of the public; and that deal with arms and ammunition for commission of these offenses in any state. Ezzat A. Fattah, "Terrorist Activities and Terrorist Targets: A Tentative Typology," In Yonah Alexander and John M. Gleason (eds.), *Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), p. 17.

⁷Maximilien Robespierre, 2nd Great Reign of Terror (1793-94), serves as the historical basis of the terms: "terror," "terrorism" and "terrorists." Albert Parry, *Terrorism: From Robespierre to Arafat* (New York: Vanguard Press, 1976), p. 39. However, Fromkin points out that Robespierre used terror to sustain government rather than destroy it. David Fromkin, "The Strategy of Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs*, 53:1 (October 1974), pp. 683-698.

managed by the state in order to control its subjects. The subjects, he argues, have the right to use violence as a means to express their political grievances, because constitutional mechanisms have not yet developed to promote less violent methods of political communication. All considered, Walter's explanation of the process of terror imagines an authoritarian state, which uses violence literally to control popular resistance. The "zones" of occupation, for both the British and the Israelis, tended towards this authoritarian violence against a popular resistance. However, the world does not wholly resemble Walter's paradigm, the traditional "zones of terror" have given way to a world held hostage by small groups using systematic violence in order to destroy the whole structures of the state. By the mid-20th Century, the balance of terror had shifted away from the state to disenfranchised minorities using a campaign of political violence to break the grip of occupied control.

While Walter's case studies bare little significance to the cases considered here, his process of terror remains relevant no matter the characteristics of the political and social system. He argues that the process of terror involves a source of violence, a victim, and a target, all of which possess a specific sphere of influence. Walter argues further that the process of terror's influence may be restricted to specific zones (e.g., township or region) or may expand to encompass an entire system (e.g., authority). "Any zone is clearly linked to the rest of society in many ways, but this larger society is itself not a system of terror unless all the members are involved, in one role or

another, actually or potentially in the terror process."⁸ One such system where all members are involved in the terror process is terrorism; what Walter calls a "siege of terror." It is this siege of terror that drives the terrorist to destroy the authority system through systematic use of violence. Therefore, Walter concludes that "in the terror process, no one can be secure, for the category of transgression is, in reality, abolished. Anyone may be a victim, no matter what action he chooses. Innocence is irrelevant."⁹ For the British and the Israeli authorities transgression was costly, innocence mattered, and impulses to wage systemic forms of terror in the occupied territories had to become more zone specific. On the other hand, the Jewish and Palestinian resistance initiated a systematic use of violence to destroy the authority system in the occupied territory, which transgressed beyond the source of the dispute to involve multiple audiences. Therefore, Walter's process of terror is indispensable, because it brings into focus the use of terrorism as a systematic means designed to achieve political ends.

Therefore, the Jewish and the Palestinian resistance held exclusive rights to a campaign of terror, because the liberalizing world was antithetical to British or Israeli systematic use of terror as a method of social control. This does not disregard a tendency of either of the occupying authorities to impose draconian measures, what

⁸Eugene V. Walter, *Terror and Resistance: A Study of Political Violence* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 6-7.

⁹Walter, p. 26.

Walter and others would call terrorist, on the populations of their occupied territories¹⁰

Both the authority and the resistance possessed a peculiar mix of traditional and modern impulses that constrained and facilitated the existence of terrorism as a means of political influence (as discussed in Chapter II). Consequently, a traditional social setting or an authoritarian political system is more conducive to "terrorism from above," while a modern social setting and a liberal political system is more conducive to "terrorism from below."¹¹

Therefore, the challenge of the Jewish and the Palestinian campaigns of terror was to provoke the occupying authorities to submit to primordial authoritarian tendencies that manifest in repressive methods of social control, contradicting the legitimate foundations of their political existence. Thomas Thornton argues that terror is a tool to be used rationally, whereby acts of terror are instituted as parts of planned campaigns to achieve political objectives, thereby also excluding nonpolitical terror.¹² If terror is a tool then the state has other means at its disposal to enforce its authority. I do not intent to get bogged down in the semantics of terrorism. Suffice it to say that

¹⁰For an account of state terrorism in general and Israeli state terror in particular: Noam Chomsky, *Pirates and Emperors: International Terrorism in the Real World* (Brattleboro, VT: Amana Books, 1990).

¹¹The contemporary literature on terrorism often differentiates between state and non-state terrorism as terrorism from above and terrorism from below. Furthermore, Noam Chomsky, *op cit.*, labels state terrorism as wholesale or *emperors* terror and a retail or *pirates* as non-state terror. For a discussion of the Jewish resistance as terrorism from below: Robert Kumamoto, "Diplomacy from Below: International Terrorism and American Foreign Relations, 1945-1962," *Terrorism: An International Journal*, 14 (1991), pp. 32-39; Furthermore, Thornton refers to state terror as "enforcement terror" and non-state terror (terror from below) as "agitational terror": Thornton, "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation," In Harry Eckstein (ed.), *Internal War: Problems and Approaches* (CT: Greenwood Press, 1964), p. 72.

¹²Thornton, p. 71.

both the British and the Israelis used terror as a tactic, but not as an all consuming ideology. By contrast, terrorism was an ideology for the Jewish and the Palestinian resistance, the exclusive and systematic use of violence as a strategic means to achieve political ends.

All considered, a definition of terrorism must reflect a process that systematically uses acts of terror as a tool to convey a political message to an occupying authority, his constituency, and his allies. Furthermore, this process must also influence known or potential supporters of the terrorist group. Accordingly, Alex Schmid's definition of terrorism proves to be the most applicable. In his book, *Political Terrorism A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature*, he reviews 109 expert definitions and concludes the following:

Terrorism is a method of combat in which random or symbolic victims serve as an instrumental **target of violence**. These instrumental victims share group or class characteristics which form the basis of their selection for victimization. Through previous use of violence or the credible threat of violence other members of that group or class are put in a *state of chronic fear* (terror). This group or class, whose members' sense of security is purposefully undermined, is the **target of terror**. The victimization of the target of violence is considered extranormal by most observers from the witnessing audience on the basis of its atrocity, the time (e.g., peacetime) or place (not a battlefield) of victimization, or the disregard for rules of combat accepted in conventional warfare. The norm violation creates an attentive audience beyond the target of terror; sectors of this audience might in turn form the main object of manipulation. The purpose of this indirect method of combat is either to immobilize the target of terror in order to produce disorientation and/or compliance, or to mobilize secondary **targets of demands** (e.g., a government) or **targets of attention** (e.g., public opinion) to changes of attitude or behavior favoring the short or long-term interests of the users of this method of combat.¹³

¹³Alex Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988), p. 1-2. Following the receipt of feedback from the research community, Schmid changes his definition somewhat on page 28, nonetheless the

Undoubtedly, Schmid's definition is difficult to consume, so I will bite of key pieces in order to make it more digestible.

Schmid has essentially defined what I call the terrorist's psychological battlefield, which encompasses the extranormal violent act and the four target audiences (target of violence, target of terror, target of demands, and target of attention) Schmid later expands his definition to include a fifth audience, the *target of opportunity* (e.g., foreign opinion, terrorist organization itself, sympathizers) The proximity to and level of identification with the victim (target of violence) dictates the extent of audience participation in the terror process. On the terrorist's psychological battlefield, the terrorist purposefully expands the scope of the conflict to include the psychological dispositions of multiple target audiences. The terrorist does not succeed by occupying or seizing key terrain ordinarily associated with conventional forms of warfare. His success hinges on the occupation of psychological positions in the minds of multiple target audiences. In effect, the terrorist carves a place for himself on the cognitive map of multiple audiences, which imprints his cause on the forefront of local and international agendas. Therefore, terrorism is a two pronged assault along local and international fronts. Locally, terrorism directly attacks the target of violence, the target of terror, and target of demands. And internationally, terrorism indirectly assaults the target of attention and target of opportunity. However, the terrorist's selected target array may consist of as few as two audiences or as many as all five, depending on the

one cited stands as the most pertinent to this inquiry.

type, features, and substance of the violent act. Furthermore, as audience involvement increases, so too does the scope of the consequences, expanding from local to international responses. Thus, the terrorist's psychological battlefield is multifaceted, consisting of five target audiences and multidimensional with local and international components. Figure 1-1 below depicts the interaction of the five target audiences.




Figure 1-1.
The Process of Terror: Target Audiences

C. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY OF TERRORISM

Terrorism is the weapon of the weak. It avoids the enemy's strengths and targets his weakness. It evades direct confrontation with the enemy's security forces preferring to attack his sources of power rather than his centers of power. Wilkinson states "terrorism is essentially a psychological weapon aimed at its immediate victims, but also at a wider audience."¹⁴ Moreover, the basic aim of terrorism is to influence changes in political and social behavior conducive to fulfillment of the terrorist's objectives. In order to create changes advantageous to the terrorist's cause, he must devise a strategy that considers the impact of acts of political violence on multiple audiences. The terrorist devises a strategy that exploits the psychological vulnerabilities among enemy and friendly populations in order to compensate for physical and material weaknesses. Ultimately, terrorism is a psychological operation in that success is achieved by an audience response that confirms the terrorist's conception of reality and facilitates those psychological and political changes he desires. Accordingly, Wilkinson states:

Terrorism is, of course, a preeminent mode of psychological and propaganda warfare. The terrorist and the government fight a war of wills...¹⁵

Therefore, the strategy of terrorism as psyop is two-dimensional. It combines psychological warfare and propaganda into a campaign of terror that manipulates psychological vulnerabilities in neutral, friendly, and hostile audiences that will

¹⁴Paul Wilkinson, "The Real World Problems of Terrorist Organizations and Problem of Propaganda," p. 69.

¹⁵Ibid.

support the achievement of psychological and political objectives. The term psychological warfare, as used in this analysis, refers to those activities of the terrorist organization which are directed against the forces of the enemy (and allies directly hostile to them) with the aim of causing chaos within his ranks, of demoralizing and disorganizing him so as to reduce, in a minor or major degree, his ability as a security force and their legitimacy as an occupying power. The term propaganda covers, on the other hand, all those activities of a terrorist organization which are directed at neutral (relative to the terrorist organization) domestic and foreign public opinion, to the members of the same terrorist organization and its sympathizers with the aim of securing as broad support as possible to the political aspirations, and to maintain, or raise to a higher level the moral force of the terrorist organization and of its constituents.¹⁶ In essence, propaganda aims at occupying and retaining the moral high ground, whereas psychological warfare aims at destroying the state's moral reputation denying them the minimum comfort of the front slope.

Therefore, terrorism as a psychological operation assaults the psychological battlefield along the psychological warfare and propaganda axis targeting vulnerable audiences in its path. To be effective, the terrorist must anticipate and control for psychological effects produced by psychological warfare and propaganda, thereby exploiting conditions that already exist and manipulating those circumstances he

¹⁶Ejub Kucuk, "Political Terrorism as a Means of Psychological Warfare," *Socialist Thought and Practice* 21 (August 1981): p. 79; and Maurice Tugwell, "Terrorism and Propaganda: Problem and Response," *Conflict Quarterly* 6 (Spring 1986): p. 5; referring to the North Atlantic Alliance for a definition of propaganda: any information, ideas, doctrines or special appeals disseminated to influence the opinion, emotions, attitudes or behavior of any specified group in order to benefit the sponsor either directly or indirectly.

creates. Along each of the axis, the terrorist must target specific audiences in order to provoke the desired psychological and political response. Psychological warfare typically targets the opposing forces defined by the locus of dispute, assaulting the enemy's psychological will in-depth (target of terror and target of demands, refer Figure 1-2 below). The psychological warfare effects are disorienting, disruptive, retaliatory, provocative, and demonstrative. By contrast, propaganda targets a broader less clearly defined and less hostile audiences, residing away from the source of conflict but involved because of a real or perceived vulnerability to the broadening scope of the violence (targets of attention and opportunity, Figure 1-3 below). The propaganda effects are cohesive, competitive, coercive, and persuasive. Ultimately, the psychological warfare and propaganda effects translate into short-term instrumental and organizational objectives, which will be discussed in Chapter IV. In combination, psychological warfare and propaganda encompass the psychological strategy of terrorism, which uses violence to gain psychological advantage leading ultimately to political success.




Figure 1-2.
Terrorism as Psychological Warfare: Target Audiences




Figure 1-3.
Terrorism as Propaganda: Target Audiences

Accordingly, the Jewish and the Palestinian psychological strategy of terrorism will be evaluated on their ability to select appropriate victims and target audiences, which combine to produce the intended psychological and political result. Although the contemporary literature considers the basis of terrorism to be rooted in a political-military strategy, the intent here is to dispense of the military component and thereby regard the phenomenon as first psychological and subsequently political. The psychological component considers the propaganda and the psychological warfare effects produced by an act of violence, and relates those effects to specific target audiences. The political component balances violent means to achieve ultimate political ends, whereby victims are selected and audiences are targeted in order to control for unintended consequences. Regarding the groups, the analysis combines the mainstream, dissident and united resistance strategies into a campaign of terror designed to achieve political success. Moreover, within the Jewish and Palestinian campaigns of terror each group assumed a role, either enhancing or detracting from the psychological effect and the political result. The role of the mainstream was to control, the dissidents to publicize, and the united resistance to win. The efficacy of these roles varied in both the Jewish and the Palestinian cases, while the objectives remained the same.

The terrorist's use of violence produces psychological warfare and propaganda effects that readily translate into objectives, which the terrorist has either previously anticipated or subsequently prepares to manipulate. The terrorist's rhetoric is full of grandiose military schemes that are designed to deceive the enemy and compensate for

his own material and physical disadvantages and psychological insecurity. Removing the military veneer exposes a conflict entirely psychological in nature that drives a wedge between the target regime and its constituents, and neutralizes, coopts, and builds sympathy among other populations. For the outside observer to believe in the military capability of terrorism is no great error, but for the terrorist to believe his own military rhetoric is a magnificent flaw.

It is important to note that neither psychological warfare nor propaganda have the ability to change in a single stroke belief systems and attitudes of target audiences that have taken years to form. The best use of psychological warfare and propaganda is to confirm existing beliefs, highlighting inconsistencies, thereby enhancing the positive and exploiting the negative. The essence of psychological warfare and propaganda is the truth. The terrorist act may psychologically confuse or deceive his audiences, but once the smoke clears from the violent episode the truth must be on the terrorist's side. Furthermore, since violence is the terrorist's only means of communication, then the dissemination of that message must have a clearly defined source.

The identification of the source is more critical to propaganda than it is to psychological warfare. As discussed above, psychological warfare targets the will of the enemy, whereby the source of violence is generally understood. Terrorist propaganda, on the other hand, is more effective when the dissemination of fear has a

clearly identifiable source.¹⁷ Essentially, the terrorist must speak with one voice, more than one or none at all, distorts the propaganda message. However, there is an exception. In those instances when the act of terror is designed to appeal to the terrorist's constituency or potential sympathizers, the source does not have to be clearly defined. Nonetheless, neither the Jews nor the Palestinians could achieve their desired political objectives without propagandizing their campaign beyond their national audiences. Therefore, success of the Jewish and Palestinian campaigns hinged on not only their ability to propagandize their national audiences, but international audiences as well. All considered, the efficacy of terrorism hinges on a psychological strategy of terrorism that exploits the psychological warfare and propaganda effects to achieve a political result. The success or failure of Jewish and Palestinian terrorism can only be understood by viewing their campaigns of terror through the prism of psychological operations.

¹⁷Classification of propaganda includes shades of white, grey, and black: white propaganda is disseminated and acknowledged by the sponsor or by an accredited agency; grey propaganda is not specifically identified with any source; and black propaganda is identified with a source other than the true one to mislead the target audience. Considering terrorism as propaganda and psychological warfare does not warrant a conventional interpretation for its employment. Terrorism attempts to make maximum gains with limited resources, therefore to confuse the audiences is a waste of resources. US Army, *Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures* FM 33-1-1 (Coordinating Draft-November 1992): p. 14-3.

D. THE ORGANIZATION OF THIS STUDY

Accordingly, the remainder of this study examines the Jewish and Palestinian resistance through the prism of psychological operations. As such, the analysis considers the Jewish and Palestinian terrorists' operational environment, the terrorists themselves as the source of violent communication, the characteristics of the target of violence and its connection to the other audiences either directly or indirectly involved in the process of terror, and then comparatively analyzes each of cases. A general description of each chapter is provided below.

Chapter II, *The Environment*, comparatively analyzes the Jewish and the Palestinian resistance within the context of their unique historical circumstances that either constrained or benefitted the effectiveness of the terrorism. The chapter is broken down into four sections. The first section discusses the technological innovations that provided the Jewish and the Palestinian terrorists the means to wage their campaigns of terror. Essentially, I argue that the technological differences between the two periods were relative, because independent of available technologies the terrorists had to device a strategy consistent with the social, political, and economic circumstances during that period in history. For instance, while the technological innovations available to the Palestinians undoubtedly made the conduct of international terrorism more feasible, at the same time these innovations made the environment infinitely more complex. In the absence of these technologies, the Jewish terrorists had to device other means to communicate their cause to international

audiences; either going to more extreme lengths to shock or devising less violent alternatives.

Section two of Chapter II comparatively analyzes the impact of urbanization on terrorism, which inevitably provided the terrorist greater access to targets of violence, the media, other target audiences, and made the social, political, and economic structures of the modern state more vulnerable to the impact of extranormal acts of terror. Section three examines the social dimension of terrorism, consisting of the historical circumstances that justified the use of violence as a means of influencing political change and the ability of the Jewish and Palestinian constituencies to condone such violent methods. The final section of Chapter II examines the international dimension of terrorism relative to Jewish and Palestinian cases. Essentially, this section brings into focus the diffuse character of terrorism, whereby the act of violence becomes a transnational phenomenon. This reflects the contagion or competitive aspects of terrorism that detract from the clarity of the violent message. For instance, while both the Jewish and the Palestinian campaigns of terror operated during periods when access to the media was complicated by competing international events (e.g., World War II and post-war reconstruction for the Jews, and Vietnam and Soviets in Czechoslovakia for the Palestinians), only in the Palestinian case do we observe a multitude of terrorist groups using violence to place their cause on the forefront of the international agenda. Finally, Chapter II concludes with a brief discussion of the non-violent mechanisms exploitable by the terrorists, which aid in creating predispositions among potential supporters that help frame the image of the terrorist's violent message.

Considering terrorism as a psychological operation requires a discussion of all the psychological aspects of the phenomenon. Moreover, as a means of communication, the analysis must include the source. Therefore, Chapter III, *Considering the Source*, introduces the psychological characteristics of the individual terrorists and the terrorist groups comparing both the Jewish and the Palestinian cases. The analysis of the profiles of the Jewish and the Palestinian terrorists demonstrates that these individuals were not a bunch of psycho-paths who enjoyed blowing up things or killing lots of people. In fact, the most common characteristic of the terrorists was their extranormality. In most cases, they were extremely well educated and had a rational grasp of the present situation. In both the Jewish and the Palestinian cases, the formation of the terrorist groups provided the organizational means to achieve instrumental ends. Moreover, the terrorist group committed to violent example was the most appropriate alternative given the existing political and social circumstances. Chapter III does not examine in any depth the organizational function of the group except to mention both the Jewish and the Palestinian terrorists' concern for imprisoned comrades.

Chapter III concludes with the establishment of a typology of the Jewish and the Palestinian resistance. The purpose of the typology is to illustrate the similarities and differences relative to each of the cases and to highlight any potential idiosyncracies that may account for the Jewish success. Furthermore, the groups are sub-divided into mainstream and dissident factions and the united resistance. The mainstream groups were the Jewish Haganah and the Palestinian al-Fatah. Representative of the principle

Palestinian dissident groups were the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the PFLP-General Command, and the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP). The Jewish dissidents were the Irgun and the Stern Gang. The united resistance is a misleading label, because in neither the Jews nor the Palestinians formed a united front on all aspects of the armed struggle. The united resistance was essentially a movement by all terrorist groups to internationalize the plight of their oppressed peoples during the same time period. In the Jewish case this was the "single serious incident" and the Palestinian case this was Munich. Furthermore, each group is broken down according to where they line up ideologically and politically in order to better understand their goals and the constituencies they appealed to.

Chapter IV, *Methodology*, discusses the analytical components which will be used to evaluate the Jewish and the Palestinian acts of terror in the subsequent two chapters. Accordingly, Chapter's V and VI, examine first the Jewish resistance and second the Palestinian resistance. It is beyond the scope of this inquiry to analyze all the acts of terrorism committed by either of the two Resistance movements. Therefore, I have selected four from each in order to demonstrate the impact of psychological warfare and propaganda on multiple target audiences. Ultimately, the true test of the effectiveness of either Jewish or Palestinian terrorism rested on the ability of the audiences' to respond favorably to the terrorists' cause. As will be shown, Jewish terrorism was instrumental in creating a favorable response, whereas Palestinian terrorism did not achieve a similar result. As a psychological operation, Jewish

terrorism assaulted the psychological battlefield along a dual axis; on the local axis, the target of violence generated a psychological warfare effect on the targets of terror and demands, and on the international axis, the target of violence produced a propaganda effect on the targets of attention and opportunity. By contrast, Palestinian terrorism assaulted the psychological battlefield along a single axis, generally provoking a psychological warfare effect on all target audiences, except for collateral propaganda effects on their own community and other terrorist groups. In other words, the Palestinian terrorists' indiscriminate selection of targets of violence created a real or perceived fear among the targets of attention and opportunity due to their high level of identification with the victim. Consequently, a comparison of the Jewish and Palestinian terrorism reveals the implications of the psychological impact of acts of violence on multiple audiences. Terrorism is a psychological operation that consists of two effects--one propaganda and the other psychological warfare--and communicates a political message to multiple target audiences, whose response dictates the success or failure of the operation.

II. THE ENVIRONMENT

The intent of the following section is to bring into focus how terrorism was possible relative to the conditions unique to each period. I will argue that despite the twenty plus years that separated the Jewish and Palestinian cases, similar conditions benefitted the possible existence and effectiveness of terrorism within each historic period. Martha Crenshaw, Paul Wilkinson, and Alex Schmid suggest that the existence of permissive factors--modernization, urbanization, social facilitation, and government inability or unwillingness to prevent terrorism--creates an environment in which the manifestation of political violence is most common. Nonetheless, this conventional interpretation of those factors that make terrorism possible are too abstract for the purposes of this inquiry. Therefore, I intend to add that while terrorism's effectiveness was enhanced by changes in the external environment, it also created a more complex environment within which to communicate its violent message. The basis of this conclusion considers the relative balance of forces that constrained the use of terrorism as a viable means of political expression consistent with each period in history. The constraints are those forces external to the group that complicate its ability to wage a campaign of terror: such as, the complexity of the environment, a lack of sophisticated technologies necessary to enhance a campaign of terror, and other competing groups or events. There are limitations as well, which are those conditions internal to the group

that restrict its ability to operate.¹ While important, limitations reflect group and organizational dynamics, which will be briefly discussed in the next chapter.

Ultimately, the possible existence and effectiveness of terrorism depends on conditions external to it.

Therefore, I will add those conditions that constrain the possibility of terrorism to the conventional wisdom's preconditions in order to establish a more realistic interpretation of the Jewish and Palestinian terrorist campaigns. Beneficial conditions include certain external events, developments, or popular modes, which may make the possibility of a terrorist campaign more likely. Crenshaw suggests that terrorism becomes possible when certain "preconditions" or "permissive causes" are present. She provides four preconditions, three of which will serve as points of reference for the remaining discussion of how terrorism may be possible during a given period. These preconditions include: modernization, urbanization, national social facilitation, and transnational communication.²

A government's inability to totally extinguish a terrorist minority for fear of popular alienation as a consequence of an indiscriminate campaign of counter-terror is Crenshaw's fourth precondition. She and other analysts of terrorism conclude that

¹One could argue that terrorism is also "limited" by external political and social mechanisms, i.e. the former Soviet Union. However, for the purposes of this discussion limitations are internal to the terrorist organization and constraints are external impediments to the terrorist groups operational ability.

²Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," *Comparative Politics* 13 (July 1981): pp. 381-383. For a review of Crenshaw's interpretation: Alex Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988), p. 117. See also E.V. Walter, *Terror and Resistance* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 340-343.

liberal democracies are typically constrained in the security measures they can impose, whereby at the expense of reducing civil liberties the costs of an effective campaign of counter-terror are too high.³ While this may in fact be true, it does not categorically fit the situations in Mandate Palestine or the Israeli-occupied territories after 1967. I find it difficult to conclude that the British administration of the Mandate and the Israeli occupied control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip as anything resembling fullfledged democracy, therefore each of the occupying authorities could expend the means of effective of counter-terrorism without exceeding the costs of a legitimate democracy in their home territory. Accordingly, each occupying authorities did impose collective measures that substantially reduced civil liberties; martial law, curfews, and cordon and search operations.⁴ Therefore, Mandate Palestine and the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip were "garrison states," which provided the occupying authorities the ability to impose penalties on the local population with scant reference to democratic principle.⁵ However, in both instances terrorism had a peculiar way of

³The historical record indicates that terrorism has been wholly ineffective at toppling democracies, however more often than not terrorism provokes democratic states to implement right wing initiatives in order to curb terrorist violence (i.e. Uruguay and Argentina). See Martha Crenshaw (ed.), "Introduction: Reflections on the Effects of Terrorism," *Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, nd.).

⁴During the Arab Revolt (1936-1939), the British administration imposed regulations authorizing arrest and search without warrant, deportation, occupation of buildings, seizure and use of vehicles, and the imposition of curfews and censorship. Furthermore, severe penalties were imposed for firing on police and troops, bomb throwing, and illegal possession of arms. J.C. Hurewitz, *The Struggle for Palestine* (NY: W.W. Norton, 1950), p. 69. For similar British emergency measures during the Jewish Revolt (1944-1948): Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, p. 151. For a similar discussion of the Israeli counter-terror campaign in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Bard E. O'Neill, *Armed Struggle in Palestine: A Political-Military Analysis* (CO: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 90-102.

⁵For more on the garrison state in Mandate Palestine: J. Boyer Bell, *Terror Out of Zion: Irgun Zvai Leumi, LEHI, and the Palestine Underground, 1929-1949* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), p. 153; and Gordon Rayford, *The Righteous Executioner: A Comparative Analysis of Jewish Terrorists of the 1940s and the Palestinian Terrorists of the 1970s* (New York: City University Ph.D. Dissertation, 1980), p. 192. For the Israeli-

highlighting the contradictions of undemocratic measures imposed by the occupying authorities to their home constituencies (examined more in chapters five and six).

Crenshaw goes on to distinguish between what she calls "permissive causes" and "direct causes," whereby the former set the stage for terrorism and the latter instigate violence against the state. She contends that the instigating circumstances (direct causes) go beyond merely creating an environment in which terrorism is possible, they provide motivation and direction for the terrorist movement. Moreover, she adds, whereas the preconditions (modernization, urbanization, social facilitation) present opportunities for terrorism, background conditions provide the reasons for violence against the state; they essentially precipitate the violence. She identifies four background conditions which include: concrete grievances, the lack of opportunity for political participation, an elite power struggle, and a precipitating event. Nonetheless, I find it difficult to separate these background conditions from the preconditions in general and the social facilitation in particular.

The permissive causes set the stage for terrorism, framing its operational parameters. Therefore, within these parameters manifest the "direct causes" that instigate the violence against the state. It will not categorically divide this section into preconditions and causes, because it makes more sense to mention direct causes when the preconditions are set. For example, the existence of popular grievances against the state suggests a weakness in the modernization process, whereby the rewards of

occupied territories: Hanon Alon, *Countering Palestinian Terrorism in Israel: Toward a Policy of Countermeasures*, N-1567-FF (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, August 1980), pp. 71-81.

modernity are insufficiently distributed to unsatisfied sectors of the population. This grieving and unsatisfied sector of the population contains an elite minority willing to be the vanguard of their cause. Finding themselves deprived of a legitimate political means to express their grievances, they are inclined to more radical behavior; demonstrations, protests, riots and sabotage. The government's repression of the grieving minority's radical behavior serves as the precipitating event that gives terrorism its origin. Although this oversimplifies the actions that might cause an outbreak of terrorism, it does illustrate that the preconditions and the direct causes are so intertwined that it is difficult to distinguish between the two.

To make this clear I will use the permissive causes of modernization and urbanization to set the stage for the Jewish and the Palestinian brand of terror during each historical period; 1944-1948 for the former and 1968-1974 for the latter. While modernization encompasses a broad range of social, political, and economic changes, the discussion will focus specifically on technological differences relative to each period. As a consequence of modernization, the section on urbanization is devoted to the benefits and the opportunities the urban environment provides the terrorist. This will provide the background for the final permissive cause of terrorism--social facilitation. Within the framework of social facilitation, I will discuss the instigating circumstances for the use of violence against the occupying authority. There are a multitude of events that precede the outbreak of terrorism and it seems more a matter of opinion than historical fact as to which event or condition was the most influential regarding the outbreak of terrorism. My intent is not to pass historical judgement--I

will reference those who have--but to provide a sketch of the operational environments that benefitted and constrained terrorism during two distinct historical periods. I have put my own personal twist on Crenshaw's framework, not because it is inadequate, but because it must provide the reader an appreciation of the operational environments confronted by the Jewish and the Palestinian terrorists. As an administrative note, when mentioned: Palestine will reflect 1944 to 1948 and Israel 1967 to 1974 in order to categorize the periods examined.

A. TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND ITS IMPACT ON TERRORISM

Both Jewish and Palestinian terrorists were products of the modernization. The ability of each to wage a campaign of terror was reflective of the output of modernization manifest during that specific period in history. Increased levels of modernization produce benefits that create political, social, economic, and military capital for the state. The state retains those benefits that strengthen its hold on power, and allocates the remaining benefits relative to the needs of individual constituencies. The aspiring terrorist is typically at the end of the line awaiting his beneficial portion of modernization. Consequently, the aspiring terrorist is one of many consumers demanding the benefits of modernization, which are largely independent of the terrorist's needs or actions. Relegated to a consumer, the aspiring terrorist is thus at the whims of the level of modernization manifest during that particular historic moment. Therefore, we should expect nothing more of the terrorist than modernization can

provide, because it is he who decides how to maximize the means of modernization to achieve specific ends.

Undoubtedly, modern societies provide the aspiring terrorist with greater access to targets of vulnerability and the means to wage a devastating campaign of terror. The modern society with its vast array of communication and transportation networks, centralized administrations, bureaucracies, specialization, industrialization, and reliance on public works is more easily disrupted than more traditional social settings. As Crenshaw points out, Noble's invention of dynamite in 1867 provided the aspiring terrorist the technological means of destruction previously unimaginable.⁶ Therefore, the advent of modern industrial society and technological innovations provided the aspiring terrorist vulnerable targets and a means to destroy the same. By bombing an electrical generating facility for instance, the modern terrorist could black-out an entire city or suburban area disrupting the lives of many millions of people. By contrast, traditional societies lack such elaborate infrastructures vulnerable to similar acts of terrorist sabotage. Consequently, the terrorist's impact is more localized in traditional societies. Moreover, while terrorism in both modern and traditional societies can be devastating, only in the former can the terrorist achieve a broader and more pervasive impact. I only point out the differences between traditional and modern societies to illustrate that there are levels of modernization, and it is this level that forms the

⁶Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," p. 382. For a studies of the anthology of terrorism refer: Albert Parry, *Terrorism: From Robespierre to Arafat* (NY: The Vanguard Press, 1976); Lewis Gann, *Guerrillas in History* (CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1971); and Walter Laqueur, *The Age of Terrorism* (MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1987).

terrorists operational parameters. The terrorist is a product of his environment, modern or otherwise. He is presented with more or less vulnerable targets and more or less available means to inflict damage on those targets. His modernization parallels the environment's modernization.

The most profound difference between the case studies regarding levels of modernization was the more numerous networks of transportation and communication and lethal weapon systems available to the Palestinians. The improvements in communications, transportation, and weapons technologies provided the aspiring Palestinian terrorist a greater means of publicity, mobility and destruction than was possessed by his Jewish predecessor. The modern technologies of jet airliners, televised communications, and surface-to-air missiles provided the aspiring Palestinian terrorist the ability to fly to Turkey one morning, shoot down an aircraft from a concealed location outside Istanbul by mid-day, and catch a return flight to Lebanon that afternoon and watch news footage of the destroyed the aircraft on the evening news in a Beirut hotel. By contrast, an aspiring Jewish terrorist hardly conceived of such international operations, and when considered, the ocean liner or cargo ship was the most sophisticated means of regular international transportation available, and shooting down an aircraft was out of the question. Furthermore, the daily newspaper was as sophisticated as the media coverage got during the Jewish campaign of terror. Table 2-1 below illustrates the technological differences between the two periods.

TABLE 2-1
A COMPARISON OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS,
(1944 vs 1967)

	Zionists	Palestinians
Communications	Wireless telegraph, light signals, carrier pigeons, courier service (children), clandestine AM radio (2), cinema, mail service, manual typewriters, black and white photography	Telephone, infrared signals, diplomatic pouch, clandestine AM-FM radio, television, walkie talkies, CB radios, electric typewriters, computers, color photography.
Transportation	<i>International:</i> diesel engine cargo ships and ocean liners, 2 or 4 radial air cooled engines propeller driven aircraft: 1940 340 commercial aircraft world-wide (Boeing 247Ds, McDonald-Douglas DC2-3) <i>Domestic:</i> stolen taxis and buses, Desotos, Packards, Model-Ts, single speed bicycles, two motorcycle, steam locomotives	<i>International:</i> nuclear propulsion ocean cruise liners (and hydrofoils), turbine powered subsonic aircraft in 1969, the US alone possessed 2,200 commercial aircraft (Boeing 747, McDonald-Douglas DC8-10) <i>Domestic:</i> unlimited military and civilian vehicles (MG, Volkswagen, Mustang, Cutlass), multiple speed bicycles, racing motorcycles, diesel-electric locomotives
Merchant Shipping	1939: 69,404,000 tons	1971: 247,303,000
Weapons	1944: Home-made mortars, 30 rifles, 1 Bren-machinegun, 60 pistols, Sten guns, V-3 rocket bomb; less than a ton of explosives including nitroglycerin and TNT. 1947: 700 arms including the Thompson sub-machinegun and the M1 Carbine, and 5 tons of explosives.	Unlimited arms and ammunition: Czech made VZ-58V assault rifle, Kalashnikov Soviet AK-47, Beretta Model 12 Submachine gun, 82mm mortars, RPG-2 grenade launchers, RPG-18 anti-tank rocket, and various pistols (Beretta, Browning Marakov), Strela Soviet made SA-7, RPG-7 anti-tank rocket

Sources: The above was compiled from the bibliographical sources cited in the body of the text. This is not a complete list by any means, but it does give some indication of the differences between the two periods. Unfortunately, there is no single source that lays these assets out completely, however the *Encyclopedia Britannica* does cover the historical development of transportation, which demonstrates its development. Refer to Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, *The Terrorists: Their Weapons, Leaders, and Tactics* (New York: Facts on File, Inc, 1982) for a description of the types of weapons.

Nonetheless, these more sophisticated means available to the Palestinians are not sufficient cause to conclude that the possibility of campaign of terror was a more viable option for the them than the Jews during a less sophisticated or technologically

advanced period. The means available are the product of the given historical moment. Whereby, the Jews made do with less sophisticated technologies, or none at all comparable to those later available to the Palestinians. Moreover, similar technologies were available to those that opposed the manifestation of terrorism as well. Thus, while the increased levels of modernization provided the Palestinians a greater access to more vulnerable targets, mobility and publicity, these were mere tactical considerations which if exploited improperly might well lead to strategic failure.⁷ Paradoxically, modernization provided the aspiring terrorist more tools of the trade, vulnerable components, and access to critics.

All considered, increased levels of modernization may not have created an environment advantageous to Palestinian terrorism, because as the environment became more modern there were more pieces to consider within the strategic calculus. Simply, Palestine was less modern than Israel. While this is an obvious statement and perhaps oversimplifies the conditions under which the Jews operated, it puts into perspective the complex world the Palestinians had to calculate. Accordingly, the Jews had to devise a campaign of terror within the parameters of modernization dictated by the historic moment. Modernization provided the aspiring terrorists opportunities and

⁷For an interesting discussion of the impact of modernization on terrorism: Gabriel Ben-Dor, "The Strategy of Terrorism in the Arab-Israel Conflict: The Case of the Palestinian Guerrillas," In Yair Evron (ed.), *International Violence: Terrorism, Surprise and Control* (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1979), p. 136. Ben-Dor argues that the terrorist's dependence on the technological benefits of modern society relates to the law of "diminishing returns," as dependence on supplies, guns, and missiles increases so does the terrorists visibility and need for sanctuary. Essentially, the terrorist unwittingly sacrifices the security of anonymity for a conventional benefit of greater technological advanced weapons systems and the tactics that correspond with those weapon systems.

vulnerable targets unique to their operational environment. The challenge for both the aspiring Jewish and Palestinian terrorists was to translate the factors of modernization, as available means, into an equation consistent with the given period and appropriate for the ends desired. A comparison of these two cases reveals that as the level of modernization increased so too does the complexity of opportunities. Moreover, with greater access to the more vulnerable targets and benefits of publicity available through more modern communications, the terrorist's violence, once localized, has taken on a life of its own producing intended and unintended consequences. Therefore, modernization in and of itself is not a sufficient cause of terrorism, because there are a host of interrelated facts that further contribute to the possible existence and potential effectiveness of modernity's techno-terrorism.

B. TERRORISM ON LOCATION

As a consequence of modernization, the growth and expanse of the modern city provides the modern terrorist with an increase in the number and the accessibility of targets and methods of terror. The urban area has become the center of government, commerce, industry, and social and cultural life in the modern society. In 1936 for example, seventy percent of the Jewish population in Palestine lived in Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem, with the remaining thirty percent clustered in nearby agricultural settlements. By the late 1960s, the Middle East was second to Latin America in urban

growth.⁸ The cumulative effects of modernization, industrialization, and centralization of governments have made the urban center the locus of the state's political, economic, and social well-being. Unlike Europe, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, the aspiring terrorist in the Middle East in general and Palestine-Israel in particular does and did not have a rural option. The region's expansive desert area limits the aspiring terrorist to the city. The city is both his battlefield and sanctuary. There, his security depends on anonymity, the cohesion of a minority dedicated to violent action, and a constituency sympathetic to such an example.

Access to the media is perhaps the greatest benefit a campaign of urban terror can provide the aspiring terrorist. The spectacular and lethal nature of a terrorist act provides the media with hard-copy of the latest in gore and devastation that shock and amaze the popular mind.⁹ The lack of censored press enables the terrorist through "propaganda of the deed" to transmit his message to multiple reading and viewing audiences. Acts of violence on the periphery or rural areas rarely receive the media attention comparable to similar acts conducted within the confines of urban metros. However, media access is not a sufficient cause for terrorism's favor of the urban option, it is simply a benefit unique to the environment.

⁸Abdulaziz Y. Saqqaf (ed.), *The Middle East City: Ancient Traditions Confront a Modern World* (New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1987).

⁹Alex Schmid points out an interesting difference, an act of terrorism committed in the 1940s took 12 hours to be reported in an international newspaper, whereas in the mid-1960s a similar act of terrorism would take seconds to make the headlines or the television screen: Alex Schmid and Janny de Graaf, *Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media* (CA: Sage Publications, 1982), p. 17

P.N. Grabosky states that "cities are a significant cause of terrorism in that they provide an opportunity (a multitude of targets, mobility, communications, anonymity, and audiences) and a recruiting ground among the politicized and volatile inhabitants."¹⁰ Thus, Grabosky suggests that there is a positive relationship between the level of urbanization and opportunities for terrorism. However, this reasoning does not consider the relationship between relative levels of urbanization and opportunities for terrorism. For instance, while Palestine was less urban than Israel, the Jews were no less opportunistic than the Palestinian's use of terrorism in a more urbanized world. Opportunities were less a function of the number of cities and more a function of access to those cities and the repressive strength of the occupying authorities. The Jews transplanted their terrorist campaign from the Warsaw ghetto to the streets of Jerusalem, whereas the Palestinian terrorists began their campaign from Israel's periphery to the cities of Cairo, Damascus, Amman, and Beirut. All considered, urbanization exists somewhere within the modernization process, during which, greater methods and access to more vulnerable targets of terror are available to the aspiring terrorist.

C. NATIONALIST JUSTIFICATION AND TOLERANCE OF TERRORISM

Crenshaw uses Gurr's concept of social facilitation as the third "precondition" for terrorism, focusing on national motives and justification for political violence. She

¹⁰Cited in Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," p. 382; P.N. Grabosky, "The Urban Context of Political Terrorism," In Michael Stohl, (ed.), *The Politics of Terrorism* (New York: M. Dekker, 1979), pp. 51-76.

contends that social facilitation is a dynamic force that brings about civil strife. Moreover, social facilitation reflects how a particular social group communicates its grievances to the authority, whereby the "social habits and historical traditions that sanction the use of violence against the government, making it morally and politically justifiable, and even dictating the appropriate form, such as demonstrations, coups, or terrorism (assassination)." Crenshaw contends therefore that social myths, traditions, and habits permit the development of terrorism as an established political custom.¹¹ Accordingly, she notes the Irish tradition of resistance, dating back to the eighteenth century, is manifested in the present by IRA-Provisional perpetual existence as a terrorist organization. While compelling and based on empirical analysis in the field of social-psychology, it is not my intent fully explore the traditional justifications for the Jewish and Palestinian use of terrorism except to mention their unique differences.

1. The Facilitation of Jewish Terrorism

Jewish political Zionism initially supported diplomatic means as the preferred course to political change, but as time progressed terrorism became a more viable alternative.¹² The wave of European anti-semitism that escalated from the late

¹¹Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," p. 382. and Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism and the Liberal State* (London: MacMillan, 1977), p. 96.

¹²Theodore Herzl's book *The Jewish State* politicized the European Jewish community by highlighting the rampant anti-semitism raging through Europe. In 1897, Theodore Herzl convened the World Zionist Congress in Basle Switzerland, whereby the foundations of the World Zionist Organization established the initial motives to "create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine." Don Peretz, *The Middle East Today*, 2d Ed. (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1971), pp. 247-249.

19th Century through the early 20th Century culminating in Hitler's Holocaust¹³ radicalized those Jews directly targeted by these pogroms. Furthermore, the 1920, 1921, 1929, and 1936 to 1939 Arab uprisings in Palestine focused on the immigrating Jewish community as well (refer Appendix A, table A-3 for Jewish casualties). The combined impact of these incidents created a level of civil strife sufficient to consider terrorism as a means of political expression. However, terrorism was not necessarily the best alternative, because the Jews in general and the Zionists in particular still hoped that the British would fulfill their promise of creating a Jewish national home as expressed in the Balfour Declaration.¹⁴ Despite the level of Jewish civil strife, the Jewish leadership feared that history might repeat itself, whereby the Zealot revolt against the Roman occupier that concluded in a bloody civil war and no political solution may again confront the modern day Zealots in their quest for a national home.¹⁵ Therefore, fearful of history repeating itself, the Jews guarded terrorism as a viable alternative of influencing political change against the potential forces of terrorist violence that could provoke a civil war.

On 17 May 1939, the British issued a White Paper that favored Arab demands: restricting of land sales to the immigrating Jews, reducing Jewish

¹³Refer Table A-2, located Appendix A.

¹⁴On 2 November 1917, the Balfour Declaration (letter from Arthur James Balfour of the British Foreign Office to Lord Rothschild) stated that the British supported "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people," while protecting the rights of the indigenous non-Jewish communities. Walter Laqueur (ed.), *The Arab-Israeli Reader*, 3d Ed. (New York: Bantam Books, 1976), p. 17.

¹⁵David C. Rapoport, "Terror and the Messiah: An Ancient Experience and Some Modern Parallels," In David C. Rapoport and Yonah Alexander (eds.), *The Morality of Terrorism: Religious and Secular Justifications* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), p. 31.

immigration quota to 15,000/year over the next five years, and establishing a 10 year target for the creation of a Palestinian state.¹⁶ The White Paper reduced Jewish immigration to Palestine during a time when it was most needed.¹⁷ Undoubtedly, a continued flow of Jewish immigrants was essential to the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine, but the indications were that the Britain had every intention of enforcing the White Paper and Hitler's persecution of German and Austrian Jews saw no end.¹⁸ Consequently, these events precipitated the wave of attacks against British efforts to control immigration. As Mardor states the White Paper forced the Haganah (the Jewish defense force) "to rid itself of all squeamishness about the use of arms."¹⁹ Nonetheless, terrorism was merely a tactic at this point in the Jewish struggle against the British, less violent alternatives remained. The combination of Germany's defeat of Poland in September 1939 and the fall of France in May 1940 led the Jews to rescind their anti-British campaign. David Ben-Gurion announced:

¹⁶Robert B. Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History*, Vol. II (New York: Doubleday, 1975), 769. For an in-depth discussion of the social and political implications of the White Paper: Hurewitz, *The Struggle for Palestine*, pp. 94-111.

¹⁷1935 was the highest year of Jewish immigration, 61,405. During the Arab Revolt (1936-1939), Jewish immigration totalled 69,536 for the four year period. For more information on Jewish immigration refer Table A-3. Walid Khalidi (ed.), *From Haven to Conquest* (Washington, DC: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987), pp. 841-842. See Appendix A, Table A-5.

¹⁸Chaim Weizman and David Ben-Gurion, leaders of the World Zionist Organization and Jewish Agency (the quasi-Jewish government in Palestine) respectively, believed that a Jewish state would be created on an immigrant-by-immigrant process. Menachem Begin, *The Revolt: The Story of the Irgun* (New York: Shuman, 1951), p. 47; and Hurewitz, *The Struggle for Palestine*, p. 77.

¹⁹Munya M. Mardor, *Haganah*, edited by D.R. Elston (New York: The New American Library, 1957), p. 30. The Haganah, a secret militia, had been formed in the early 1920s to defend Jewish settlements against Arab attacks. By 1936, it was recognized by the British as a legal force to assist in the continued defense of the Jewish population during the Arab Revolt [refer: J.C. Hurewitz, *Struggle for Palestine* (NY: W.W. Norton, 1950), p. 42].

The Jews of Palestine happen to be the only community in the Middle East whose very survival is bound up with the defeat of Hitler. We shall fight the war as if there were no White Paper; and the White Paper as if there were no war.²⁰

While the mainstream Haganah curtailed its anti-British activities, a breakaway faction emerged that was less willing to cease activities. The dissident Irgun agreed to limit its attacks against the British, which translated into a limited campaign of arms raids and bank robberies. Avraham Stern, a leader in the Irgun, believed that the Haganah and the Irgun had sold out, that the Jewish homeland would not be given, but had to be won. He was convinced that "the British, as foreign occupier, was the target...and Britain's concessions to the Arabs and restrictions on the Jews," were his proof.²¹ The result was the Stern Gang or the Lehi, which committed itself to a campaign of personal terror against the occupying British authority.

From May 1940 to January 1944, the Irgun continued its organizing activities, while the Stern Gang waged its campaign of personal terror by killing British police and intelligence officers. In November 1943, the World Zionist Organization met at New York's Biltmore Hotel and established the Biltmore Program which essentially called for the creation of a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine. The Biltmore Program also called for an increase in immigration amid news of Hitler's concentration camps. The British denounced the Biltmore Program and remained committed to enforcing the "closed gates" policy of the 1939 White Paper. The British

²⁰Barnet Litvinoff, *To the House of Their Fathers: A History of Zionism* (New York: Praeger Press, 1965), p. 223.

²¹J. Boyer Bell, *Terror Out of Zion* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), p. 63.

steadfast refusal to accept the Zionist's proposals combined with the concrete evidence of civil strife caused the dissidents to ally. In January 1944, the Irgun and Stern Gang formed a tacit-alliance in open revolt against the British administration. These circumstances precipitated the Jewish wave of terrorism, both dissident and mainstream, that would eventually influence British occupier to leave and create a Jewish home.

2. Palestinian Facilitation of Terrorism

By comparison, a diplomatic resolution to the plight of the Palestinian peoples was inconceivable given circumstances. Neither the Israeli occupier nor the Arab hosts of the Palestinian diaspora were willing to release their claim to all or part of Palestine. Consequently, one of the mechanisms used by the Palestinian resistance to legitimize their historic claim to Palestine was propagandizing the myth of the Arab guerrilla. While Christopher Dobson and others date the mythical origins of Palestinian terrorism back to two distinct periods, this obscures an objective appraisal of the use of violence as a means of political expression. For instance, the exploits of the Palestinian Black September organization are somehow reflective of the Hashish tribe (the Assassins) of the 11th Century, which operating in groups as small as three or four, assassinated local elites as a means of influencing political change.²² More recently, the historical traditions of Yasir Arafat's al-Fatah originated from the Grand

²²Christopher Dobson, *Black September: It Short, Violent History* (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1974), pp. 5-6. and Ovid Demaris, *Brothers in Blood: The International Terrorist Network* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1977), pp. 121-123.

Mufti of Jerusalem Haj Amin el Husseini in the 1920s.²³ The Mufti's fida'is (fedawi or fedayeen)²⁴ waged a campaign of terror against the other local Arab elites, the Jewish community, and the British Administration during the Mandate period (1922-1948). Furthermore, terrorism as a traditional means of influencing political change was not a strategy solely unique to the Palestinian people. As John Laffin's interview with a Libyan cabinet minister reveals, "violence is the muslim's most positive form of prayer."²⁵ Consequently, Dobson and others would lead use to believe that from the 11th Century to the Arab uprisings in the 1920s to the revolt against the British and immigrating Jews in the 1930s, terrorism became a morally and politically sanctioned means of opposing a government or occupying power.²⁶

Yet, the fact is that the combination of British counter-terror efforts during the Arab rebellion (1936-1939) and the Israeli systematic evacuation of the indigenous Palestinian population during the 1948-49 Arab-Israeli War devastated the remnants of

²³Yasir Arafat's (Abu Ammar) mother was a Husseini and he himself was born in Jerusalem. His real name is Abd el-Rahman Abd el-Rauf Arafat el-Qudwa el-Husseini. For Arafat's biographical information: Thomas Kiernan, *Arafat: The Man and the Myth* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976); Janet and John Wallace, *Arafat: In the Eye of the Beholder* (New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1990), pp. 3-112; Andrew Gowers and Tony Walker, *Behind the Myth: Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Revolution* (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1991), pp. 5-22.

²⁴*fedawi* means devoted one and *fedayeen* (fida'iyyin), one who sacrifices or goes on a suicide mission. The contemporary myth of the fedayeen originates in the Arab guerrilla attacks on Israel in the 1950s.

²⁵Cited in: Ovid Demaris, *Brothers in Blood* p. 120.

²⁶Arabs see great symbolism in this carrying out the fight from one generation to the next: as exemplified by Ali Hassan Saleme, a senior intelligence officer in Al-Fatah (Razd), was the son of a legendary Palestinian leader who was killed fighting the Israelis in 1948. Accordingly, Saleme acquired much prestige from his fathers reputation and an implacable desire for revenge for his father's death. Dobson, *op cit*, p. 45.

the Palestinian political leadership.²⁷ Virtually overnight, the Palestinians became a leaderless and fragmented society, which would take a generation to recreate and consolidate. In 1949, the Palestinians, once a majority population, became a minority population in the Jewish dominated state of Israel.²⁸ Consequently, Palestinian refugee camps dotted the landscape of the Arab border states: from Egypt's Gaza Strip to Jordan's East and West Banks to southern Syria and Lebanon.²⁹ From 1949 to 1967, the Palestinians therefore were subjected to the political and military adventurism of their host governments and not entirely free to wage a campaign of terror by their own design.³⁰ Moreover, without the conventional means of "throwing Israel into the sea," the Arab border states exploited the Palestinian desires to return to their homeland by

²⁷J.C. Hurewitz, *Struggle for Palestine* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1950), pp. 112-117, 330; Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, p. 21.

²⁸Pre-1948 Palestinian population in Israel (Palestine) was 1.3 million and following the July 1949 armistice 160,000 Palestinian remained in Israel. For a detailed account of the Arab exodus from Palestine: Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-49* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

²⁹According to the UN Economic Survey (1949) the population of the refugee camps was as follows: Jordan 70,000; Lebanon 97,000; Syria 75,000; Gaza 200,000; Arab Palestine (West Bank) 280,000; Iraq 4,000; and Israel 31,000. Cited in: Dennis C. Howley, *The United Nations and the Palestinians* (NY: Exposition Press, 1975), p. 20. Refer original: *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. XXI, No. 544 (December 5, 1949), p. 847a-848a. See also Appendix B, Table B-2: Palestinian Diaspora.

³⁰There were parallel developments to consider, such as the politicization of Palestinian youth within the refugee camps as well as those within the occupied territories. By 1970, with the help of the UNRWA (United Nations Relief and World Agency) schools staffed with Palestinian teachers and the propaganda efforts of Palestinian political organizations [i.e. General Union of Palestinian Students (1959)] created over 50,000 graduates from institutions of higher learning, with an intense consciousness of their plight and a desire for action to reverse the catastrophes of 1949 and 1967. Howley, *The United Nations and the Palestinians*, p. 78; for an in-depth analysis of the political institution building of the Palestinian movement and the politicization of the Palestinian peoples, refer: Laurie Brand, *Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for State* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).

using them in an unconventional war of attrition against the Jewish colonial outpost of Western imperialism.³¹

Israel's lightning defeat of the Arab armies in the Six-Day War (June 1967) was the final step in the radicalization process of the Palestinian peoples. Prior to the June war, the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip in general and the West Bank in particular identified less with the Palestinian cause and more with their respective sovereigns; Egypt for the former and Jordan for the latter. Furthermore, many Palestinians became two-time refugees, twice forced from their homeland by the Zionist armies, and for many others it was the first time they were subjected to Israeli rule. Consequently, Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank facilitated for the inhabitants their first conclusive sense of Palestinian identity.³² Most decisive of all was the humiliation felt by the Arab states bordering Israel; the June War proved that they were incapable of driving Israel into the sea, which further elevated the Palestinian question to a higher place on the Arab and Middle East political agenda. Moreover, the Palestinian question became a central consideration in the Arab-Israeli dispute, because of the over one million Palestinians subjected to Israeli occupation in Egypt's

³¹Y. Harabi, "The Arab Slogan of a Democratic State," In Yonah Alexander and Nicholas N. Kitzie (eds.), *Crescent and Star: Arab & Israeli Perspectives on the Middle East Conflict* (New York: AMS Press, 1973), p. 28.

³²David Howley, *The United Nations and the Palestinians*, suggests that the Palestinian identity was also reflected in their literature, arts, poetry, and songs. He states a central theme has been the plight of the Palestinian refugee, his sense of injustice and his longing for a "return" to his homeland. He notes how strikingly similar this dynamic is to Zionism. Accordingly, Howley cites A.L. Tibawi's article in *Middle East Journal* (Autumn 63, p. 507-9) on Palestinian art and poetry: "There is a new Zionism in the making, an 'Arab Zionism' with the aim of returning to the homeland." Howley, p. 74. For an analysis of Zionist expression through the arts and literature see, Alfred M. Lilienthal, *Zionist Connection: What Price Peace* (New York: Dodd, Mead, & Co., 1978).

Gaza Strip and Jordan's West Bank. The stage had been set for the Palestinians to take control of the strings from their Arab host puppeteers. In sum, the Palestinian question had shifted from a peripheral to the central issue in the Arab-Israeli dispute, thereby facilitating a level of social strife conducive to the existence of terrorism.³³

All considered, from 1949 to the mid-1960s, a new generation of Palestinians developed, which was educated by the host Arab states and United Nations relief agencies and exploited by the former in its self-indulged campaign of terror against Israeli occupier. Consequently, by the mid-1960s, from the Palestinian masses emerged a leadership sufficiently educated and trained in the merits of terrorist tactics, which strove to take control of the political destiny of the Palestinian peoples and reclaim their lost territory by means of armed struggle. This emerging Palestinian leadership referred to themselves as the "Generation of Revenge," and openly denounced the "Generation of Disaster" for its failure to rid their homeland of the foreign usurper.³⁴ Consequently, an objective interpretation of those circumstances that facilitated the Palestinian use of terrorism or violence against the state indicates that their decision paralleled the Jews.

Furthermore, diplomacy was not a viable option given the involvement of Arab states in Palestinian affairs and the location of the Palestinian population outside

³³For a discussion of the effect of the Six-Day War and Arab politics: Zvi Ankori, "The Continuing Zionist Revolution," In Yonah Alexander and Nicolas N. Kittrie (eds.) *Crescent and Star: Arab & Israeli Perspectives on the Middle East Conflict* (New York: AMS Press, 1973), p. 96; and Don Peretz, *The Palestine Arab Refugee Problem*, RM-5973-FF (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, October 1969), pp. 54-64.

³⁴John Laffin, *Fedayeen: The Arab-Israeli Dilemma* (New York: The Free Press, 1973), p. 7; and Thomas Kiernan, *Yasir Arafat: the Man and the Myth* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976), p. 168.

the country of occupation. While the creation of Palestinian Liberation Organization in 1964 marked a significant change in the recognized right of a Palestinian entity to self-determination, this right addressed less the Palestinian question and more the pan-Arab desires for solidarity among the Arab states in an eventual showdown with the Zionist imperial outpost. From 1964 to the June 1967 War, the Palestinian right to a homeland in all or part of Israel (Palestine) remained an unresolved question. The humiliating defeat of the Arab armies against Israel in June 1967 provided the Palestinians their first real opportunity at unmanipulated political expression. Yet, the Israelis nor the Palestinians recognized the political existence of the other, or other's right to historic Palestine. Consequently, violence became the means of diplomatic dialogue. Furthermore, the Arab states bordering Israel continued to exert their influence over Palestinian affairs by creating their own Palestinian terrorist organizations or by providing financial or material support to Palestinian organizations previously in existence.³⁵ In sum, it is oversimplified to conclude that contemporary Palestinian terrorism is the present manifestation of a tradition of violence against authority. Palestinian terrorism is the result of complex array of political and social circumstances that fostered acts of terror as the most appropriate means to achieve the desired political ends. Like the Jews, rational strategic choice was the basis of Palestinian terrorism.

³⁵The Gulf States were the principle financiers of the Palestine Liberation Organization. For a discussion of Arab states' sponsorship and creation of Palestinian resistance groups (e.g., Syria's Al-Sa'iqa and Iraq's Arab Liberation Front): John W. Amos, *Palestinian Resistance: Organization of a Nationalist Movement* (NY: Pergamon Press, 1980), pp. 89-112.

In both cases civil violence against authority became an almost regular activity. The Jews refused to relive the catastrophe of the Zealot revolt two thousand years before, terrorism was to fit within present situational parameters or not at all. Similarly, the Palestinians sought to reverse the historical failure of the "Generation of Disaster," by seeking revenge against the Zionist occupation of their homeland.³⁶ In essence, neither Jewish nor Palestinian terrorism can be considered normative behavior, as Dobson and Laffin would lead us to believe. Both the Jews and the Palestinian used the oppressive circumstances of their respective diaspora as a moral weapon, which justified violence as a political necessity against the occupying authority in the absence of less violent alternatives. By the 20th Century, the Jewish violent opposition to authority had long since lapsed. In effect, the Jews had to recreate a strategy of terrorism, based less on historical myth and more on recent experience. The combination of military experience in the World War I and II (conventional in the former and unconventional in the latter) and defense against the Arab rebellions from 1920 to 1939 created a unique appreciation for the merits of terrorism.³⁷ Accordingly, the Jews depended less on terrorism as a means of popular identity and more as a means of achieving a political result (discussed in more detail

³⁶Jillian Becker, *The PLO: The Rise and Fall of the Palestinian Liberation Organization* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984), p. 32.

³⁷For a concise history of the Israeli Defense Force, Ze'ev Schiff, *A History of the Israeli Army* (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1985); and for a discussion of Palestinian Arab and Jewish enlistment in World War II, the latter representing the overwhelming majority: J.C. Hurewitz, *The Struggle for Palestine* (W.W. Norton, 1950), pp. 119, 128-130.

in Chapter V). By contrast, terrorism became an integral component of Palestinian (and Arab) identity and a means of achieving a political solution.

However, this image is based on political and social circumstances. For instance, if the majority of Palestinians lived under the occupied control of the Israelis (as did the Jews under British control), then the Palestinians would have had the ability to conduct non-violent dialogue with the occupying authority and simultaneously continue a campaign of terror as necessary to expedite those social and political circumstances they desired. Accordingly, the Palestinians would have depended less on terrorism as a means of popular identity and more as a means of achieving a political solution. But as it was, the Palestinians were victims of circumstances, those they perpetuated through popular myth and those imposed on them by non-Palestinian Arabs elites. Considering the contextual circumstances, the basis of Zionism was passivism, whereas the basis of Palestinian nationalism was armed struggle, which may inevitably account for their unique brands of political violence and the ultimate political result. Nonetheless, a comparison of the origins Palestinian and Jewish terrorism reveals very little without considering the relative capacity of their respective constituencies to support such violence.

3. The Popular Toleration of Political Violence

Therefore, a crucial component of the utility of terrorism during any given historical moment is the specific constituency's cultural and social predisposition toward violence as a means of challenging authority. While terrorism thrives best in a climate of social strife, its utility is contingent on a popular constituency which

regulates violence within its own social and cultural normative structures. Yet, a unique feature of terrorism is its extra-normal character, which typically exceeds the bounds of social regulation. A characteristic of both Zionist and Palestinian campaigns of terror was that each periodically exceeded the bounds of social regulation. Accordingly, E.V. Walter contends that a community's tolerance of violence reflects "socially approved coercive techniques beyond established limits...specified as legitimate or illegitimate by social definition."³⁸ In other words, terrorism generated violent acts that typically exceeded the normal standards of active political protest or "political agitation." How then does a particular society condone the use of armed violence against an apparently legitimate authority? And how did the Jewish (Yishuv) and the Palestinian communities differ in their absorptive capacity of violent acts committed by a militant fringe?

Thomas Thornton suggests that "the appropriateness of terror varies according to the degree of political support enjoyed by the terrorists [insurgents]," whereby "terror is only appropriate if the terrorists [insurgents] enjoy a low level of actual political support but have a high potential for such support."³⁹ Both the Zionist and the Palestinian terrorists possessed a high potential for political support from their respective constituencies. In spite of this, however, the degree of actual political

³⁸Eugene V. Walter, *Terror and Resistance* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 23. For more on the social threshold of violence: R.D. Crenstein, "Terrorism as Political Communication: The Relationship between Controller and the Controlled," In P. Wilkinson and A.M. Stewart (eds.) *Contemporary Research on Terrorism* (MD: Aberdeen University Press, 1987), pp. 3-23.

³⁹Thomas P. Thornton, "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation," In Harry Eckstein (ed.) *Internal War* (CT: Greenwood Press, 1964), p. 74.

support enjoyed by the terrorists was often negated by the consequences of their violent acts. Terrorism typically provoked the occupying authority to administer repressive measures against the entire community instead of targeting only those known to be sympathetic to the terrorists.⁴⁰ In order to protect themselves from the authority's reprisals, each community, Jewish or Palestinian, tolerated violence to a certain level. Once this threshold was broken the citizens, who previously condoned armed violence as a legitimate expression of their grievances, reversed their allegiance by supporting the authority's counter-terror efforts.⁴¹

A couple brief examples will bring into focus when a constituency might reverse its support for a campaign of terror to backing the occupying authority's campaign of counter-terror. As discussed in the introduction, the bombing of the King David Hotel by the Irgun and the Stern Gang outraged both world opinion in general and local opinion in particular. The killing and wounding of over 100 persons exceeded the bounds of the Yishuv's social regulation, which led to open collaboration between the Jewish Agency's Haganah and the British authorities. They declared an open "season" on the dissidents and began a campaign to liquidate terrorism once and

⁴⁰Accordingly, Hurewitz points out that the British meted out collective punishment as a matter of principle, whereby whole villages or districts whose unidentifiable residents were responsible for the offenses: Hurewitz, *Struggle for Palestine*, p. 69.

⁴¹This popular reaction to terrorist violence that exceeds social regulation is also referred to as the "backlash effect." Irving Louis Horowitz, "The Routinization of Terrorism," In Martha Crenshaw (ed.), *Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power* (CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1983), p. 43.

for all.⁴² Similarly, the Palestinian campaign of terror was not immune to the effects of violence that exceed the cultural bounds of its constituency. The combined effect of the assassination of a member of the Shatti refugee council and an attempted assassination of a former mayor in the Gaza Strip led to open protest by local Palestinians against this recent wave of murderous violence and to the circulation of a petition calling on the Arab world to help curb the Palestinian guerrilla attacks in the Gaza Strip. Consequently, in both cases terrorism exceeded the normal bounds of social regulation, which led the local constituents to reverse their support for the terrorist's campaign of terror to support for the liquidation of the terrorists by the occupying authority.

Within the Jewish and Palestinian communities, the tolerance of violence was a function of geography, the proximity to the occupying authority, and the length of the conflict or the cumulative impact of the occupying authority's counter-terror initiatives. In the Jewish case, the more removed the diaspora was from the locus of conflict the less tolerant they were of terrorism as a means of political resolution. Although more tolerant than Jews outside Palestine, the Yishuv was reluctant to condone the terrorist paradigm. Incidents such as the one mentioned above and the

⁴²Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, p. 128-136: This was the second (Aug - Oct 46) of the so-called open "seasons" against the Irgun by the Haganah and the British administration, which resulted in the Haganah's handing over to the British more than a thousand Irgun suspects including 25 ex-Irgunists serving in the British Army in Cairo. The first occurred shortly after the assassination of Lord Moyne (British Minister of State for the Middle East) on 6 November 1944 and lasted from January to May 1945. An elaborate examination of Lord Moyne's assassination can be found in: J. Boyer Bell, "Assassination in International Politics, Lord Moyne, Count Bernadotte, and the Lehi," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol 16, No. 1 (March 1972), pp. 59-82.

assassination of Lord Moyne exceeded the Yishuv's absorptive capacity of terrorism.⁴³

As the conflict progressed, however, the British persistence in meting out collective punishment and lack of a resolve for the Jewish question, the Yishuv's tolerance of violence increased. By contrast, the Palestinian diaspora tolerated terrorism as a means of political agitation more so than their brothers in the occupied West Bank and Gaza. In the refugee camps that dotted the Arab states bordering Israel, terrorism was a morally and politically justified means of reclaiming their lost homeland--Palestine. Furthermore, terrorism was a traditionally sanctioned means of maintaining Palestinian autonomy within the confines of a host state. Essentially, terrorism emanating from the refugee camps created states within states, whereby Palestinian terrorism manipulated and was manipulated by the host government.

There were unique differences in threshold levels of the occupied territories as well. The Gaza Strip was inhabited by mostly refugees, whereas many of the West Bank residents had been inhabitants of the area for many decades. Furthermore, the residents of the West Bank were descendants of the Hashemite Kingdom, linking them socially and culturally to Jordan. The Gazans lacked a similar cultural link to a neighboring state, and therefore possessed a more exclusive claim to territory within Israel's 1949 border. Consequently, historic Palestine provided the basis of Gazan-Palestinian identity, whereas the West Bank Palestinians were not necessarily interested in the same exclusive claim. Therefore, the Gazans had more to gain from

⁴³For the Yishuv response to the Irgun's and Stern Gangs violence: J. Boyer Bell, *Terror Out of Zion: Irgun Zvai Leumi, Lehi, and the Palestine Underground* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), pp. 121, 126 & 135. And for a Sternist's interpretation of the events: G. Frank, *The Deed* (New York: Ballentine, 1963).

any political solution that Palestinian terrorism might bring. By contrast, the West Bank Palestinians allied first with the King of Jordan in anticipation that he would reunite the East and West Banks. Therefore, the West Bank Palestinians possessed a violence threshold lower than Palestinian occupants of the Gaza Strip.⁴⁴ Nonetheless, the Palestinian communities (like the Yishuv) condoned increased levels of violence as Israeli reprisal raids continued and the Arab states and world community proved incapable of resolving their grievances. Furthermore, the combination of King Hussein's campaign of counter-terror against Palestinian guerrillas and his recognition of the PLO as representative of the Palestinian people undermined the previous distinction between the absorptive capacity of violence between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In the end, Crenshaw best summarizes how terrorism became the preferred course for the Palestinians:

The Arab defeat in the 1967 war with Israel led Palestinians to realize that they could no longer depend on the Arab states to further their goals. In retrospect, their extreme weakness, [dispersion, manipulation by their Arab hosts, and Israel's failure to recognize their existence] in the Middle East made it likely that militant nationalists should turn to terrorism. Since international recognition of the Palestinian cause was a primary aim (given the influence of outside powers in the region) and since attacks on Israeli territory were difficult, terrorism developed into a transnational phenomenon.⁴⁵

⁴⁴For similar conclusions: William B. Quandt, *Palestinian Nationalism: Its Political and Military Dimensions* R-782-ISA (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, November 1971), pp. 34-37, and Bard E. O'Neill, *Armed Struggle in Palestine: A Political-Military Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 90-102, 113-123.

⁴⁵Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," p. 389.

D. TRANSNATIONAL TERROR

The transnational character of terrorism introduces multiple actors into the terrorist's drama. The terrorist drama is not limited to the local stage, projecting a demonstration and contagious effect on audiences beyond the source of the conflict. Domestic and international communities either wittingly or unwittingly become spectators or vulnerable participants in the violent episodes of the theatrics of terrorism. The modernization of transportation, communication, and weapons technologies has greatly facilitated the transnational character of contemporary terrorism, such that the absence of modern technologies limited the effects of terrorism to the locus of dispute. For the modern terrorist the whole world is his stage, because as Freedman aptly describes:

The terrorist appears suddenly on the scene, an anonymous figure who attacks the very structure of society either by selecting a powerful figure or by challenging authority and social mores by violating the security of accepted social procedures. The sudden assault and apparent fearlessness communicates a sense that the terrorist can in fact work miracles in upsetting the state. The terrorist's belligerent denial of the normal effective reactions, other than anger and resolution, assaults the sensibility of the spectator. The sudden unexpected fall of someone in power assaults the sense of security of the spectator.⁴⁶

While the terrorist's theatrical performance captures the imagination of an attentive transnational audience in the present, its current screenplay may well be based on a past series of violent episodes that used terror to effect reactions favorable to the achievement of terrorist goals.

⁴⁶Lawrence Z. Freedman, "Why Does Terrorism Terrorize?" In David Rapoport and Yonah Alexander (eds.), *The Rationalization of Terrorism* (MD: University Publications of America, 1982), p. 27.

The success of resistance movements in the 1920s, 50s, and 60s served as credible evidence that an imperial power was not immune to defeat by a smaller force. Consequently, the Jews used the IRA's success in the 1920s and the 1936-39 Arab uprising against the British as credible evidence of the effectiveness of terrorism as a means of challenging authority. According to the leader of the Irgun, Menachem Begin, all revolutionaries are "brothers in arms. All the world's fighters for freedom are one family."⁴⁷ Similarly, the Palestinians translated the success of the FLN in Algeria, the Viet Cong in Vietnam, and Fidel Castro's and Che Guevara's revolutionary success in Cuba into their struggle against the imperialist backed, colonizing Zionists.⁴⁸ While the Jewish and the Palestinian terrorists were influenced by the success of previous resistance movements, only the latter could exploit the competitive and contagious effects of resistance movements elsewhere.

The Jewish terrorist had at his disposal a peculiar mix of the 19th and 20th Century's technologies, possessing the explosive potential to destroy buildings and kill numerous people but lacking sophisticated communication and transportation technologies, which aid in the transmission of the physical and psychological effects of violence beyond the source of conflict. By contrast, the Palestinians faced no such

⁴⁷Menachem Begin, *The Revolt: The Story of the Irgun* (New York: Shuman, 1951), pp. 47-48, 55-56.

⁴⁸John Laffin points out that Yasir Arafat met Che Guevara in 1965 and suggests that Arafat was probably influenced by Guevara's revolutionary ideas: John Laffin, *Fedayeen: The Arab-Israeli Dilemma* (New York: Free Press, 1973), p. 16.

constraints in their potential to broaden the scope of conflict. As Abu Iyad⁴⁹ (Yasir Arafat's number two man in al-Fatah and later, the leader of Black September) puts it "when deprived of our elementary right to our own territory in order to dislodge the usurper, it is natural that we should enlarge the field of battle. That is why we are asking all our fighters to preserve their sacred right to fight by retreating into the most complete secrecy."⁵⁰

This reflects a unique dimension of transnational terror that the Palestinians possessed almost exclusive claim. And that is the competitive and contagious components of the violent action that expand the terrorist's field of battle to include other terrorist groups.⁵¹ Palestinian terrorism existed during a period in history when similar campaigns of terror and resistance were being waged elsewhere: the Tupamaros in Uruguay, the ERP in Argentina, the PLA in the Philippines, the Baader-Meinhof gang in West Germany, Basque Separatists in Spain, and so on. By contrast, the Jewish terrorists operated during a period when there were far fewer groups waging a campaigns of terror: IRA-Provos in Northern Ireland and the EOKA in Greece. Consequently, the effect of the Palestinian campaign of terror was diffused by the

⁴⁹For more on Abu Iyad: Abu Iyad (Salah Khalaf) *My Home, My Land: A Narrative of the Palestinian Struggle* (New York: Times Books, 1978).

⁵⁰Dobson, *Black September*, p. 44.

⁵¹For the contagion of terrorism: Midlarsky et al., "Why Violence Spreads: The Contagion of International Terrorism," *International Studies Quarterly* 24 (June 1980): 2, pp. 262-298; Frederick J. Hacker, "Contagion and Attraction for Terror and Terrorism," In Yonah Alexander and John M. Gleason (eds.), *Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), pp. 73-85; and Edward Heyman and Edward Mickolus, "Imitation by Terrorists: Quantitative Approaches to the Study of Diffusion Patterns in Transnational Terrorism," *op cit.*, pp. 175-195.

competitive desires of terrorist campaigns elsewhere that attempted to capture the attention of the world through acts of violence. While the Jews competed with fewer groups, their ability to capture world attention was undermined by less sophisticated means of communication and world events. Although the effects of the Holocaust were well known by the international community, world attention was consumed by post-war reconstruction and resettlement of other refugees besides the Jews.⁵² The Palestinian's strategic environment was complicated by world events as well (Vietnam, Soviets in Czechoslovakia, etc), but the innovations in communications and transportation technologies easily compensated for their competitive grasp on world attentive. Furthermore, the existence of other groups waging campaigns of terror provided the Palestinians vital allies during periods when the oppressive security forces were in hot pursuit. This advantage the Jewish terrorist could not boast.

While terrorism is indeed theatrical, it is certainly not the only show in town. If the central purpose of terrorism is to capture an audiences attention, then during periods of competing dramas terrorism must reach new heights in spectacular appeal. In 1968, with the US bogged down in Vietnam, Europe engaged in student riots, and the Soviets in Czechoslovakia representing the major events gripping the world's attention, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine broke this grip by hijacking an El Al 707 airliner enroute from Rome to Tel Aviv diverting it to Algeria. This terrorist drama occupied a major portion of the world's stage for over a week involving

⁵²For example, from 1931-1940, the Jewish immigrants numbered a total of 137,445 out of 528,431 total foreign immigration to the United States for that period: US Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service and the *Jewish Year Book*. Refer Appendix A, Table A-5.

the International Red Cross and the Algerian, Italian, and the Israeli governments. Modernity provided the Palestinian terrorists the ability to capture world attention with a dramatic single stroke, but the Palestinians did not possess an exclusive claim to the theatrics of hijacking and it was not long before other terrorist groups exploited the same elevated stage to gain recognition for their cause. Consequently, hijacking was contagious and competition for world recognition was diffuse. The following year attempted hijackings doubled (38 in 1968 to 82 in 1969), and the world could no longer distinguish between the Palestinian message and those of the many other terrorist groups that used the world's airlines as a means to communicate similar appeals.⁵³

Therefore, it is hardly a secret that the Palestinians have enlarged the field of battle. It is my contention that the Jews enlarged the field of battle as well, but without the benefit of sophisticated technologies that were at the Palestinians' disposal and the solidarity of other groups waging similar campaigns of terror. Unquestionably, the most salient feature of Palestinian terrorism was its transnational character. The Irgun and the Stern Gang neither had the luxury nor conceived of conferring with other national resistance leaders to discuss revolutionary strategy. By comparison, the Palestinians considered that standard procedure. For instance, at a symposium

⁵³Refer: Richard Clutterback, "The Politics of Air Piracy," *Living With Terrorism* (New York: Arlington House Publishers, 1975), p. 95; Alona E. Evans, "Aircraft Hijacking: What is being done," In M. Cherif Bassiouni (ed.) *International Terrorism and Political Crimes* (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1975); and J. Boyer Bell, *Transnational Terrorism* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute Press, 1975), pp. 80-84. For an analysis of the contagion of hijacking: Robert T. Holden, "The Contagiousness of Aircraft Hijacking," *American Journal of Sociology*, 91:4 (January 1986), pp. 874-904.

organized by North Korea's Worker's Council, George Habash met with 400 other delegates from around the globe to discuss revolutionary strategy. He concluded that "there are no political and geographical boundaries or moral limits to the operations of the people's camp."⁵⁴ Therefore, the Jews were less technologically capable of transmitting their violent message to transnational audiences, than the Palestinians who had the benefit of more communication and transportation technologies with which to do so.

However, it is central to my thesis that for terrorism to be successful it must transcend national boundaries and become a transnational dynamic, independent of available technologies. The aspiring terrorist must prepare his psychological battlefield by exploiting every available means to communicate his message, undistorted by competing organizations or world events. The Jews did introduce outside actors into the Palestine drama by committing acts of indiscriminate terror, which generally outraged international opinion but created an awareness of their cause nonetheless. Similarly, the Palestinian terrorists committed acts of indiscriminate terror that placed their cause on the international stage as well, but without the same political result. This raises an interesting question: once the violent message reaches the international stage, what happens to it and how is it received?

As discussed above, the local Jewish and Palestinian communities possessed an absorptive capacity for acts of violence, and as the conflict progressed and the

⁵⁴Demaris, *Brothers in Blood*, p. 196.

occupying authority was seen as more illegitimate, the absorptive capacities generally increased. But, in both cases the resolution of the Palestine question did not rest entirely with the occupying authority. The most decisive point of decision was the occupying authority's source of power. The United States and the occupying authorities' popular constituencies were representative of both the British and the Israeli sources of power. In the Jewish case for example,

The ultimate seat of authority was with the British government in London. It was here, not in Jerusalem, that the operative decisions were made, and it was London that Zionist pressure could most effectively be applied. Pressure might reach the British Government in Whitehall through three channels. The Jewish Agency in Jerusalem could transmit pressure through the High Commissioner to the Colonial Office and thence, through the Secretary of State for the Colonies, to the Cabinet. Secondly, the mechanism of what we now call "Public Relations" could be brought to bear upon public opinion in England, through Members of Parliament, and then to Ministers in general, among them the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Third, by similar means public opinion could be influenced in other countries, especially in the United States of America, so that pressure would be brought through Embassy channels on the Foreign Office and thus on the Colonial Secretary and the Cabinet.⁵⁵

No matter the geographic location of the seat of authority, the terrorist must find a means to frame his acts of violence, such that they are viewed less for their violent quality and more for the quality of their cause. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the terrorism is constrained by public opinion, which indirectly impacts the manner in

⁵⁵Michael Ionides, "Zionists and the Land," In Walid Khalidi (ed.) *From Haven to Conquest* (Washington, DC: Institute of Palestine Studies, 1987), pp. 259-260. By comparison, Hurewitz points out that the US Congress was equally sensitized to public opinion. This, in so far as it was articulate on Palestine, was markedly Pro-Zionist, primarily because of the plight of the European Jews and the effective public relations program of American Zionists: Hurewitz, p. 226. The road to London, in Zionist strategy, led all agreed through Washington, ...the militants contended, could be moved through pressure of public opinion ...creating an American awareness: Zvi Ganin, *Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 1945-48* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979), pp 12-29.

which the terrorist's violent example is understood. Operating within the context of the given historical moment, the audiences level of identification with the terrorist cause also constrains the efficacy with which his cause is understood.

For terrorism to be effective, the terrorist must finally determine how local and international channels will receive the violent message. As should be obvious from the discussion above, the terrorists direct exposure to local audiences makes him fully aware of how those audiences' respond to acts of violence. On the other hand, the terrorists' knowledge of international audience response is doubtful. Accordingly, in order to manipulate international audiences toward the terrorists cause, the terrorist must develop mechanisms to create favorable audience predispositions. Where these predispositions are weak or absent the terrorist (or his ally) must prepare those audiences for the eventual violent act. Violence as the terrorists primary means of communication must be as clearly understood. Consequently, when audiences are predisposed to react negatively toward violence, as most Western audiences are, then the terrorist must devise a means to prepare his audiences for the eventual violent act. The intent is for audiences to identify less with the violence and more with the terrorists cause. However, as is most often the case, audiences initial response is to frame the violent act within preexisting intellectual constructs and images, which in most cases are based on prior exposure, media portrayal, and elite interpretation of the event.⁵⁶ Consequently, the terrorist must develop a mechanism to influence the media's

⁵⁶For an in-depth analysis of the American image of the Arab transmitted by the popular press: Edmund Ghareeb (ed.), *Split Vision: The Portrayal of Arabs in the American Media* (Washington, DC: American-Arab Affairs Council, 1983).

portrayal and elite interpretation of the event that creates positive images within the popular mind and a climate of opinion favorable to the terrorist cause

How then does transnational terrorism overcome negative predispositions?

Although it is beyond the scope of this study to discuss the influence of interest groups, lobbies, public opinion, or conventional propaganda campaigns, a few general comments are necessary, because terrorism was not the exclusive mechanism that created a Jewish state on the one hand, and left the Palestinians in the refugee camps or the occupied territories on the other. While the international community was well aware of the atrocities of the Holocaust, there was not an overwhelming drive by the international community to insure that the Jews had a home in Palestine. In fact, many of the leading Zionists had complained about the complacency of the American public towards their drive for a Palestinian home.⁵⁷ Consequently, terrorism became a violent reminder of the plight of desperate peoples' quest for a Jewish national homeland. Moreover, the public image of the Jews was not of a terrorist, but of a Jew awaiting Hitler's infernos, which reflected the media portrayal of the terrorist incidents and elite interpretation. By comparison, the general image held by the international community of the Palestinian and Israeli dispute was a terrorist for the former and a desperate nation surrounded by hostile Arab states for the latter.⁵⁸ In 1972, Israeli Premier Golda Meir's selection as "woman of the year," is indicative of the Jew's ability to shape

⁵⁷For a discussion of the Zionist criticism of US support: Richard P. Stevens, *American Zionism and US Foreign Policy, 1942-1947* (NY: Pegeant, 1962), pp. 29-36; and Laqueur, *A History of Zionism*, p. 549.

⁵⁸Refer: Richard H. Curtis, *A Changing Image: American Perceptions of the Arab-Israeli Dispute* (Washington, DC: American Educational Trust, 1982).

favorable images, despite the numerous Israeli raids into southern Lebanon killing scores of innocent civilians.⁵⁹ By comparison, the hooded Palestinian terrorist at the 1972 Munich Olympics remains as one of the most salient images on the international popular mind, which predisposed international audiences to see first the act of violence and perhaps never see or understand the Palestinian cause.

How then did the Zionists create their image? And by comparison what didn't the Palestinians do to shape a similar positive image among international audiences? Moreover, how did the world learn to interpret the Jewish struggle versus the Palestinian struggle? There has been volumes written on the Zionist propaganda campaign and very little comparable literature written on the Palestinian campaign. Therefore, I have chosen to explore some facts. Table 2-2 below lists the quantity of publications produced by the Jewish/Zionist and the Arab communities during four distinct periods.

TABLE 2-2.
COMPARISON OF TOTAL PUBLICATIONS
IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND PALESTINE

	Pre-1945			1946-1948			1949-			Unknown		
	D	W	M	D	W	M	D	W	M	D	W	M
Jewish	7	8	20	2	5	1	4	0	4	2	5	22
Arabic	2	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	4
Other	3	1	4	0	0	3	4	0	1	4	5	6

Note: D = Daily, W = Weekly, and M = Monthly/Quarterly publication: Unknown refers to the existence of that publication during that period but lacking a founding date.

Source: *The Middle East*, 1958, 6th Ed. (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1958), pp. 226-29.
For a complimentary survey of the available publications during the Mandate period through 1949: J.C. Hurewitz, *The Struggle for Palestine* (NY: W.W. Norton, 1950), pp. 363-388.

⁵⁹Refer Appendix B, Table B-1, for a chronology of the Palestinian resistance and Israeli reprisals.

The data indicates that the Jews produced considerably more literature than the Arabs. However, this literature was primarily published for their local communities, therefore it was necessary to find additional data on publications or information provided to international audiences as well. Both the Zionists and the Palestinians waged extensive propaganda campaigns targeting the international community. The Zionists had considerable success among the American Jewish community after 1945 and the Palestinians developed a popular following among the New Left in Europe, the United States, and most of the Third World after 1967.⁶⁰ Yet, only the Zionists were able to gain decisive access to the political decision makers vital to a solution to the Palestine question. In 1945, approximately one-third of American Jewry subscribed to the pro-Zionist Yiddish press. Moreover, twenty of the twenty-four American periodicals were characterized as pro-Palestine, if not actually Zionist during the mid-1940s.⁶¹ Despite the existence of the New Left support in the United States, the Palestinians were unable to exploit comparable access to the media, and therefore were unable to create the perception necessary to address the Palestine question without radicalism or political violence clouding the discussion. Ultimately, the ability of the Zionists to exploit the popular media enabled them to control the image of the Jewish resistance. The media framed the public perception, and in doing so unwittingly

⁶⁰For a discussion of the Zionist international propaganda campaign: Stevens, pp. 95-160. And the Palestinians: Zeev Schiff and Raphael Rothstein, *Fedayeen: Guerrillas Against Israel* (NY: McKay, 1972), pp. 158-174; and Kemal Kirisci, *The PLO and World Politics: A Study of Mobilization of Support for the Palestinian Cause* (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1986), pp. 69-126.

⁶¹Stevens, p. 20.

promoted the interpretation of events as scene through the cameras eye or the front page headlines from the Zionist perspective. Accordingly, James Abourezk states

Descriptions by the media of terrorism committed by both Arabs and Jews boiled down to public perceptions, an act of terrorism committed by an Arab is labeled what it is 'terrorism,' but an act of terrorism committed by an Israeli is usually applauded as a 'daring raid' or 'retaliation' or as 'seeking out the terrorists'.⁶²

What does all this mean? The preceding discussion was meant to illustrate that under no circumstances will terrorism be wholly effective at bringing about the desired political result. The success of terrorism depends on the ability of the perpetrators to frame their violence in such a manner that it becomes justifiable to the international community given the desperate circumstances of the terrorist's constituency. In essence, violence is hardly an acceptable means of political change considering Western audiences, but it can become more palatable provided the West has been predisposed to understand the circumstances that provoked the violent event. Even today the Jews continue to dominate the media. Israeli publications total 1079 versus a combined 621 total publications produced by the Arab states bordering Israel.⁶³ Consequently, until such time as the Arab states in general and the Palestinians in particular shift their propaganda campaign to the West and create a more favorable image, then the international perception of the Palestinian problem will continue to be blurred by the negative label of terrorism. Ultimately, terrorism must be complimented

⁶²James Abourezk, "Preface," In Ghareeb, *op cit.*, p. x.

⁶³These figures were obtained by conducting a literature search on *Ulrichs* (1992) CD-Rom. Total figure for all Arab Gulf and Levant States is 1202. A complimentary word-search to locate publication titles considering Israeli or Palestinian sources indicated a similar advantage for the former: 712 publications contained the words--Zion, Israeli, Jew, or Hebrew--versus 54 contained the words--Palestine or Palestinian.

by a non-violent propaganda campaign that enables international audiences to view the violent incident less for its violent quality and more for the quality of the underlying cause.

E. SUMMARY

In sum, modernization equipped the Jewish and Palestinian terrorists with the means and access, urbanization set the stage with its multiple and vulnerable targets, and social facilitation provided the justification and direction for a campaign of terror against the occupying authority. Their terrorist campaigns were urban, without a rural option. The city was their sanctuary and battlefield. The level of modernization represented the most salient difference between the two cases. But it was a relative difference: the technological innovations available to the Palestinian terrorist made domestic and international actions more feasible, whereas similar actions were unimaginable to the Jewish terrorist. Both the Jews and the Palestinian terrorists viewed terrorism as politically justified means to achieve the desired political ends, due to the social and political circumstances confronting their respective communities. Furthermore, both the Jewish and Palestinian histories of violence against authority had lapsed, which translated into a morality based on present circumstance, not mythical hapstance as the conventional wisdom suggests in the latter case. Furthermore, the Palestinian terrorist's technological advantages had a short shelf-life, spoiled by superior technologies available to the forces of counter-terror and the competitive use by other terrorist groups exploiting similar technologies. While the

impact of the Palestinian campaign of terror was diffused by other terrorist groups, the Jewish terrorists confronted no comparable interference or contagion effect. In both cases, terrorism competed with world events, which occasionally led the terrorist groups to commit indiscriminate acts of terror with more newsworthy potential. Only in the Zionist case do we observe efforts to create mechanisms independent of terrorism to shape images and frame their cause such that violence serves as only a reminder of the unresolved Palestine question. Considering either the Jewish or the Palestinian case, for terrorism to aid in the resolution of the Palestine question it had to exploit the psychological battlefield, with its vast array of domestic and international audiences, by depending less on technological means and more on strategic design, which considered audience response as central.

III. CONSIDERING THE SOURCE

A. THE INDIVIDUAL TERRORISTS

Although the study of individual terrorist psychology is not the focus of this inquiry, a brief mention of their individual characteristics here will dispel any potential concerns as the analysis progresses into other areas. The psychological study of individual terrorists has provided little conclusive evidence suggesting a relationship between individual psychosis and the conduct of acts of terrorism. This is no less the case regarding the Jewish and Palestinian terrorist organizations. In both cases, the leadership was represented by mature men with higher than average education levels. For the Jewish terrorists there were men like Menachem Begin, a Polish Jew and leader of the Irgun (1942), graduated from the University of Warsaw with a degree in law.¹ Another prominent Irgunist was Avraham Stern, a German Jew, who prior to arriving in Palestine was the first Jew to teach mathematics in Germany.² Similarly, the Palestinian leadership was represented by men with strong educational backgrounds. Yasir Arafat, muslim leader of al-Fatah and the chairman of the PLO (1969), obtained a degree in engineering from the University of Stuttgart. Similarly, Ahmed Jibril, the leader of the PFLP-GC, received a degree in engineering from the

¹At age 34, Menachem Begin was the oldest member of the Irgun. Doris Katz, *The Lady was a Terrorist* (New York: Shiloni Publishers, 1953), p. 38. Asprey points out that "young intellectuals in the Polish tradition" represented the leadership of the Irgun. Robert Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History* Vol. II (New York: Doubleday, 1975), p. 771.

²For more on the characteristics of the leadership of the Stern Gang (LEHI): J. Boyer Bell, *Terror Out of Zion: Irgun Zvai Leumi, LEHI, and the Palestine Underground, 1929-1949* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), p. 84-85.

Syrian Military Academy. George Habash, the christian leader of the PFLP, received a medical degree from the American University in Beirut. From the same university, Wadi Haddad, the PFLP's number-two man, received a degree in dentistry.³ All considered, the terrorist leadership was represented by men with professional backgrounds, who for reasons not entirely psychological in nature set there professional careers aside for a life committed to the salvation of their people.

By contrast, there were some unique differences between the rank and file membership of the Jewish and the Palestinian terrorist groups. The Jewish terrorist groups were composed of individuals who had come to Palestine from European ghettos or displaced person camps. The typical individual of the Irgun or the Stern Gang was a teenager with little or no college education. By comparison, while the Palestinian rank and file may have originated from a refugee camp, his age and level of education typically exceeded the Jewish terrorist.⁴ One can not dismiss the Palestinian use of teenagers, and in some cases pre-teens, in the campaigns of terror in the occupied territories, but this was not representative of the typical profile of a

³For short biographies on the Palestinian resistances' leadership: John W. Amos II, *Palestinian Resistance: Organization of a Nationalist Movement* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), pp. 47-55, 72-76, 91-93; Zeev Schiff and Raphael Rothstein, *Fedayeen: Guerrillas Against Israel* (New York: David McKay, 1972), pp. 110-111; and Ehud Yaari, *Strike Terror: The Story of Fatah* (New York: Sabra Books, 1970), pp. 211-212, 215-217. Note: Members of the Palestinian Black September Organization were predominately graduates of the American University in Beirut.

⁴Recruiting Palestinians in the occupied territories differed as well; after the Six-Day War (June 67) Egypt's Palestinian Liberation Army disbanded leaving many militants to reside in the Gaza Strip, accordingly these individuals provided the Palestinian terrorist organizations a ready source of recruits. The West Bank, on the other hand, did not possess the recruiting advantage of ex-militants, but the teen-age population tended to be the most willing recruits.

Palestinian terrorist.⁵ The Palestinian terrorist had either completed secondary education or completed both secondary education and was attending or had completed college. In both cases, women were present in the terrorist groups, filling roles that differed little from their male counterparts.⁶

The evidence suggests that the rank and file membership of both the Jewish and the Palestinian terrorist groups originated from similar oppressive conditions, the squalor of displaced persons camps or refugee camps.⁷ The most salient difference between the two cases concerns the age and the level of education of the individual terrorist, whereby the typical Palestinian terrorist was older and more educated than the Jewish terrorist. Nonetheless, it is difficult to conclude whether this was an advantage or a disadvantage for either of the two groups. Moreover, a review of the literature suggests that the Jewish or the Palestinian terrorist profile was more a function of the level of national consciousness than it was of some peculiar personality

⁵Likewise, the Jewish terrorist groups used youths, but restricted their activities to courier duties and propaganda dissemination.

⁶For a memoir of a female Sternist refer: Geula Cohen, *Woman of Violence: Memoirs of a Young Terrorist, 1943-1948*, trans. Hillel Halkin (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1966); and female Irgunist Doris Katz, *The Lady was a Terrorist* (New York: Shiloni Publishers, 1953). And a memoir by a female Palestinian terrorist: Leila Khaled, *My People Shall Live: The Autobiography of a Revolutionary* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1973).

⁷As discussed in Chapter II, from the late-1890s to the mid-1940s, International Jewry became conscious of their threatened existence due to the wave of the European anti-Semitism and Hitler's systematic genocide. Similarly, from 1949 to 1967, the Palestinian identity developed amid the squalor of the refugee camps and the host Arab states exploitation of their desires to return to their homeland by committing them in guerrilla-type attacks on the Israeli occupier. Once their Arab hosts were humiliated by the Israeli's lighting victory during the June 1967 War, the Palestinian awareness of their threatened existence increased exponentially. The Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the systematic resettlement of Jews in the occupied territories threatened the very existence of what it meant to be a Palestinian. Independent of age or educational level, both national groups became fully aware of their threatened identity.

trait or reflective of age or education level.⁸ Therefore, a comparison of the psychological profiles of Jewish and Palestinian terrorists suggests that little or no empirical evidence can be gained from further exploration into this level of analysis. An understanding of terrorism is not contingent on an individual psychological analysis, because much of it is based on pure speculation rather than empirical fact.

Martha Crenshaw, Walter Laqueur, and Paul Wilkinson are equally skeptical about the merits of continued probe into the terrorist personality. Wilkinson and Laqueur conclude that there is no convincing profile of the political terrorist.⁹ Similarly, Crenshaw argues that the most common characteristic of terrorists is their normality. Moreover, she contends that terrorism seems to be the connecting link between widely varying personalities.¹⁰ By contrast, Jerold Post, a major contributor in the field of individual terrorist psychology, suggests that characteristics associated with abnormal psychology correspond to similar personality traits among terrorists. He concludes that terrorists are typically action oriented, exhibit aggressive behavior, dehumanize, project blame, and their own bad characteristics onto their opponent. Post notes the high incidence of fragmented families and loss of a father among West

⁸Bell points among the members of the Stern Gang (LEHI) were Sephardim, Yemeni dervishes, communists, dropouts from the Irgun, new recruits who knew neither Hebrew nor Palestine, and sabras (second generation Palestinian Jews). Similarly, the one half of the Irgun was oriental Jewry with the Yemenites and the Sephardims the prime source of recruits. Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, p. 85.

⁹ Walter Z. Laqueur, *Terrorism* (London: Weidefeld and Nicolson, 1977), p. 129; and Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism and the Liberal State*, (London: MacMillan, 1977), pp. 75, 193.

¹⁰Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," *Comparative Politics* 13 (July 1981): p. 390; and Maxwell Taylor, *The Terrorists* (New York: Brassey's, 1988), p. 139. Taylor notes the heterogeneity of individual terrorists considering all ages, education levels, psychological profile, and gender.

German terrorists as other distinguishing characteristics that may contribute to an individual's choice of a terrorism as a means of political influence. Yet, he is unable to account for similar individuals that do not chose the terrorist option. Unfortunately, Post and others are restricted in their ability to provide conclusive evidence that these traits are common among all terrorists. Furthermore, ex-terrorists are either dead, in jail, not willing, or not allowed to submit to psychological examination. And those that are available are not in sufficient quantity to provide a valid sample for conclusions of universal applicability.¹¹

B. THE TERRORIST GROUP

Maxwell Taylor and Albert Bandura contend that the terrorist group takes on an independent collective identity that transcends individual characteristics.¹² This suggests that the individual's psychological identity is submerged within the group, whereby the individual's psychological potential conforms to the greater needs of the group. Inevitably, the group provides the individual with the emotional needs he so

¹¹Jerold M. Post, "Terrorist psycho-logic: Terrorist behavior as a product of psychological forces," In Walter Reich (ed.) *Origins of Terrorism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 25-29; and Martha Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Political Terrorism," In Margaret G. Hermann (ed.) *Political Psychology* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1986), p. 382. Crenshaw provides an in-depth review of the literature on the individual and group psychology of terrorism.

¹²Taylor, pp. 163-176; and Albert Bandura, "Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement," In Walter Reich (ed.) *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, States of Mind* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 161-191; Taylor discusses the psychological processes of "de-individualization," whereby the individual's psychology is submerged within the group. Bandura adds those group psychological mechanisms that allow individual participants to disengage from the immorality of their acts, which make them socially acceptable within the group's value structure.

desires. Menachem Begin's description of the Irgun exemplifies the collective identity of the terrorist group. He refers to members of the group as friends, and "more:"

We were all like brothers. And the mutual deep affection, the affection of fighters, than which there is no greater, was the source of happiness, perhaps the only happiness in the darkness of the underground...there reigned a profound spirit of fraternity...It was not by chance that one of the pseudonyms we used for the Irgun was 'the fighting family'...We *were* a family [based on] mutual trust...Each was prepared to give his life for his comrade."¹³

The terrorist group is a family based on loyalty, trust, affection and the supreme self-sacrifice of giving one's life for one's comrade. The group furnishes the individual a source of identity, restricts his freedom, indoctrinates him to specific norms of behavior, a value structure, security, and a sense of dependence and belonging.¹⁴ Therefore, the psychology of the individual terrorist becomes a non-entity; submerged in the terrorist underworld his psychology is the group psychology--emotionally absorbed and politically expressed.

The Jewish and Palestinian terrorist groups' preoccupation with their imprisoned comrades testifies further to the importance of the group. Bell notes that prison breaks were the most costly operations the Irgun performed; large sums of money, high risk, meticulous planning, and more men than were typically employed in other operations. Similarly, on 23 July 1968, the PFLP used hijacking as a means to gain release of

¹³Menachem Begin, *The Revolt: The Story of the Irgun* (New York: Shuman, 1951), p. 73.

¹⁴For more on terrorist group dynamics: Martha Crenshaw, "Decisions to Use Terrorism: Psychological Constraints on Instrumental Reasoning," In Donatella Della Porta (ed.), *International Social Movement Research, Social Movements and Violence: Participation in Underground Organizations 4* (Greenwich, CT: Jai Press, 1992), pp. 29-42.

1,200 Arab commandos held in Israel.¹⁵ Crenshaw uses the memoirs of two Irgunists to further illustrate the psychological dynamics of the terrorist group

Meridor, a member of the Irgun High Command, felt 'high spirits' and 'satisfaction' when arrested by the British because he now shared the suffering that all fighters had to experience. He almost welcomed the opportunity to prove that he had felt 'morally uncomfortable,' whereas afterwards he felt 'exalted'

Begin expressed similar feelings. Once, waiting as the British searched the hotel where he was staying, he admitted anxiety and fear, but when he knew there was 'no way out,' his 'anxious thoughts evaporated.' He 'felt a peculiar serenity mixed with incomprehensible happiness' and waited 'composedly,' but the police passed him by.¹⁶

The preceding examples demonstrate what James Turner refers to as the "affective" function of the group. The individual becomes psychologically consumed by the terrorist group, whereby his psychological and cognitive ability to freely interpret the world around him becomes framed in the group's perception of the world

Crenshaw argues that understanding how the terrorist group's perceive the world and themselves is essential to explaining terrorism. She states that "the psychological relationships with the terrorist group--the interplay of commitment, risk, solidarity, loyalty, guilty, revenge, and isolation--discourage terrorists from changing the direction they have taken."¹⁷ Yet, terrorist groups do change direction, conducting ideological,

¹⁵Hijacking was used to gain the release of hostages on 29 August 1969, 22 July 1970, and 6 September 1970: Richard Clutterbuck, "The Politics of Air Piracy," *Living with Terrorism* (New York: Arlington House, 1975), p. 98-101. Refer Table B-5 in Appendix B for additional hostage situations that demanded release of jailed terrorists.

¹⁶Cited in Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," p. 395. See original citations in Ya'acov Meridor, *Long is the Road to Freedom* (Tujunga, CA: Barak Publications, 1961), pp. 6, 9; and Menachem Begin, *The Revolt*, 111. Note: Meridor's, *Long is the Road to Freedom*, work provides an enlightening portrayal of an imprisoned terrorist's desires to escape and return to his comrades.

¹⁷Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," p. 396.

strategic, or tactical shifts in order to continue to exist and achieve short and long-term objectives. For instance, when the Second World War started, the Haganah and the Irgun decided to curtail their subversive activities. In this sense, the terrorist groups became less radical in their methods, awaiting a more conducive external environment from which to continue the armed struggle. Appropriately, Turner contends that the terrorist group's ability to change direction, make strategic and tactical shifts consistent with its concept of reality, is dependent on its level of radicalization. He defines radicalization as "the movement of an individual from a position within a set of cultural guidelines for dissent to one outside the framework." Furthermore, Turner adds that radicalization occurs in stages. Initial dissatisfaction with a government policy or action leads to passive methods (lobbying, demonstrations, protests) in order to aggregate demands, but when blocked, ignored, or repressed, they lead to more aggressive methods (strikes, riots, sabotage, terrorist acts).¹⁸

A survey of the literature on terrorist group dynamics tends to weigh heavily on the relationship between the group's emotional function and its level of radicalization. The literature suggests that a positive correlation exists between levels of group frustration and radicalization, such that the more frustrated a group becomes so too does it become more radical. While this seems valid in a practical sense, in reality such a relationship does not always exist. For example, in 1940 the Irgun High Command's decision to cease anti-British activities was not universally accepted by

¹⁸James T. Turner, "Systematic Conception of Acts of Terror," *Journal of Political and Criminal Psychology* 1 (March 1985): p. 36.

other Irgunists in general and Avraham Stern in particular. Consequently, he broke away from the Irgun and formed his own terrorist group--the Stern gang. While the Stern gang was more radical than the other Jewish terrorist groups, there is no conclusive evidence that suggests they were more frustrated than any other group.¹⁹

The dynamics of the terrorist group serve not only an organizational (emotional) function, but an instrumental function as well. The instrumental function of the terrorist group encompasses the maintenance and goal-directed activities of the group, whereas the emotional function concentrates on its psychological health. It is not entirely clear where the group's emotional function ends and the instrumental function begins, because the group's instrumental activities can combine both roles. For instance, a terrorist group conducts a bank robbery in order to acquire funds to purchase arms and to finance future operations, an instrumental function. But, during the same operation, the terrorist group overcomes overwhelming odds in pulling off the robbery, which either provokes admiration among friendly audiences, curiosity among neutral audiences, and motivates other terrorist groups to conduct similar acts or more spectacular acts, all of which serve the emotional (organizational) needs of the terrorist group. Therefore, the act provides the terrorist group the instrumental means to continue operations and the emotional means to appeal to their own sympathizers, potential constituents, and other terrorist groups engaging similar activities.

¹⁹Similarly, the Palestinian PFLP splintered into the PFLP-GC in October 1968 and the PDFLP in February 1969, the former calling for an escalation of attacks on international Israeli targets and the latter calling for a more liberal approach to the Palestinian-Israeli dispute (a bi-national state). In both cases the group's dissention was more a difference of perspective than it was radicalization. For instance, Jabril the PFLP-GC leader was a former Syrian army officer, therefore it should be surprising that he favored intense military operations.

Accordingly, Turner distinguishes between the two by defining the instrumental function as goal directed, characterized as logical and coherent acts, and the organizational or emotional function as effectual, arising from feelings of frustration related to group goals or from the emotional needs of the person(s) dominating the group, characterized as senseless, shocking or counter-productive acts.²⁰ Consequently, when the instrumental motives of the terrorist group become frustrated they manifest in more spectacular and emotional acts. It would seem evident at this point that there is a link between internal group dynamics and its translation into external violence, whereby terrorism is a self-defeating proposition. While instrumental acts are directed by rational strategic choice, organizational acts encompass psychological barriers that undermine logical choice. The challenge to the Jewish and the Palestinian terrorist was to remain instrumentally focused, while maintaining organizational coherence. Moreover, the efficacy of Jewish and the Palestinian terrorism hinged on the management of a psychological balance, whereby subordinating the groups' organizational function to the instrumental function would allow the political object to remain in focus. Therefore, the self-defeating potential of emotionally driven acts would be supplanted by a strategic logic dominated by instrumental reason. Accordingly, both Jewish and Palestinian terrorism was the result of a strategic choice

²⁰Turner, p. 38.

based on instrumental reasoning²¹ Therefore, there are political, strategic, and contextual considerations that compensate for the negative effects of emotionally driven violence and make possible the political result--a homeland.

C. MILITANT MINORITY

Terrorism is the strategy of a minority. A terrorist group is generally the most radical element of a broader political movement. A political movement, observing that conventional methods of political influence are denied by the existing political institutions, spawns a militant wing, or "lunatic fringe," which adopts terrorism as a means to preempt the desired political result. In the Zionist case, the Revisionists represented the their political interests of the Irgun and the Histadrut (Jewish Labor party) politically represented the Haganah. The Stern Gang had no above ground political representative. Similarly, Palestinian political movements in Egypt (and later Kuwait), Lebanon, and Syria eventually gave birth to militant political factions; the General Union of Palestinian Students' al-Fatah (Palestine National Liberation Movement), the Arab Nationalist Movement's PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine), and the PFLP's splinter groups, the PFLP-General Command and the PDFLP (Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine) respectively. The militant faction, appropriately radicalized, spawns a militant wing that uses terrorist violence to engage the target regime in order to provoke the desired political outcome.

²¹ renshaw, "Decisions to Use Terrorism," p. 29.

In both the Jewish and the Palestinian cases, the militant wing represented a mere fraction of the entire organization. For instance, the Irgun had six-hundred members, but only forty were hardcore fighters living in the underground and relying on the remainder of the organization for its survival. By comparison, the Palestinian resistance boasted that they possessed large organizations. Al-Fatah, for instance, had a few as 1000 members in 1967 and as many as 20,000 members in 1970, but the actual fighting strength was a mere fraction of that total. Like the Irgun, al-Asifa, Fatah's combat forces numbered around 6,000. The remaining Palestinian groups boast large organizations as well, but much of it is above ground, dedicating itself to political organizing in the refugee camps and supporting a small fraction of hardcore terrorists.²²

1. Terrorist Groups by Type

The political militancy of the terrorist groups provides the basis for the establishment of a group typology. A typology of the terrorist groups is important because it brings into focus the group's political motives, likely goals, and which potential constituency it is apt to represent. Alex Schmid contends that "typologies are ideal type classifications, not 'true' reflections of the real world which includes impure cases and exceptions."²³ Following a review of existing typologies, I have concluded that none sufficiently represent the Jewish and the Palestinian groups. Therefore, I

²²Refer Appendix B, Table B-4 for the Strength and Support of the Palestinian Resistance; and Appendix A, Table A-4 for a similar outline of the Jewish Resistance.

²³Alex Schmid and Albert J. Jongman et al, *Political Terrorism: A Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988), p. 49

have devised a typology that best reflects the groups considered²⁴ It is not my intent to elaborate excessively on the complexity of each group, because to do so would detract from the central purpose of this inquiry. Consequently, it is important to keep in mind that the purpose of this analysis is to understand the process of terror in general and the influence a terrorist act has on multiple audiences in particular. The typology is meant to reveal potential idiosyncracies that may either detract or enhance the effectiveness of a campaign of terror.

The resistance groups were divided into three categories: mainstream, dissidents, and united resistance. Political representation in major political groupings was the major feature that distinguished mainstream and dissident groups. Furthermore, mainstream groups typically disassociated themselves with the dissident groups' indiscriminate acts of terror. Moreover, the mainstream groups took it upon themselves to control dissident violence that might detract from diplomatic initiatives being formulated by aboveground constituencies. In the end, the mainstream groups' distance from indiscriminate acts of terror and control of dissident violence was meant to create a more favorable image among their local constituencies in general and international constituencies in particular. Such an image would enable the mainstream groups to

²⁴All the groups, Jewish and Palestinian, were (are) nationalistic. Yet, this label is excluded from the typology because it lacks comparative insight. Nationalism does not capture the essence of the Zionist and the Palestinian struggles, because such a term assumes an exclusive ethnic dimension. Certainly, there was an ethnic component to their struggles, but communal more accurately reflects their grouping. Communalism, meaning Jewish and Palestinian in a holistic sense, encompassing those oppressed peoples subjected to the repressive policies of the occupying authority and a diaspora whom longed for a united homeland.

transition from a resistance movement or quasi-government status to a representative political body once the enemy occupier had withdrawn.

The Haganah, the Jewish Agency's defense force, represented the Jewish mainstream; with its offensive strike force, the Palmach, bearing the brunt of the terrorist activity. Politically, the Haganah was representative of the Histadrut, the Jewish Labor party. By comparison, al-Fatah embodied the Palestinian mainstream, possessing an offensive strike force, el-Asifa. By 1969, al-Fatah dominated the Palestinian Liberation Organization and was the de facto official spokesman for Palestinian diaspora and resistance.

The dissidents on the other hand, were more militant, clandestine, and politically removed than the mainstream resistance. The Irgun and the Stern Gang comprised the Jewish dissident groups. And, the PFLP, the PDFLP, and the PFLP-GC represented the major Palestinian dissident groups. By comparison, the Palestinian dissidents were more politically represented than the Jewish dissident groups. Once the militant arm of Revisionism, the Irgun cut political ties with the movement once the "Revolt" began in 1944. Similarly, the Stern Gang, an apparent social revolutionary, could never claim an above ground political constituency. For the Irgun and the Stern Gang, politics would be addressed once the British withdrew.²⁵ By comparison, the Palestinian dissidents possessed strong political motives, ranging from communism to

²⁵Following independence in May 1948, the Irgun became the *Herut* party and the Stern Gang was absorbed within the Histadrut. For more on the political structure and parties in Mandate Palestine: J.C. Hurewitz, *The Struggle for Palestine* (NY: W.W. Norton, 1950), pp. 38-50.

social democracy. For instance, the PFLP was a Marxist-Leninist group and the PDFLP was a social democratic group, with the PFLP-GC somewhere in between ²⁶

The united resistance represented a tacit-alliance between mainstream and dissident factions during periods when diplomatic initiatives seemed their worst: May 1939-May 1940 and November 1945 to June 1946 for the Jews; and September 1970 to March 1973 for the Palestinians. Furthermore, the united resistance dissolved when violence exceeded the bounds of social regulation (King David Hotel July 1946, and Khartoum Embassy assault March 1973), whereby the mainstream's representative credibility deteriorated because its constituents perceived them incapable of controlling the violence. As discussed above, it was imperative that the mainstream groups distance themselves from dissident violence; while the Jews accomplished this with relative ease in 1946, the Palestinian mainstream did not have as easy a separation in 1973. The inability of the Palestinian mainstream to disassociate itself from dissident violence (discussed in more detail in Chapter VI) undermined its potential to achieve the desired political result.

The resistance is further differentiated by political/ideological orientation and type of revolutionary strategy. Richard Shutz distinguishes revolutionary and sub-revolutionary strategy as follows:

²⁶For more on the ideological and political orientation of the Palestinian resistance. Bard O'Neill, *Armed Struggle in Palestine: A Political Military Analysis* (CO: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 125-161; and William B. Quandt, *Palestinian Nationalism: Its Political and Military Dimensions*, R-782-ISA (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, November 1971), pp. 9-77. For the Jewish Resistance: Walter Z. Laqueur, *A History of Zionism*, 2d Ed. (NY: Schocken Books, 1972), pp. 374-378, 382; and J. Boyer Bell, *Terror Out of Zion: Irgun Zvai Leumi, LEHI, and the Palestine Underground, 1929-1949* (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1978), pp. 19-37, 62-70, and 111-113.

Revolutionary terrorism may be defined as the threat and/or employment of political violence, in varying degrees, with the objective of successfully effecting a complete revolutionary change of fundamental political-social processes. Sub-revolutionary terrorism may be defined as the threat and/or employment of extranormal forms of political violence, in varying degrees, with the objective of effecting various changes in the structural-functional aspects of the particular political system. The goal is to bring about changes within the body politic, not to abolish it in favor of a complete system change.²⁷

In other words, the revolutionary terrorist focused on the total territorial withdrawal of the occupying authority, while the sub-revolutionary terrorist settled for territorial compromise.

2. THE TYPOLOGY

Table 3-1 below categorizes the mainstream, dissident, and united resistance groups by their political/ideological orientation. Interestingly, al-Fatah and the Irgun were largely apolitical, appealing to broad constituencies. The left-wing Palestinian dissident groups, preaching the communist line, were more exclusive in their appeal. Their appeal focused on the educated and idealistic youth and the middle-class Palestinian. While left-wing, the Haganah was more social democratic than communist. Consequently, when the Haganah called for the Jewish community to revolt (1945) against the British, their words--lacking the ideals of Marx and Lenin--

²⁷Richard Schultz, "Conceptualizing Political Terrorism: A Typology," *Journal of International Affairs* 32 (1978): No. 1, p. 9-10. See also: G. Davidson Smith, "Counterterrorism Contingency Planning and Incident Management," In David A Charters (ed.) *Democratic Responses to International Terrorism* (New York: Transnational Publications, 1991), 137. Smith lists six classifications of terrorist groups: combining Nationalist-Separatist-Irredentist into one type focusing on "nationality" with ethnic overtones; Issue types are single-issue oriented; Ideological pursue radical ideals, i.e. fascism, anarchism or nihilism; Exile oppose the prevailing situation in homeland; State and State-sponsored conduct covert/surrogate warfare; and Religious conflict over fundamental beliefs or doctrines.

appealed to the entire Jewish community. Again, while the intent here was not to elaborate in detail on the complexion of the terrorist groups, it was to establish a frame of reference from which to later suggest the unique political and social features of the groups that either enhanced or reduced the effectiveness of their particular brand of terrorism.

It is important to note that the Black September Organization did not truly represent a physical alliance between the Palestinian mainstream and the dissidents. It is defined as such because of the psychological implications of the Black September international activities, whereby both Palestinian mainstream and dissident internationalized the psychological and physical effects of their campaign of terror. In both cases, the operational alliance between mainstream and dissident groups was therefore indicative of an effort to introduce outside actors into the drama of Palestine

TABLE 3-1.²⁸
POLITICAL-ORIENTED TYPOLOGY
OF
THE ZIONIST AND PALESTINIAN TERRORIST GROUPS

Resistance Group	Revolutionary Maximalist	A-political Right-Wing	Marxist-Leninist Left-Wing	Sub-Revolutionary Minimalist
Mainstream				
Haganah			✓-	✓
Al-Fatah	1967-72	✓		1973-
Dissidents				
Irgun	✓-	✓		
Stern Gang	✓		✓-	
PFLP	✓+		✓	
PDFLP			✓	✓
PFLP-GC	✓		✓-	
United Resistance				
Tenuat Humeri	✓	✓-	✓-	
Black September	✓	✓-	✓-	

Notes: Maximalist and minimalist refers to the groups orientation toward the occupying authority and the ability to commit the local community to armed-struggle. Such that: al-Fatah called for total commitment from 1967-72, but from 1973 on the shift was to partial independence and organization.; the PFLP ✓+ indicates a total withdrawal and the radicalization of the Arab border states against Israel. Right wing indicates the groups location on the political spectrum relative to the remaining groups, not meant to suggest fascism in any way; commonly referred to as such by the remaining groups as well. ✓- Marxist Leninist column indicates social democracy. United resistances' political orientation was mixed, all groups participating and fighting for the ultimate objective--statehood.

²⁸Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," p. 385-6. The groups not pertinent to this analysis, but discussed by Crenshaw include: minority separatists (secessionist, ethnic, national irredentist), reformists (single-issue), and reactionaries (prevent change). For a critique on typologies, see: Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman et al. *Political Terrorism: A new guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases, theories, and literature* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988), 39-48.

D. SUMMARY

In sum, both the Jewish and the Palestinian resistance were similarly subdivided--mainstream, dissident, united resistance--each contributing to the achievement of their ultimate objective in their own unique way. Although not mentioned above but analytically significant was the exclusive role played by the dissidents in placing their cause on the world stage. In both cases, the dissidents' indiscriminate acts of violence were instrumental in introducing to the world the plight of their desperate peoples. For instance, the Jew's Stern Gang used the assassination of Lord Moyne and the PFLP used hijacking. Yet, the introduction of outside actors confers no advantage, unless the terrorists are prepared to illustrate the contradictory policies of the occupying authority over the course of subsequent violent exchanges. The occupying authority's reprisals, searches, arrests, and detention must be made to look blatantly unprovoked and repressive. In the end, the mainstream must control the indiscriminate tendencies of the dissidents in order to keep the violence within the bounds of the acceptable, whereby the psychological fear inducing impact of indiscriminate violence do not inappropriately target potential friendly constituencies.

IV. METHODOLOGY

A. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

In order to be effective on this psychological battlefield, the terrorist must devise a strategy of terror that exploits the psychological vulnerabilities of target audiences along both local and international fronts. Along these fronts, terrorism as a psychological operation produces psychological warfare and propaganda effects on multiple audiences. The targets of attention and the targets of opportunity are particularly vulnerable to the impact of terrorist propaganda, whereas the targets of terror and demands are more prone to psychological warfare effects. This Chapter will define the components of the terrorist's psychological battlefield and establish a model for the subsequent analysis of the Jewish and the Palestinian campaigns of terror. Ultimately, the terrorist's selection of a target of violence fulfills the instrumental and organizational needs of the terrorist group and its cause. The linkage between the target of violence and the remaining target audiences generates either a psychological warfare or a propaganda effect. The success of terrorism as a psychological operation depends on the selection of a target of violence that produces psychological warfare effects on the targets of terror and demands, and generates a propaganda effect on the targets of attention and opportunity. Figure 4-1 below depicts terrorism as a psychological operation and the target audiences.




Figure 4-1.
Terrorism as a Psychological Operation: Target Audiences

As Schmid's definition contends, the victim of terror is a mere medium through which the terrorist communicates his message to multiple target audiences. If the medium illicitly elicits a response that is inconsistent with the terrorists' objectives, then the medium will be changed not the method. Crenshaw contends that "as audience grows larger, more diverse, and more accustomed to terrorism, the terrorist must go to more

extreme lengths to shock."¹ Moreover, the terrorist changes his medium to both recapture the audiences' attention and retain his emotional advantage on the psychological battlefield.

All considered, the military function of terrorism is negligible, because the terrorist does not defeat the enemy by force of arms.² The terrorist's victory is won in the mind, he defeats his opponents psychological will to persist. Accordingly, Martha Crenshaw adds that "the intent of terrorist violence is psychological and symbolic, not material."³ Therefore, the success or failure of terrorism is best understood by focusing on the psychological components of the battlefield. By virtue of the psychological complexity of the terrorist battlefield each component must be understood relative to its psychological significance. The terrorist group, the act of violence, the target audiences and their responses to acts of violence create an intense array of psychological forces. The inter-relationship of these psychological forces encompasses the process of terror and will therefore serve as the analytical components of the Jewish and the Palestinian campaigns of terror.

The process of terror involves the inter-relationship between the terrorist's strategic selection of a victim manifest in an act of terror, relative to the terrorist's

¹Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," p. 386; and Jeffrey Rubin and Nehemia Friedland, "Terrorists and Their Audience: Theater of Terror," *Current* 284 (July-August 1986): pp. 38-39.

²Thornton, p. 75.

³Regarding the military function of terrorism, Martha Crenshaw's definition of terrorism is particularly apt "The systematic use of unorthodox political violence by small conspiratorial groups with the purpose of manipulating political attitudes rather than physically defeat an enemy...Terrorism is premeditated and purposeful violence, employed in a struggle for political power." Crenshaw, *Terrorism Legitimacy and Power*, p. 2.

objectives and target audiences, and the subsequent audiences' response to terrorist violence and any apparent future change in the terrorist's psychological strategy of terror. In order to make the process of terror more comprehensible, the terrorist's psychological battlefield is broken down into four components. The first component is the act of violence contributing to the second, attainment of the short-term instrumental or organizational objectives and the long-term ultimate political objective, relating to the third, the target audiences and their response to the act of violence, being interrupted by a fourth component, competing events and political forces, i.e. inappropriateness of the victim or misinterpretation of the violent message. Furthermore, audience response (third component) will be measured relative to physical and material changes in the terrorist environment, because the emotional responses are too subjective to be valid. Each of these components will be discussed in separate sections below and later applied to the case studies in the following chapters.

1. The Act: Target of Violence

Acts of terror are multi-dimensional, consisting of type, selection criteria, feature, and substance. There are at least eleven different types of terrorist acts, which include: bombing; kidnapping; arson; assassination; robbery; sabotage; raids, ambushes, and assaults; skyjacking/hijacking; and seizures of facilities. The Jewish terrorists can claim credit for conducting the first nine, while the Palestinian terrorists' repertoire of terror included all eleven. The type of act reflects terrorist capability, which is generally consistent with the specific historical circumstances; as discussed above (modernization, urbanization, social facilitation, transnationalism). Ultimately,

the combination of terrorist group's capability and its strategic choice of an anticipated response dictates the type of act committed. Therefore, the terrorist commits a violent act based on a selection criteria, limited by internal capability and constrained by external circumstances.⁴

a. Access to the Target of Violence

As discussed above, the process of modernization has provided the terrorist a target rich environment consisting of potential victims and vulnerable audiences. The communication, transportation and weapons innovations have magnified the scope of terrorism from the confines of the source of dispute to an outgrowth of international tension.⁵ Therefore, the terrorist must now choose from among an increasingly vulnerable mix of victims, the one most accessible and appropriate to prompt the desired response. The accessibility of victims is a relative function of "soft" or "hard" depending on the victim's availability, the terrorist group capability, and the level of protection or security afforded the victim. In other words, "soft" is less defended and therefore more accessible, than a more defended "hard" target which is obviously less accessible.⁶ For instance, the Stern Gang's initial and

⁴The terrorist group's limitations include previous activities, available manpower, experience level, and self confidence; and external constraints include political events, previous successes or failures of terrorist acts, debts owed to other groups: Robert H. Kupperman and Darrell M. Trent, *Terrorism: Threat, Reality, Response* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), p. 190.

⁵For a review of the impact of modernization and technological innovations on terrorist targetting: Paul Wilkinson, "Terrorist Targets and Tactics: New Risks to World Order," *Conflict Studies* 236 (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1990).

⁶For a discussion of the different acts of terrorism relative to group capabilities, weapons availability, general support apparatus, cadre, experience, unique skills, operating environment, target pool, government counter-measures, level of sophistication, clandestine havens, and external support: Kupperman and Trent, p.

subsequent failures to assassinate British High Commissioner Sir Harold McMichael was the result of a parallel increase in his personal protection making it less feasible to assassinate him on subsequent occasions. Therefore, an act of terror against an apparently soft target, becomes hardened in order to prevent subsequent attempts. A final example will bring into focus the extent to which this is possible and its implications concerning the terrorists ability to commit subsequent acts.

From 1968 to 1972, the Palestinian terrorism became synonymous with aircraft hijackings, which motivated airports world-wide to install metal detection devices in passenger boarding ways and submit passengers to the unpleasantness of random searches of personal luggage in order to reduce the likelihood of further hijackings. While the international airline industry made obvious security precautions against hijacking, less obvious was the measures taken by the Israelis. El Al, the Israeli international airlines, received the brunt of Palestinian assaults. From Bangkok to Brussels, Israeli airlines and ticket agencies were both vulnerable and accessible to Palestinian terror. Consequently, the Israeli authorities hardened both ticket agencies and aircraft with inconspicuous armed guards and reinforced the cockpits and baggage compartments of their passenger aircraft with steel plating in order to absorb a bomb's explosive impact and enable the aircraft to land with passengers unharmed. In February 1969, Israeli airport security were put to the test during an attack on an El Al plane taking off from Zurich. As the plane was taxiing, four Palestinian terrorists

riddled the plane with bullets, wounding three passengers and three crewmen. An on-board Israeli security guard jumped from the cargo door, pursuing the terrorists in an exchange of gun fire, shot and killed one terrorist, and would have killed the other three if Swiss police hadn't arrived to place the remaining three terrorists in custody. Consequently, Palestinian hijacking became considerably more costly as the years passed.

A final distinction needs to be addressed relative to the accessibility of victims. The modern media provides the terrorist an additional means to increase the influence of his violent message. The selection of a victim must capture the attention of not only local audiences, but international audiences as well. Therefore, the terrorist will select a victim based on not only its accessibility, but also its sensational appeal to the modern media and its ability to illicit intended responses by multiple audiences.⁷ Furthermore, the amplification of terrorist violence through the modern media increases the likelihood that the newly informed audiences will become psychologically vulnerable.⁸ To psychologically manipulate his target audiences, the terrorist must reverse the process of victimization, whereby he becomes the victim of violent atrocities committed by the occupying authority and only in desperation and

⁷Both the Jewish and the Palestinian terrorists completely understood the importance of media coverage. In those instances where media access/coverage was insufficient or occupied by other more newsworthy events the terrorists took it upon themselves to use their own propaganda apparatus, or shifted their target selection to more newsworthy acts of terror. Alex Schmid notes that although the Palestinian terrorists had the financial ability to develop an extensive propaganda apparatus capable of keeping international audiences informed of their exploits, they relied exclusively on Western news sources to propagandize their causes. Schmid and de Graaf, pp. 27-31.

⁸Additionally, the terrorist's access to the media facilitates contagion of violence among other terrorist groups. Robert G. Picard, "News Coverage as the Contagion of Terrorism: Dangerous Charges Backed by Dubious Science," *TWI Report* 7 (1987) 3, pp. 39-45.

self-preservation does he commit acts of extreme violence.⁹ Nonetheless, the terrorist's access to victims, the media, and audiences dissipates over time because of the forces of counter-terror committed to denying such access, and the existence of more captivating and newsworthy events occurring elsewhere. In order to regain the access to multiple audiences so vital to the process of terror, the terrorist must make a qualitative leap in his act of violence. Fattah contends that "inaccessibility of specific (victims or) targets may lead to the use of indiscriminate or random terror."¹⁰

b. Indiscriminate or Random Acts of Terror

The most salient feature of an act of terror is indiscrimination and randomness, which makes terror unpredictable and therefore more disorienting, which contributes to the creation of anxiety.¹¹ However, Calvert suggests that acts directed toward specific groups can create anxiety and disorientation among specific target audiences. He points out that "there are many degrees of discriminating terror, and the fact that it is carefully directed and calculated does not make its impact on its target any less devastating."¹² For example, in the case of Sir Harold MacMichael discussed

⁹Alex Schmid refers to this process as self-victimization, for more information. Alex Schmid and Janny De Graaf, *Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1982), p. 18-19.

¹⁰Ezzat A. Fattah, "Terrorist Activities and Terrorist Targets: A Tentative Typology," In Yonah Alexander and John M. Gleason (eds.) *Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), p. 27.

¹¹Fattah, p. 20; Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," p. 387; and Thornton, p. 81. Note: Fattah refers to categories indiscriminate or random acts of terror as "generalized" and selective or discriminate acts of terror as "personalized." pp. 28-29.

¹²Peter Calvert, "Terror in the Theory of Revolution," In Noel O'Sullivan (ed.) *Terrorism, Ideology, and Revolution* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), p. 32.

above, there was sufficient anxiety created not only within MacMichael, but regarding subsequent high commissioners who made it a matter of routine to travel heavily guarded or avoid travel all together during periods deemed most threatening.

Nonetheless, Thornton argues that terror must always have at least one element of indiscrimination, else it becomes predictable, loses its broad character, and can no longer be legitimately designated as terror.¹³ In effect, a particular act of terror becomes routine and therefore fails to maintain the extranormality of violence necessary to provoke audience response. Rubin and Friedland refer to this effect as the psychology of satiation, whereby a target audience becomes accustomed to particular acts of terror. They conclude that "a terrorist action if repeated too often, causes the audience to turn away in boredom. To be effective, terrorists cannot strike too often in the same place or in the same way "¹⁴

Turk argues that randomization of victim selection is the hallmark of political terror. He states that "randomization can be accomplished in two ways first by the largely indiscriminate selection of one or many persons representing a social category viewed as somehow a 'problem,' such as an enemy, obstacle, or irritant,

¹³Thornton, p. 81. For a contrasting perspective Rubin and Friedland argue that knowing the inevitable outcome of the plot in no way detracts from audience involvement or appeal, if anything, predictability heightens anticipation and involvement, p. 37.

¹⁴Rubin and Friedland, p. 37, and Thornton, pp. 80-81. Note. The literature also refers to the psychology of satiation as "routinization." For the purposes of this analysis, routinization or satiation will not be considered entirely negative, such that the continued existence of the terrorists and a threat of violence maintains a constant level of psychological tension. In other words, it is the dramatic events involving multiple casualties or particularly bloody incidents that result in the projection of violence to multiple audiences, while low-level violence (e.g., sniping, sabotage, etc) sustains a level of psychological tension providing the target of terror a constant reminder that a terrorist threat still exists.

second, by creating a generalized risk of injury or property loss for anyone who happens to be in, or have property in a target site."¹⁵ Randomization creates a generalized fear that innocence is irrelevant. The closer the audiences' identify with the victim the more acute the fear. Miller contends that "by its very nature terrorism can only function if it can disseminate fear. The essence of terrorism is to create a climate of fear in which the weaknesses of the terrorists are hidden through the distortion of public perception."¹⁶

The combination of indiscriminate and random acts of terror create a general perception that the terrorist group is larger than life and his system of terror encompasses all who oppose his objectives. According to Robert Asprey, "anyone who opposed creation of a Jewish state became fair game" in the eyes of the Stern gang and its followers.¹⁷ Similarly, George Habash, the leader of the PFLP, states that there are "no innocent victims" in this world.¹⁸ Yet, in reality, the terrorist is weak and his words don't always match his deeds. Furthermore, the terrorist's system of terror does not involve all those who oppose his objectives. The degree of discrimination and level of randomization do not provide the basis of the terrorist's selection of a victim, they are mere characteristics of the violent act as perceived by the audiences.

¹⁵Austin T. Turk, "Social Dynamics of Terrorism," In Marvin E. Wolfgang (ed.), *The Annals* 463 (December 1982): p. 122.

¹⁶Abraham H. Miller, "Terrorism and the Media in the United Kingdom: Government Policy as Symbolic Ritual," In David A. Charters (ed.) *Democratic Responses to International Terrorism* (New York: Transnational Publishers, 1991), p. 312.

¹⁷Asprey, p. 848.

¹⁸Kupperman and Trent, p. 191.

Ultimately, the desired response governs the degree of discrimination and level of randomization to be used in terrorism. In other words, the terrorist selects his victim, person or thing, according to the consequences he intends to provoke and the access he needs to multiple audiences in order to convey his cause.

c. Appropriateness of the Target of Violence

Most importantly, the terrorist selects a victim because it is appropriate given the outcome he anticipates. Fattah defines an appropriate victim as "one whose destruction or victimization would help best the terrorist's cause and would assist them in achieving their goals."¹⁹ For example, in the MacMichael case, his inaccessibility led the Stern Gang not to random or indiscriminate acts of violence, but to search for another more accessible and equally appropriate victim. On 6 November 1944, the Stern Gang assassinated Lord Moyne, the British Colonial Secretary for the Mid-East, which appropriately compensated for the less accessible and then still living MacMichael. While the British viewed this act as highly inappropriate, the Stern Gang found it highly appropriate given the circumstances and the message they intended to project. Consequently, those audiences finding themselves victimized or targeted by terrorist violence typically perceive acts of terror as wholly inappropriate, while on the other hand, the terrorist views the situation from an entirely different perspective.

¹⁹Fattah, p. 25.

d. Symbolic Significance of the Target of Violence

The appropriateness of an act of terror can only be completely understood by considering its symbolic substance. An act of terror can be perceived as symbolic only if the target audiences realize that the act implies a broader meaning than the physical or material destruction it creates. For example, the Sir Harold MacMichael's fulfillment of the British Jewish immigration policies made him a prime candidate for a symbolic terror. Bell notes, "as a symbol of the closed gates and the oppressing power in Palestine, the Lehi [Stern Gang] believed MacMichael would be a suitable victim."²⁰ As discussed above, the MacMichael's assassination was never realized, and Lord Moyne became an appropriate symbolic substitute. Similarly, the Palestinian terrorists' victimized El Al airlines and travel agencies as symbolically representative of Zionist occupation of their homeland.²¹

Thornton makes two crucial distinctions regarding the symbolic concept of the terrorist act: between terror and sabotage and between terror and assassination. He discusses further:

Although sabotage is virtually always directed against objects rather than against people, while terrorism is generally directed against people, a distinction can not be made solely along these lines--for terrorism is occasionally used against objects. The proper distinction--which coincides with persons vs. objects distinction in most cases--is to be found in the psychological, rather than the physical objective of the act. If the objective is primarily removal of a specific thing (or person) with a view towards depriving the enemy of its usefulness, then

²⁰J. Boyer Bell, *Transnational Terrorism* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute Press, 1975), p. 23.

²¹A review of the airlines servicing Israel's international airport indicates that most if not all Palestinian hijackings can be considered symbolic: BOAC, Cyprus Airways, KLM, Sabena (Belgium), SAS (Sweden), Swissair, and TWA.

the act is one of sabotage. If, on the other hand, the objective is symbolic, we are dealing with terror.²²

Therefore, the essence of an act of terror is the symbolic connection between the victim and the audience.²³ But, what are symbolic acts? Violent acts take on a symbolic significance when they represent the following: repressive or contradictory policies of the state, dates of historic significance for the enemy or the resistance, oppressive institutions or structures, persons or things that signify the dominant power, and so on. The list is not exhaustive, but it does provide an indication of what is generally characteristic of a symbolic act. Ultimately, the more symbolic the act of violence the less the act will be subject to misinterpretation by the target audiences.

e. Summary

In sum, randomized acts typically target larger audiences, whereas selective acts target smaller and more specific audiences. Accordingly, the more random or indiscriminate the violent act is perceived, the more the violent message is misinterpreted and the greater access it provides to multiple audiences. Adding a symbolic substance to the act reduces message distortion. However, this is provided that the audiences have been previously predisposed to understand the violent act's symbolic significance. Consequently, the act's symbolic significance, randomness or indiscrimination must be considered in the context of the terrorist's strategic choice and the historic and political circumstances during a given period. Furthermore, it is

²²Thornton, p. 77-78.

²³George Gerbner, "Symbolic Function of Violence and Terror," In Yonah Alexander and Robert Latter (eds.), *Terrorism and the Media* (New York: Brassey's, 1990), pp. 93-99.

important to keep in mind that purpose of an act of terror, random or selective, is to influence behavioral changes among target audiences. Walter states, "as long as terror is directed toward an end beyond itself (audience response) it has a limit and remains a process."²⁴

The randomness and indiscrimination were generally the most salient features of the Jewish and the Palestinian campaigns of terror, giving the impression that certain acts of terror were mere ends in themselves. However, this considers the violent acts from a spectators point of view, which fails to recognize the systematic aspects of the campaign from the terrorist's perspective. Furthermore, if a single act--indiscriminate, random, or otherwise--could achieve the terrorist's ultimate objective in a single blow, then there would be no need for a campaign of terror. Terrorism is essentially a war of attrition that defeats the enemy incrementally by wearing down his psychological will to resist in order to achieve a political victory.

2. Target Audiences

Prior to a discussion of the objectives of terrorism, an introduction to the audiences is essential because it will clarify those audiences that are an integral part of the psychological strategy of terrorism. For the purposes of this analysis, the four audiences (plus the one) introduced in Schmid's definition of terrorism above will suffice. To review, the five audiences include the target of violence, the target of terror, the target of demands, the target of attention and target of opportunity. Relating

²⁴Walter, p. 14.

the process of terror to the communication process will demonstrate the psychological link between each of the audiences. The initiator of the process of terror is a terrorist organization, or an individual terrorist. It, or he, establishes relations with the social environment, sending to it certain messages in the form of violent acts, namely to (1) the victim (e.g., person or thing), who is the target of violence, and (2) the specific groups most closely identified with him, who are the target of terror (e.g., political, social, economic, and political groups or elites); (3) and to a more broadly defined forces hostile to it, who are the target of demands (e.g., the colonial administrator, the occupying authority, or the organs of the state structure--the decision makers); (4) and to the domestic audience, who constitute the target of attention (e.g., those social-political groups linked to the administration and authority of the state); (5) the foreign public or target of opportunity (e.g., indirect popular constituencies, other terrorist organizations, and neutral audiences or potential supporters), including also the members of the terrorist organization itself and its national and international constituency (diaspora). Table 4-1 below depicts these audiences graphically in order to clarify an potential misunderstanding.

TABLE 4-1
GENERAL TYPOLOGY OF JEWISH AND PALESTINIAN TARGET AUDIENCES

Resistance	Target Audiences				
Movements	Violence	Terror	Demands	Attention	Opportunity
Zionist Mainstream	Symbol of British Immigration Policy	British Occupation and Security Forces	British Authority	British Public Opinion	US Public Opinion
Palestinian	Symbol of Israeli Colonization of Palestine	Israeli and Allied- International Constituency	Israeli Authority	Arab Public Opinion	Third World Opinion

The target of violence represents the medium through which the terrorist psychologically communicates to other target audiences. The target of violence is not always symbolic, but as discussed above this substantive feature of the act clarifies the violent effect by making it more distinguishable from random and indiscriminate acts. Considering for a moment that the target audiences exist along a continuum, from the target of terror to opportunity, the level of identification with the target of violence (victim) decreases as each audience becomes further removed from the target of violence. Furthermore, the greater the target audience identifies with the target of violence, the greater the perceived vulnerability of that audience to future acts of terror. Therefore, the terrorist selects a victim (target of violence) to target specific audiences in order to create the conditions he desires. For instance, if the terrorist is most concerned with manipulating the psychological vulnerabilities of the target of attention, then he selects a target of violence easily identifiable to or representative of

something or someone that audience considers important. Clearly then, the terrorist anticipates the consequences of a violent act and the behavioral response it will motivate. Yet violence, like other forms of communication, is subject to distortion, creating a wave of unintended consequences.

Crenshaw states that "terrorism as a process gathers its own momentum, independent of external events."²⁵ As a consequence of the terrorist's violence, this momentum creates negative perceptions and images in the minds of multiple audiences, all of whom may or may not have been considered in the terrorist's strategic design. In effect, the extranormality of the violent act exceeded the bounds of social regulation, whereby those audiences previously friendly or neutral have become hostile to the terrorist shifting their support to forces of counter-terror. The terrorist's challenge becomes one of recreating an image favorable to his continued existence and two, shifting the momentum to his advantage, whereby he distances himself from further acts of similar terror and commits acts that create consequences consistent with his objectives. Kupperman concludes that the terrorist's "prime concern is a positive outcome from each operation...leading to respectability before some constituency, the embarrassment of a government, and an ill-conceived reaction by that government while under pressure to 'do something.' 'The main point,' George Habash (the leader of the PFLP) once said, 'is to select targets where success is 100 percent assured. To

²⁵Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," p. 396.

harass, to upset, to work on the nerves through unexpected small damages."²⁶

Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the objectives of terrorism logically link an act of violence to target audience response, which in turn creates psychological and political consequences favorable to terrorist success.

3. Objectives of Terror

The next analytical component is the relationship between the terrorist's ultimate political and psychological objectives to the target audiences. In both the Jewish and the Palestinian case, the terrorists'--mainstream or dissident--ultimate objective was the establishment of a homeland. Each viewed the authority, the British or the Israelis, as illegitimate occupiers of their historic homeland. Accordingly, both the Jews and the Palestinians used terrorism as a logical means to achieve their ultimate political ends--statehood. Additionally, the terrorists waged a campaign of terror producing multiple psychological effects, each in some way linked to the achievement of their political objective. The psychological effects serve organizational or instrumental objectives, providing a formula that links the violent act to a target audience. While an act of terror can be broken down into its constituent parts, it is analytic impossibility to separate the terrorist's objectives from audience response, because the objective consists of a violent action and a subsequent reaction. Moreover, the success or failure of terrorism does not hinge on the act itself, but on how the audiences' respond to it. Therefore, the terrorist strategically selects victims consistent

²⁶Kupperman and Trent, p. 191; and Jay Mallin (ed.), *Terror and Urban Guerrillas: A Study of Tactics and Documents* (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1971), p. 46.

with objectives in order to provoke responses he anticipates. In both the Jewish and Palestinian cases, the ultimate objective remained constant, while the organizational and instrumental objectives varied relative to their contribution to the former. Therefore, the analysis of the organizational and instrumental objectives will bring into focus the use of terror as a psychological means to achieve political ends.

a. Organizational Terror

The organizational and instrumental objectives create psychological warfare and propaganda effects among specific target audiences. Essentially, organizational terror consists of those violent acts that have propaganda value to the terrorist group. They serve the morale building, competitive, coercive, and persuasive needs of the group. Morale building activities are those acts of violence that maintain and reinforce group and constituent cohesion and esprit. Terrorist violence also generates a competitive or a demonstration effect, whereby a spectacular act of terror communicates to other terrorist groups that a new standard of violence has been reached, whereby all future acts of violence will be measured. Acts of terror are coercive when the terrorist group uses such acts as punishment or control within the group itself or among its sympathizers. Similarly, acts of violence may be persuasive, advertising or propagandizing through "propaganda of the deed." Ultimately, organizational terror is group-centric, whereby acts of violence keep the group in business and propagandize its cause to neutral and friendly audiences.

b. Instrumental Terror

While organizational terror focuses exclusively on propaganda objectives, instrumental terror is a mixture of both psychological warfare and propaganda effects. Therefore, a single act of instrumental terror can produce multiple effects. Psychological warfare aims at enemy forces or those audiences hostile to it. Its effects include disruption, demonstration, revenge, and provocation. The propaganda influence serviced by instrumental terror is a collateral benefit. Whereby, a successful act of instrumental terror that disorients the enemy forces or his constituents may benefit the terrorist organization by boosting morale among his constituents, persuading neutral audiences that his goals are genuine, or generating a competitive atmosphere among other terrorist groups. Nonetheless, the intent is to attempt to isolate the impact of psychological warfare and propaganda in order to evaluate their contribution to achievement of the ultimate political objective (statehood). Ultimately, organizational and instrumental terror motivates selected target audiences to behave in a manner advantageous to the terrorist organization, which is consistent with the intended impact of psychological warfare and propaganda [Table 4-2, below provides a summary of the organizational and instrumental objectives (terror)].

A terrorist act motivates psychological responses ranging from curiosity to despair among the five target audiences. The target of violence is scared to death at least psychologically, or perhaps physically. Therefore, the target of violence is only significant in as much as the other target audiences identify with him or it. Furthermore, the ability of the remaining target audiences to perceive themselves as

potential victims is proportional to the level of discrimination. Moreover, there is a negative relationship between levels of discrimination and identification, such that a highly discriminate act combined with a low level of audience identification may at the most create acute anxiety. Kucuk argues that to induce a state of fear in a target audience is not the only goal of terrorist activity. Organizational terror aims at inspiring such responses as enthusiasm, curiosity, and anxiety. By contrast, instrumental terror is more decisive, motivating anxiety, fear, and despair. Kucuk contends further that while intimidation may be a component of the terrorist act targeted at specific audiences, there are other components of the act that transmit an effect less salient than intimidation. The target of terror and demands may be frightened or provoked, the target of attention informed of the existence and objectives of the terrorist group, and the target of opportunity, also informed, persuaded or won over to the terrorist's cause. Ultimately, terrorism is a means of psychological warfare on the one hand, and propaganda on the other.²⁷

²⁷Cited in Ejub Kucuk, "Political Terrorism as a Means of Psychological Warfare and Propaganda," *op cit*, p. 78. See also Brian Jenkins, "International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict," (Washington, DC: 1976), p. 7; Abraham Kaplan, "The Psychodynamics of Terrorism," *Terrorism: An International Journal* No. 3-4 (1978), 239; David L. Milbank, "Research Study, International and Transnational Terrorism: Diagnosis and Prognosis," CIA, (Washington, DC: CIA, 1976), p. 8; Robert H. Kupperman, "Treating the Symptoms of Terrorism: Some Principles of Good Hygiene," *Terrorism: An International Journal* 1 (1977): p. 37, and Gerlad Holton, "Reflection on Modern Terrorism," *Terrorism: An International Journal* 3-4 (1978): p. 320.

TABLE 4-2
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AND PROPAGANDA EFFECTS

Instrumental Terror		Organizational Terror	
Disruptive	Undermines the people's trust of political institutions in a certain society. Presents occupying authority as incapable of maintaining order, peace, and security; inducing a state of fear out of proportion to the damage created by the act of terror, leading to feelings of insecurity, distrust, and irritation for the ruling authority; aimed at disorganizing or creating havoc in the ranks of the occupying authority or state institutions. Degrades the morale standards of the occupying authorities security forces--take the morale high ground away; attacking the enemy's will to fight Damages international prestige of the occupying authority, by threatening foreign interests in a certain country, upsetting good relations among states or intensifying distrust among them, by exercising pressure on the real and potential, foreign and domestic supporters of anti-terrorist activities etc.	Morale Building	Success breeds admiration and pride among local and international constituents
Demonstrative	Proves that despite the military strength of the occupying power, the terrorist still possesses freedom of action	Competitive	Through spectacular and daring acts the terrorist group creates a new standard...becoming potentially contagious
Revenge	Seeks vengeance for present and past injustices or the repressive policies of the occupying authority	Coercive	Focuses terror on its own constituents as a means of control...denying constituents from collaborating with the security forces...detering dissident violence from escalating beyond levels necessary to achieve desired results
Provocative	Compels the occupying authority to introduce repressive measures which do not affect only the terrorist organization but the entire population of the respective country, degrading the occupying authority's prestige by exposing to the world audience the contradictory policies pursued by the target regime...intensifying the resentment of the people against the repressive measures of the authorities and to secure the legitimacy of terrorist violence	Persuasive	Wins the sympathies of certain social classes and strata, as well as support for the terrorist organization. Representing the vanguard in the struggle against world imperialism...

Note: The above objectives are a synthesis of the academia's reference to goals, aims, purposes, functions, and types.

Sources: Thomas P. Thornton, "Terrors as a Form of Political Agitation," In Harry Eckstein (ed.) *Internal War* (CN: Westview, 1964), pp. 82-84; Ejub Kucuk, "Political Terrorism as a Means of Psychological Warfare," *Socialist Thought and Practice* 21 (August 1981): pp. 80-81; Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," *Comparative Politics* 21 (July 1981), pp. 387, 394; and Ezzat A. Fattah, "Terrorist Activities and Terrorist Targets: A Tentative Typology," In Yonah Alexander and John M. Gleason (eds.) *Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism* (NY: Pergamon, 1981), pp. 11-32.

c. Typology of Instrumental and Organizational Terror

Tables 4-3a and b depict the organizational and instrumental typologies of terrorism (see next page). Table 4-3a illustrates the relationship between the propaganda effects, the typical target audiences, and the level of discrimination of an act of terror that provokes relatively positive emotional responses. For instance, the propaganda effect of competition is accomplished by committing an indiscriminate act of terror that arouses enthusiasm among the target of opportunity (e.g., another terrorist group).

TABLE 4-3A.
ORGANIZATIONAL (EMOTIONAL) TYPOLOGY OF TERRORISM

Propaganda Effects	Discrimination	Target Audience	Response
Morale Building	Irrelevant	Attention-Opportunity	Enthusiasm
Competitive	Irrelevant	Opportunity	Enthusiasm
Coercive	High	Demands-Attention	Anxiety
"	Medium	Terror-Attention	Anxiety
Persuasive	High	Attention-Opportunity	Curiosity

Sources: Refer Table 4-3b.

By comparison, Table 4-3b below represents the relationship between the psychological warfare effects, the typical target audiences, and the level of discrimination of the act of terror that provoke relatively negative emotional responses. Regarding the levels of discrimination, table 4-3b is lower than table 4-3a, reflecting the destructive intent of psychological warfare against target audiences more closely identified with the target of violence. The purpose of these two typologies is to

summarize the preceding discussion into a tabular format that brings into focus the impact of psychological warfare and propaganda on targeted audiences targeted, relative to the level of discrimination and the audiences potential response. The material and physical destruction created by an act of either instrumental or organizational terror obscures the real psychological effects lurking below. Considering the significance of the objective and the effect of the act, the audiences, and their response highlights the intense array of psychological forces that dominate the process of terror.

TABLE 4-3B.
INSTRUMENTAL TYPOLOGY OF TERRORISM

Psychological Warfare Effects	Discrimination	Target Audience	Response
Disruptive	Low	Terror-Demands	Fear
Demonstrative	High	Terror-Demands	Anxiety
"	Low	Terror-Attention	Anxiety-Fear
Revenge	High	Terror	Anxiety
"	Low	Terror-Attention	Despair
Provocative	Low	Terror-Demands	Fear

Sources: The above typologies are a synthesis of Martha Crenshaw's and Philip Karber's "Typologies of Terrorism," cited in Alex P. Schmid and Alber J. Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988), p. 52-53; Martha Crenshaw, *Revolutionary Terrorism* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 1979), pp. 36-37; and Philip A. Karber, "Urban Terrorism: Baseline Data and a Conceptual Framework," *Social Science Quarterly* 52 (December 1971): pp. 528-529.

d. Summary

An analysis of the objectives to be obtained through terrorist activity clearly reveals that terrorism is both a instrumental means of waging psychological warfare and an organizational means of propaganda. The objective of terrorism

through which the terrorist organization frightens the enemy, causes chaos with his ranks and destroys his forces, or harms his interests in another way, constitutes a first class weapon of psychological warfare. But, a terrorist act is not meant to be only a means of psychological warfare with the forces hostile to the terrorist organization, but also as a organizational means of propaganda with the members of the terrorist group itself, its real and potential sympathesizers, as well as the neutral parts of foreign and domestic population. The basic objective of propaganda is to morally strengthen the terrorist organization, to encourage its sympathesizers and to persuade the neutral parts of the population to commit themselves in any possible way to the goals of the terrorist organization.²⁸ Terrorism is the quintessential psychological operation, translating psychological warfare and propaganda objectives into a process of terror that uses instrumental terror to directly target enemy audiences and organizational terror to target known or potential friendly audiences.

B. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The preceding discussion provides the theoretical background for the development of an analytical framework. Martha Crenshaw contends that "the political effectiveness of terrorism is importantly determined by the psychological effects of violence on audiences."²⁹ But, how does this occur? How does the psychological impact of terrorist violence induce changes in the attitudes and political behavior of

²⁸Kucuk, 83-84.

²⁹Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Political Terrorism," p. 400.

multiple audiences? The answer can be obtained by breaking the previous discussion down into its component parts (table 4-4). First, a campaign of terror is composed of actors--mainstream, dissidents, and united resistance--all performing specific roles. Second, the selection of a target of violence is based on accessibility, appropriateness, and symbolic significance that relates to creating vulnerable audiences. Relating to the third, certain audiences identify with the target of violence or the terrorist group, which motivates the fourth, audience response. Each of the component parts will be discussed briefly below.

1. Roles

The efficacy of the Jewish and the Palestinian campaigns of terror hinged on the ability of specific groups to perform specific roles. The role of the mainstream was to essentially keep the campaign of terror focused on the political objective, avoiding indiscriminate acts of terror associated with dissident violence, and maintaining above ground political representation. The mainstream targets the enemy occupier directly, engaging in psychological warfare, which assaults the occupier's will in-depth. The dissidents, on the other hand, unconstrained by above ground political associations, commit acts of violence to indirectly provoke responses from audiences removed from the source of conflict. The role of the united resistance is a combination of mainstream and dissident roles: attempting to maintain its political representation, while escalating the level of violence in order to force a political result. Accordingly, a comparison of the roles played by the Jewish and the Palestinian terrorist groups will reveal those instances when the role of the groups were clearly defined and those

instances when they were not. Moreover, if terrorism is the systematic use of violence by one or more groups to achieve political ends, then the system functions best when the roles of each individual or group are clearly defined.

2. Selecting a Target of Violence

To achieve the desired political ends, the terrorist must select a target of violence (victim) that communicates a message. The terrorist's selection of a target of violence will be evaluated by the following: (1) accessibility of the target of violence serves as a linkage for the terrorist to multiple audiences; (2) appropriateness of the act given the consequences intended; (3) indiscrimination or randomness that either enhances accessibility or produces unintended consequences; and (4) the symbolic significance of the act that reduces message distortion and links the target of violence with more specific audiences, controlling for unintended consequences. In the end, the act of terror provokes audiences to respond, because of the real or perceived level of identification with the victim.

3. Target Audiences

As the third analytical component, the level of identification brings into focus the effect a specific act of terror will have on the spectators. The audiences' manifest level of identification is revealed by their feeling of vulnerability either as potential victims themselves or as supporters of the terrorist's cause. Furthermore, audience vulnerability is also enhanced by the timing, place, and scope of the attack. For instance, the timing, place, and scope of the Palestinian Black September group's

kidnapping of nine Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics could not have been better. By 9am 5 September 1972, the hooded Palestinian terrorists had the attention of the international media at the first Olympic games in Germany since Hitler's hosting of the 1936 Games, which lasted for 22 hours and ended in the tragic deaths of all nine hostages. The implications of Munich will be discussed more in detail in the following chapter. Suffice it to mention that the Israeli athletes would forever consider themselves vulnerable, as would to some degree host governments and attending spectators.

If an audience's level of identification varies relative to the victim selected, then the selection of a victim conveys different messages to dissimilar audiences. The success of terrorism depends on the accessibility and the vulnerability of selected audiences to respond in a manner the terrorist anticipates. In order to promote the desired response, the terrorist selects a target of violence that produces psychological warfare effects and propaganda effects. The terrorist uses psychological warfare to directly assault the target of terror and the target of demands, and uses propaganda to indirectly influence the target of attention and the target of opportunity. In this sense, psychological warfare erodes the popular and political will of the occupying authority, and propaganda builds popular support for the terrorist cause outside the source of the conflict. But, how then do the target audiences respond to the psychological warfare and propaganda effects of terrorism?

4. Measuring Audience Response

Fear, anxiety, curiosity, and so on are difficult responses to measure, because they are personal and time sensitive. Unfortunately, the luxury of first hand exposure to Jewish and Palestinian terror is not available, because without it measuring the impact of terrorist violence relative to emotional responses would be pure speculation and therefore empirically useless. Nonetheless, the Jewish and the Palestinian acts of terror did provoke behavioral responses that can be analytically measured. Any physical or material changes in the terrorist external environment will be the general basis of measurement of audience response. There are two categories of impact indicators, one direct and the other indirect. Direct impact indicators are those that relate to those audiences that were the objects of psychological warfare. The direct impact indicators include responsive actions (e.g., reprisals, curfews, searches, roadblocks), target audience reaction (e.g., local and international news reports), and constituent support for the forces of counter-terror (e.g., number of terrorists arrested during the search). Furthermore, the direct impact indicators typically represent the responses of the target of terror and target of demands. Indirect impact indicators measure the audience response relative to the propaganda effect. These indicators focus on behavioral changes in the target of attention and the target of opportunity (see Table 4-4 below).

TABLE 4-4.
TERRORISM AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATION
(TARGET AUDIENCE CONTROL SHEET).

Ultimate Objective: (1)				
Terrorist Group: (2)		Mission: (3)		Themes and Symbols (4)
	Target of Terror (5)	Target of Demands (6)	Target of Attention (7)	Target of Opportunity (8)
Audience(s): (5-8)				
Propaganda Target: (9)				
Psycho-Warfare Target: (10)				
Psychological Objective: (11)				
Conditions: (12)				
Vulnerability: (13)				
Identification: (14)				
Accessibility: (15)				
Impact Indicators: (16)				
Related Operations/Actions: (17)				
Catalyst: (18)				
Mainstream Approval:				

Legend:

- (1) What is the Ultimate Political Objective: Territorial compromise or no compromise.
- (2) Who is the group committing the act, is the group identified?
- (3) Mission: task is physical or material (e.g., sabotage) in order to achieve what psychological effect?
- (4) Theme or Symbol: Is this operation a continuation of similar activities and does the target of violence possess a symbolic significance (refer to block 14 for identification).
- (5-8) Who are the target audiences or Who was influenced by the act of terror?
- (9) Which audiences were propagandized?
- (10) Which audiences were psyop'd?
- (11) What was the psychological effect on each target audience?
- (12) What conditions enhance or detract from the psychological effects of the operation (e.g., competing events)?
- (13) How vulnerable were the target audiences to this act of terror (low, medium, high)?
- (14) What was each audiences' level of identification with the target of violence (low, medium, high)?
- (15) How accessible were/are the target of violence and the target audiences, and what means were/are available to access the intended audiences (print or electronic media)?
- (16) Impact indicators, those physical and material changes in the terrorist's external environment.
- (17) Previous acts of terror that may have contributed to the psychological vulnerability or access to target audiences.
- (18) Specific event preceding this act of terror that serves as a basis of justification.
- (19) If not a mainstream act, do they or don't they approve of the consequences (no comment equals approval)?

Table 4-4 above is the terrorist's target audience control sheet, which breaks down the terrorist act into its component parts. The purpose of this table provides an analytical guide and simplifies the process of terror by considering those psychological and political forces the terrorist controls or potentially controls, and those forces he does not. The legend clarifies what is meant by each block. Essentially, the Table synthesizes the preceding discussion into a checklist for evaluating the Jewish and Palestinian acts of terror.

5. Summary

It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze all the Jewish and Palestinian acts of terror (e.g., 1944-1947 and 1967-1974). However, certain incidents will be discussed in order to illustrate the roles of the groups, characteristics of the act, targeted audiences and their responses. In a chronological sense, the cumulative impact of acts of terror will be considered relative to their contribution to the creation of a political and social climate conducive to terrorist success. The intent is to bring into focus the idiosyncracies of the psychological warfare and propaganda components of the Jewish and the Palestinian campaigns of terror, which in the case of the former facilitated the accomplishment of the ultimate objective, and in the latter case did not. I will demonstrate that the pivotal aspect of the Jewish successful use of terrorism was the distinction between psychological warfare and propaganda target audiences. Furthermore, Jewish success was enhanced by the efficacy of roles played by the three terrorist groups. By comparison, the Palestinian were neither successful nor efficient, political achievements were marginal at best.

V. THE JEWISH RESISTANCE

In order to comparatively examine the role of terrorism in generating the intended political consequences within the framework discussed above, the differences between mainstream, dissident, and united resistance will illustrate their unique brands of terrorism. The mainstream manipulated the effects of terrorist violence in order to propagandize their cause and exploit the effects of the dissidents' instrumental terror. The mainstreams' objectives were typically persuasive, coercive, competitive, and morale-building, all of which were intended to propagandize their cause and keep the campaign of terror focused on a political result. Organizationally, the mainstream directly targeted the occupying authority and deterred the dissidents from escalating violence *beyond levels that would jeopardize the life of the resistance.*

While the dissidents intended to propagandize their cause, their acts of violence had more of a psychological warfare effect. Instrumentally, the dissidents directly targeted the occupying authority and intended to indirectly manipulate outside audiences. The dissidents' objectives were disruptive, demonstrative, provocative, and vengeance-related. However, as discussed above, psychological warfare can produce some organizational benefits as well, whereby those audiences who identify more with the terrorist and his cause than with the target of violence may be propagandized. Ultimately, it was the dissident factions' target of violence that transmitted to world audiences the plight of their subjected peoples.

The ultimate intent of Zionist campaign was to focus world attention on the "Palestine question" in order to illuminate the illegitimate, contradictory, and repressive policies of the occupying authorities. The efficacy of their campaign of terror depended on the ability of the mainstream and the dissidents to perform their proper roles. The success of the Zionist campaign depended on the appropriate selection of a target of violence to produce the intended propaganda and psychological warfare effect on domestic and international target audiences. The following analysis will assess the efficacy and level of success of the Jewish resistance relative to the intended psychological and political outcome. Considering the effects of psychological warfare and propaganda on multiple audiences will demonstrate how audiences relate to the target of violence in general and how audiences respond to terrorist violence in particular. We turn now to a discussion of mainstream and dissident roles, target of violence selection, instrumental and organizational objectives, and the specific incidents of terrorist violence to illustrate the psychological warfare and propaganda effects on multiple audiences.

A. THE ZIONIST MAINSTREAM

As discussed in Chapter II, the 1939 White Paper and the British refusal to increase the flow of European Jewish immigration at the end of World War II precipitated the rise of militant mainstream Zionism. The 1939 White Paper restricted European Jewish immigration to Palestine during a time when Hitler was intensifying his attacks against German and Austrian Jews. Moreover, the White Paper was the British answer to the Arab revolt, which was indicative of how violence could be successfully employed to gain political advantage. Accordingly, the mainstream Haganah increased its efforts to support the flow of illegal immigration, and targeted any British attempts to prevent such immigration. The Haganah's anti-British activity generally subsided once the Britain became involved in World War II, except for some minor sabotage operations directed against British activities and installations interfering with illegal immigration. In September 1945, the Zionist hopes of a relaxation of the British immigration policy were dashed when the newly installed Labour Government contradicted their pro-Zionist stance during the war, and held to the principles of the 1939 White Paper.¹

In the dark shadow of the Holocaust, Britain's blatant denial of the Jewish moral right to a homeland outraged the Zionists.² Accordingly, the Haganah intensified its attacks on the manifestations of British immigration control: inciting demonstrations in

¹Michael J. Cohen, *Palestine and the Great Powers, 1945-1948* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 69; Jon Kimche, *Seven Fallen Pillars: The Middle East, 1915-1950* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1950), p. 141; and Brian Crozier, *The Rebels* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1960), p. 185.

²Albert M. Hyamson, *Palestine Under the Mandate, 1920-1948* (London: Methuen, 1950), p. 157

Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem; clashing with British soldiers on the Lebanese border on 6 October 1945; liberating two-hundred and eight illegal immigrants from the Atlit detention camp on the 10th; and conducting an arms raid on a military camp on the 11th.³ On 31 October 1945, *Kol Israel* (Haganah's clandestine radio--the Voice of Israel) proclaimed the existence of the Jewish Resistance movement (*Tenuat Hamer*) composed of the Haganah, the Irgun, and the Stern Gang. That same night, the Jewish Resistance launched simultaneous assaults throughout Palestine: the Palmach blew up the Palestine railway system in 153 places; the Stern Gang successfully destroyed three police launches in Haifa and Jaffa, while their attempt to blow up a Haifa refinery failed; and the Irgun attacked the Lydda train station and rail yards, killing one British soldier.⁴ The intent of this assault was to create a "single serious incident" that would demonstrate to the British the gravity of the Zionists' desires for a reconsideration of their immigration policy and their dire need to create a Jewish national home.

Despite the apparent intensity of the Jewish mainstream's anti-British activities, there was a cool political logic guiding the recent wave of terrorist incidents. David Ben-Gurion, chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive (1939-1948), stressed that "the Haganah was to avoid the personal terror activities of the Lehi (Stern Gang) and the Irgun...each act of sabotage was to be calculated as to achieve maximum publicity,

³Cohen, p. 70. See also: *The Times*, 11 and 12 October 1946.

⁴Begin, *The Revolt* (New York: Shuman, 1951), pp. 186-191; Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, pp. 144-146; and *The Times*, 2 November 1945.

while every effort should be made to avoid human casualties."⁵ As Ben-Gurion had hoped, the serious incident provoked the British to form a committee of inquiry and not "go it alone," manifest in the introduction of the United States to help resolve the problem.⁶ Britain's repudiation of the Balfour Declaration, enforcement of the 1939 White Paper, and the denouncement of the Biltmore Program provided Ben-Gurion with sufficient cause to conclude that the British would not easily submit to Zionist diplomacy. Unlike Dr. Chaim Weizman (President of the World Zionist Organization), who favored dealing directly with the British, Ben-Gurion sought to indirectly influence the British policy toward the Mandate by building strong support in the United States.⁷

By increasing the costs of maintaining stability in Palestine through controlled incidents of mainstream terror directed at the manifestations of British immigration policy, Ben-Gurion intended to enhance the propaganda potential of these incidents by exploiting immigration as the moral weapon in order to generate international pro-

⁵Cohen, p. 70.

⁶Christopher Sykes, *Crossroads to Israel* (New York: World Publishing, 1965), p. 283. For a discussion of the Anglo-American Committee: Cohen, pp. 96-115. David Ben-Gurion was convinced that the main arena of diplomatic emphasis--outside Palestine--was not Britain but America. Aside from the Yishuv itself we had no more effective tool at our disposal than the American Jewish community and the Zionist movement...Cited in: Walid Khalidi (ed.), *From Haven to Conquest* (Washington, DC: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987), p. 480.

⁷The Zionist propaganda campaign concentrated on winning the approval of American public opinion and Congress, and through both, of the government, for the resettlement of European Jews in Palestine, the abrogation of the White Paper, and a pro-Zionist solution of the Palestine problem along the lines of the Biltmore Program (Jewish commonwealth): J.C. Hurewitz, *The Struggle for Palestine* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1950), p. 174.

Zionist sentiment in general and United States support in particular.⁸ Nonetheless, the mainstream Haganah's terror was nothing more than a tactic aimed at keeping pressure on the British toward a pro-Zionist solution to the Palestine problem.⁹ While the Haganah's attacks on the British immigration controls were instrumentally disruptive, they were meant more for increasing the organizational strength of the Palestinian Jewish community than instrumentally decreasing the psychological strength of the British occupier.

Additionally, the mainstream's fear of being the tarred with the terrorist's brush led to open collaboration with the British during their counter-terror campaign against the dissidents (see below). While Ben-Gurion endorsed the selective use of terrorism directed at the manifestations of British immigration policy, he feared uncontrolled dissident violence would provoke severe British reprisals that could crush the Yishuv. Ultimately, Ben-Gurion's fear of British ability to crush the Yishuv prompted him to adopt a policy of restraint against the British and a hope for American sympathy.¹⁰ In

on, the mainstream's role was to isolate Great Britain diplomatically by driving a political and psychological wedge between Britain and the United States. Furthermore, the Jewish mainstream sought to deter dissident violence by employing the Haganah

⁸After 1945, the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA) used mass meetings, protest rallies, and public petitions as a mechanism to create the desired pressure on the Truman Administration. In August 1945, a 200,000 person rally gathered in New York's Madison Square Park to protest British White Paper policy and a similar rally was staged in 1946, refer Appendix A, Table A-1.

⁹Rayford, pp. 742-743.

¹⁰Gordon E. Rayford, *The Righteous Executioners: A Comparative Analysis of Jewish Terrorists of the 1940s and the Palestinian Terrorists of the 1970s* (NY: City University of New York, Ph.D. Dissertation, 1980), pp. 131-132; and J. Boyer Bell, *Terror out of Zion* (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1977), pp. 47-48.

against the dissident Irgun and Stern Gang. In the end, it was the dissidents, not the mainstream, that used terrorism as an all consuming strategy, servicing as both an instrumental and an organizational means to destroy the occupying authority's psychological strength.

On 6 November 1944, the Stern Gang assassinated Lord Moyne, the British minister of state in Cairo. The immediate general reaction was outrage. Following an emotional speech by Winston Churchill to the House of Commons, "on 20 November 1944, the sixth Histadrut convention approved Ben-Gurion's four-part motion: expulsion of members of separatists groups from their employment; denial to them of shelter and refuge; no submission to threats and extortion; and most important, cooperation with the British to wipe out the terror."¹¹ In other words, with the British furious and the Jewish Agency stunned, they both agreed on an open season (*Saison*) against the dissidents.¹² On 11 January 1945, Lord Moyne's assassins were condemned to death and subsequently executed on 23 March 1945.¹³

Organizationally, the *Saison* was cruel and effective. Rather than turn the dissidents over to the British immediately upon capture, the Haganah would subject them to their own interrogation first: "fingers broken in door hinges, regular beatings,

¹¹Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, p. 127.

¹²Begin, p. 145.

¹³J. Boyer Bell, *Transnational Terror* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1975), p. 22; and Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, p. 100.

burns, threats, more fake executions."¹⁴ From November 1944 to May 1945, more than one-thousand dissidents had been turned over to the British. As Eliahu Golomb, the Chief of the Haganah, noted "the organized Yishuv had [has] brought terrorist activity to a standstill."¹⁵ The assassination of Lord Moyne had exceeded the bounds of mainstream organizational tolerance, whereby the dissidents--forced further underground--were nearly extinguished.

On 29 June 1946 (Black Saturday), the British authorities raided the headquarters of the Jewish Agency in Palestine. Documents obtained in the raid revealed the Agency's involvement in anti-British activities, prompting the subsequent detention of over 2,700 Jews during the next two weeks.¹⁶ The British had effectively brought the Jewish Agency to its knees, and more importantly, the Haganah's subversive activities were exposed. This incident and series of arrests eventually led to the bombing of the King David Hotel on 22 July. The King David Hotel contained the executive offices of the British Administration in Palestine. At 12:37pm on the 22nd, the dissidents detonated a bomb in the basement of the Hotel's south wing, killing and wounding over one hundred people.¹⁷

¹⁴Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, p. 134. Asprey points out that by the end of 1944, 279 Irgunists and Sternists had been captured and deported by the British to Eritrea: Robert B. Asprey, *War In the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History* Vol. II (New York: Doubleday, 1975), p. 774.

¹⁵Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, pp. 133-134; and Hurewitz, p. 199. For a discussion of the Haganah's intelligence organizations contribution to the *Saison*: Samuel M. Katz, *Soldier Spies: Israeli Military Intelligence* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1992), pp. 31-33.

¹⁶Cohen, p. 85; Hurewitz, pp. 254-255; Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, p. 167; and Kimche, p. 146.

¹⁷For a detailed account of the King David Bombing, "Operation Chick:" Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, pp. 168-173.

Again, the British and the Yishuv were outraged by the indiscriminate killing of innocence. The Jewish Agency immediately claimed no knowledge of the operation. Yet, in spite of the Agency's and Haganah's claim to the contrary, there was evidence that they had both knowledge and probable cause to insure the plan was carried out, due to the fact that the King David housed the incriminating documents seized by the British on 29 June.¹⁸ Nonetheless, the mainstream would not allow itself to be linked to the dissidents' indiscriminate acts of terror. Accordingly, the Haganah collaborated with the British, in the so-called *mini-Saison*, to liquidate the dissidents which lasted until mid-August 1946. Inevitably, Black Saturday, the King David atrocity, and the *mini-Saison* proved to Ben-Gurion that the political future of Palestine depended on the mainstream's distance from indiscriminate terror and an ability to control it if need be. Accordingly, on 23 August 1946, the united resistance was officially dissolved by Ben-Gurion. He knew that the dissidents would continue their subversive activities, while he was free to remain the recognized leader of mainstream Zionism in Palestine with whom the British would have to negotiate.¹⁹

From August 1946 until May 1948, mainstream and dissident unification was infeasible due to the mainstream's collaboration with the British during 1944-1945 and the Summer of 1946 anti-terror campaigns.²⁰ Menachem Begin, the leader of the Irgun (1943-48), refused to give in to organizational demands for retaliation against the

¹⁸Cohen, pp. 90-91; Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, p. 168-169, Asprey, p. 776.

¹⁹Rayford, p. 202

²⁰Rayford, pp. 181-85; and Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, pp. 135-38.

mainstream for their brutal treatment of captured dissidents.²¹ He was a man guided by instrumental logic, who viewed terrorism as a means to achieve an ultimate political end. Begin stated,

We decided not to suspend our struggle against the British rule; yet at the same time we declined not to retaliate for the kidnappings, due to the denunciations and the handing over of our men...Not logic, but instinct said imperatively: No; not civil war. Not that at any price." And who knows: perhaps instinct is the very heart of logic.²²

As J. Boyer Bell puts it:

to rid Palestine of the separatists [dissidents] at the cost of a huge pool of Jewish blood would have given everyone pause...The Haganah's Season had maimed without killing, created sympathy where none had existed before, endowed the Irgun with a long denied legitimacy, and when ended, assured Begin that the great divide had been safely if painfully passed: the revolt would have the toleration of the Yishuv. With the toleration, and perhaps soon with positive sympathy, the Irgun could persevere.²³

In sum, the mainstream used a small dose of instrumental terror to disrupt the British anti-immigration efforts and used organizational terror against the dissident Irgun and Stern Gang in order keep indiscriminate acts of terror from undermining political progress. The two *Saisons* exemplified the mainstream's organizational objectives, but only collaborating so far as to not jeopardize their image in front of the Yishuv. The "single incident" demonstrated the mainstream's ability to exploit the psychological potential of violence to provoke the intended result--British introduction

²¹Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, pp. 135-36; and Samuel Katz, *Days of Fire* (New York: Doubleday, 1968), p. 85

²²Begin, p. 152; Rayford, p. 183; and Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, p. 134.

²³Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, pp. 135-136; and J. Boyer Bell, *On Revolt: Strategies of National Liberation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 52.

of the United States. Furthermore, this incident also illustrated the mainstream's recognition of the merits of controlled dissident violence. In the end, the mainstream was in a position to organizationally control the resistance and instrumentally benefit from dissident acts of violence.

B. THE JEWISH DISSIDENTS

Like the mainstream, the Jewish dissidents opposed the British immigration policies, but their violence was precipitated by a different interpretation of events. By comparison to the mainstream, the Irgun awaited neither the end of the second World War nor the arrival of a pro-Zionist government in Britain to begin the "Revolt" against the British occupier.²⁴ The British repudiation of the Biltmore Program was enough to send the Irgun into final preparations for the armed struggle. An acceptance of the Biltmore Program would have guaranteed the Jewish right to a state in Palestine, whereby future immigration would be under the complete jurisdiction of a Jewish authority. But as it was, the British refused. This combined with the word of continued extermination of Jews in Hitler's concentration camps provoked the Irgun into action. The dissident Revolt began on 1 February 1944, with Begin proclaiming that:

There is no longer any armistice between the Jewish people and the British Administration in Eretz Israel which hands our brothers over to Hitler. Our people is at war with this regime--war to the end. This then is our demand: immediate transfer of power in Eretz Israel to a provisional Hebrew government.

²⁴However, Begin would not allow the Irgun to attack the British Army until the war with Germany was over. Katz, p. 83; and Asprey, p. 773.

We shall fight, every Jew in the homeland will fight. The God of Israel, the Lord of Hosts, will aid us. There will be no retreat. Freedom or death.²⁵

The dissident Revolt would eventually be instrumental in placing the Palestine question on the international agenda. Through spectacular and daring acts, the dissidents would simultaneously publicize their cause and illustrate for attentive audiences the contradictory policies of the occupying British authorities. Begin's goals were independence without territorial compromise (eventual Jewish state would be mandate Palestine in its entirety) and the complete deterioration of British authority in the Mandate. The effectiveness of the Arab revolt (1936-1939) in Palestine and the Irish Republican Army in Ireland at forcing British concessions provided the basis for Begin's strategy, which avoided direct confrontation with British forces by attacking targets symbolic of British prestige.

Unlike the mainstream targets of violence, the Irgun's included not only manifestations of British immigration policy, but also all targets symbolic of British authority. Ultimately, Begin understood that the British presence in Palestine depended on the maintenance of a prestigious international image which originated in British popular will.²⁶ Accordingly, Begin wrote,

The very existence of an underground, which oppression, hanging, torture and deportations fail to crush or to weaken must in the end, undermine the prestige of the colonial regime that lives by the legend of omnipotence. Every attack which it fails to prevent is a blow at its standing. Even if the attack does not

²⁵Cited in: Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, p. 112

²⁶Begin, p. 52.

succeed, it makes a dent in that prestige, and that dent widens into a crack which is extended with every succeeding attack.²⁷

In typical terrorist style, it was Begin's intention to provoke overreaction by the British forces, thereby creating an immoral or an illegitimate incident for the world to see. The dissidents' execution of daring and spectacular acts would arouse popular resistance and force a British blow to play into their hands. The demonstrated potential of an armed minority to commit acts of terror at will would prove the British incapable of maintaining order, peace, and security in the Mandate.

The British frustrated attempts to crush the resistance manifest in acts of repression would be exposed to the world with ever-increasing interest. Ultimately, the dissidents acts of terror would erode the British will to resist. By attacking the occupier directly and exposing his repressive tendencies, the Irgun intended to psychologically separate the British occupation forces from their popular support base. In other words, the exposure of the British repressive tendencies would cost Britain's prestigious imperial image, which was a price, the dissidents reasoned, the British public would not bare. As Begin said, Palestine resembled a glass house with its transparency providing their shield of defense and arms their weapons of attack.²⁸

While the Irgun targeted the collective representation of British authority, the Stern Gang targeted individual manifestations of anti-Zionism, adding assassination to

²⁷Begin, p. 52; Bell, *Terror out of Zion*, pp. 142-143; and Asprey, p. 773.

²⁸Begin, p. 56.

the dissident repertoire of terror.²⁹ The Stern Gang's targets of violence included those deemed responsible for the colonization of Palestine, high commissioners, ministers of state, chiefs of police, etc. By comparison, like the mainstream, the Irgun made it standard practice to avoid civilian casualties, issuing warning prior to their assaults.³⁰ The Stern Gang's acts of violence were meant not only to instrumentally demonstrate to the occupying British that a challenge to their authority existed, but to also break the passive organizational restraint of the Jewish community in Palestine (Yishuv). In sum, the dissidents' targets of violence consisted of the individual and collective manifestations of British authority, whereas the mainstream's targets included those singularly representative of British immigration policy. Through acts of extranormal violence, the dissident Irgun and Stern Gang intended to erode British popular support and ignite the Yishuv into active resistance against the British presence in Palestine.

All the Jewish resistance groups viewed immigration as a pressing problem, but differed on what was the first priority, immigration or statehood. The mainstream envisioned Jewish Palestine being built on an immigrant-by-immigrant basis. The dissidents, on the other hand, saw statehood as a most pressing need and immigration would follow thereafter. Furthermore, the mainstream and the dissidents differed on the eventual size of the Jewish state. The mainstream was willing to accept territorial partition, whereas the dissidents envisioned the future state of Israel encompassing the

²⁹Refer: Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, pp. 78, 89-100, 183-84, 336-39.

³⁰Katz, p. 93.

entire British Mandate (stretching from the Jordan River in the east to the Mediterranean coast in the west).

In order to achieve their ultimate political objective, the mainstream and dissidents performed different roles. The mainstream disassociated itself with the perceived dissident indiscriminate acts of terror, providing the necessary political freedom of maneuver when the time came to assume control of the Jewish state. Furthermore, the mainstream was committed to controlling the dissidents so as to not jeopardize Zionist diplomatic initiatives. The dissidents' role, unconstrained by above ground political associations, was to use acts of violence that would attract world-wide attention to their cause. Psychologically, this entailed the Stern Gang's selection of targets of violence directly representative of the British imperial system in general and Mandate administration in particular. The Irgun's role, on the other hand, manifest in a selection of targets of violence that indirectly targeted the psychological vulnerabilities of the British occupier--their pride and prestige. In effect, Ben-Gurion was the diplomat and Begin was the terrorist, the former exploiting the latter's campaign of terror to political advantage.³¹

³¹For a detailed discussion of the Irgun's strategy: J. Boyer Bell, "The Palestinian Archetype: Irgun and the Strategy of Leverage," *On Revolt: Strategies of National Liberation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 33-70; and Lehi (Stern Gang) strategy: J. Boyer Bell, "The Anatomy of a Revolutionary Strategy: Lehi, Lord Moyne, and Bernadotte," *Transnational Terrorism* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1975), pp. 22-25; and for a summary of the Jewish anti-colonial struggle: Brian Crozier, "Terrorist Successes," *The Rebels: A Study of Post-War Insurrections* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1960), pp. 182-191.

C. TARGET AUDIENCES

The preceding discussion should have made clear that the Zionist mainstream influenced international audiences primarily through non-violent diplomatic channels and the British authority in Palestine through terrorist tactics against manifestations of immigration policy. By comparison, the dissidents transmitted a violent message to both domestic and international audiences, whereby the targets of violence were generally linked to audiences beyond the source of dispute. The following will demonstrate how the psychological impact of terrorist violence induces changes in the attitudes and the political behavior of multiple audiences. The answer to this question will be provided by analyzing the audience responses to the Stern Gang's assassination of Lord Moyne, the Irgun's bombing of the King David Hotel, and the Irgun's campaign against the British judicial system. In order to get a sense of how terrorism was or was not able to contribute to the political result (statehood), a brief discussion of the cumulative impact of other acts of terror will be provided as well.

1. The Assassination of Lord Moyne

In February 1942, a Jewish immigration ship, the *Struma*, containing over 700 refugees was refused entry into Palestine. Sir Harold MacMichael, the British High Commissioner, suspected that some of the passengers on board may have been Nazi agents. On 14 February, while under tow in the Black Sea, the *Struma* broke free and sank, leaving only one survivor. Soon thereafter, handbills were made up: "Sir Harold MacMichael, known as the High Commissioner of Palestine, WANTED FOR

MURDER by drowning 800 refugees aboard the *SS Struma*.³² From 1942 to August 1944, the Stern Gang attempted to assassinate MacMichael five times.³³ When word came of his departure, the Stern Gang searched for an appropriate substitute for the inaccessible MacMichael.

Lord Walter Edward Guinness Moyne, the British minister of State of Middle Eastern Affairs, MacMichael's superior, supporter of the 1939 White Paper, an Arabist, and an ardent anti-Zionist, provided the Stern Gang an accessible and appropriate substitute target of violence.³⁴ Bell states that Moyne was an ideal target of violence because of his title, his cabinet rank, his connections in Britain, and his friendship with Winston Churchill. In a single spectacular act, the Stern Gang would internationalize the Palestine question, which they reasoned would prevent Britain from handling Palestine like a colony and ultimately change the course of history.

On 6 November 1944, the Stern Gang assassinated Lord Moyne in Cairo. The target audiences responded (see Figure 5-1 below): the targets of terror, the Egyptians feared they'd be blamed and the Colonial administration was appalled, the target of demands, the Parliament was outraged and wanted the Yishuv to help in capturing the dissidents, and the targets of attention, the Jewish Agency and the Yishuv were dismayed and prepared to cooperate with the British counter-terror effort.

³²Gerold Frank, *The Deed* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1963), pp. 110-111.

³³Christopher Sykes *Crossroads to Israel* (London: Collins, 1965), p. 249; Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, p. 90-91, and Frank, Chapter 14.

³⁴Frank, p. 191; Sykes, p. 254; and Katz, *Soldier Spies*, p. 31.




Figure 5-1.

The Assassination of Lord Moyne: Target Audiences

Accordingly, Winston Churchill stated "these harmful activities must cease and those responsible for them must be radically destroyed or eliminated."³⁵ On 20 November, Ben-Gurion echoed Churchill's remarks by devising a plan for the Jewish Agency and the Haganah to cooperate with the British to wipe out dissident terror (see the *Saison* above).³⁶ All considered, the assassination of Lord Moyne did not provoke the intended consequences, the targets of attention and opportunity were not propagandized positively toward the terrorist's cause.

³⁵Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, p. 127.

³⁶*Ibid.*

With the world still involved in a Second World War, the assassination of a minister of state by a oppressed minority was bound to have difficulty motivating international sympathy.³⁷ The Stern Gang did calculate Moyne's appropriateness and symbolic significance, yet failed to recognize the audiences' psychological dispositions given the present historical circumstances. With the British furious and the Jewish Agency stunned, they both agreed to liquidate the dissidents.³⁸ On 11 January 1945, Lord Moyne's assassins were condemned to death and executed on 23 March 1945.³⁹ The audiences' applauded, colonization of the Mandate materialized, and history had not changed positively for the terrorist's cause. Once the WWII ended, the world stage awaited the next in a series of terrorist's dramas emanating from Palestine--the bombing of the King David Hotel.

2. The Bombing of the King David Hotel

On 22 July 1946, a bomb exploded in Jerusalem's King David Hotel, killing 91 and injuring 45.⁴⁰ The Hotel was the Mandatory headquarters housing the British military command, the administration senior executives, and the Central Intelligence Department (CID), and possessed impressive defenses. Ultimately, the King David Hotel was the physical and symbolic representation of the center of British

³⁷Walter Z. Laqueur, *A History of Zionism* (NY: Schocken, 1972), pp. 556-557.

³⁸Begin, p. 145.

³⁹J. Boyer Bell, *Transnational Terror* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1975), p. 22; and Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, p. 100.

⁴⁰Asprey, p. 776; and Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, p. 172.

social and diplomatic life and imperialism in the Middle East. The intention of the attack was to present a severe blow to British prestige and destroy the incriminating documents seized from the headquarters of the Jewish Agency on the 29th of June.⁴¹ Yet, the perceived indiscrimination of the attack raised doubts about the dissidents' intent, whereby the Jewish Agency refused to accept responsibility and the British were quick to blame the dissidents. A controversy arose over the Irgun's claim that a warning was sent and the British claim that no such warning existed.⁴² Nevertheless, the general response was disgust, due to the loss of so many innocent lives and a lack of justification that neither the mainstream nor the dissident terrorists could provide.

Figure 5-1 below illustrates the relationship between the target of violence--the King David Hotel--and the remaining target audiences. Clearly, the group that most closely identified with the target of violence was the British administration--target of terror. The symbolic significance of the target of violence facilitated further identification relative to the target of demands--the British Parliament. The Yishuv and British popular opinion, the target of attention, were effected because of the apparent indiscrimination of the act. Moreover, such an atrocity lent to the introduction of the target of opportunity, international public opinion in general and US public opinion in particular. A description of the dynamics of the bombing will illustrate the responses

⁴¹Rayford, p. 202; and Cohen, pp. 90-91.

⁴²For a discussion of the warning: Begin, p. 219; Katz, p. 94; Kimche, pp. 174-175; and Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, p. 173. The author is of the opinion that warning or not, a bomb explosion at 12:37pm on a Monday in a building that is half British administration and the other half is a hotel and restaurant had to have been considered as having the potential of killing a number of innocent people.




Figure 5-2.
The Bombing of the King David Hotel: Target Audiences

of each of the target audiences.

Indicative of the target of terror's response (British Administration) was the initiation of strict curfew regulations, cordon and search operations, and the arrest of suspected dissidents. Over three hundred Jews were eventually detained on suspicion of the King David bombing. These measures lasted until 7 August. The Yishuv (target of attention) was similarly outraged manifest in the Jewish Agency's condemnation of the act. Accordingly, Ben-Gurion denounced the attack by stating that "the Irgun is the

enemy of the people."⁴³ In response, Begin stated that "the Hebrew Resistance Movement denounced the heavy toll of lives caused by the dissidents' operation at the King David Hotel."⁴⁴ Despite Begin's plea, a 2000 pounds reward was placed on his head.⁴⁵ The British Parliament (target of demands) hardened as reflected in a statement by the British Prime Minister Clement Attlee:

The British Government have stated and stated again they will not be diverted by acts of violence in their search for a just and final solution to the Palestine problem⁴⁶...The authorities in Palestine will be provided with any sanctions they need to prevent attacks by terrorists...⁴⁷

President Truman provided the best indication of the target of opportunity's feelings toward the act, when he stated:

Such acts of terrorism will not advance but, on the contrary, might well retard the efforts that are being made, and will continue to be made, to bring about a peaceful solution of this difficult problem.⁴⁸

As Litvinoff suggests, "the Irgun had intended the explosions to be a propaganda spectacular, not a mass murder."⁴⁹ Yet, the effect was of minimal

⁴³Begin, p. 207.

⁴⁴Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, p. 226. For a full account of the incident refer to: Bell, pp. 168-73; and Begin, pp. 212-230.

⁴⁵Kimche, p. 175.

⁴⁶Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, p. 173.

⁴⁷*The Times*, 24 July 1946.

⁴⁸Cited in: Zvi Ganin, *Truman, American Jewry, and Israel, 1945-1948* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979), p. 78. Note: Within the statement, President Truman also mentioned his support for an increase in 100,000 Jewish immigrants to Palestine: Robert Kumamoto, "Diplomacy from Below: International Terrorism and American Foreign Relations, 1945-1962," *Terrorism: An International Journal* 14 (1991): pp. 35-36.

⁴⁹Barnet Litvinoff, *To the House of Their Fathers: A History of Zionism* (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 248.

propaganda value. While the bombing of the King David Hotel may have advertised the cause, it won few supporters. The bombing was a classic form of psychological warfare in which the Irgun failed to control for the effects on multiple audiences. Therefore, the bombing of the King David Hotel presented the dissidents with some unanticipated consequences: polarizing the Yishuv, alienating the Jewish Agency, and receiving condemnation from the international community. The Irgun (and the Stern Gang), forced further underground by the extensive British counter-terror initiatives, became cut-off from any potential political base. Moreover, the Jewish mainstream's refusal to accept blame and condemnation of the dissidents undermined any hope of a reestablishment of a united resistance. The united resistance was officially dissolved on 23 August 1946.

Although this attack alienated the Irgun, the British eventually played into their hands. General Barker, the British Military Commander in Palestine, apparently took Attlee's sanctioning literally when he stated:

I am determined that they [Yishuv] should be punished and made aware of our feelings and contempt and disgust at their behavior...I understand that their measures will create difficulties for the troops, but I am certain that if my reasons are explained to them, they will understand their duty and will punish the Jews in the manner this race dislikes the most: by hitting them in the pocket, which will demonstrate our disgust for them.⁵⁰

The Irgun created a wall poster out of this statement illustrating to the Yishuv the anti-semitic character of the occupying authority.

⁵⁰Cited in Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, p. 174; See also: Jon Kimche, *Seven Fallen Pillars: The Middle East, 1945-1952* (New York: Prager, 1953), p. 41-42.

Consequently, while the initial responses of outrage and disgust were negative, the process of terror eventually reversed these responses for the positive benefit of the terrorist cause. The attack demonstrated the capability of a small clandestine force to penetrate impressive British defenses, which brought into question the British ability to maintain control over the Mandate. While British and Zionist public opinion was outrage, they both began to question the legitimacy of the occupying authority. Ultimately however, the attack undermined any hope of a unified resistance due to Ben-Gurion's and the Haganah High Command's denial of any prior knowledge of the operation. Therefore, the Irgun had to turn to a more comprehensible means of violence, from which to convey a message that would not alienate their most critical ally, the Yishuv.

3. The Campaign Against the Judiciary

The Irgun's campaign against the British judicial system provided the means to communicate a more comprehensible message to both the Yishuv and the British public (the targets of attention). The Irgun's campaign against the judiciary began in June 1946. The intent was to present to the British public the contradiction between their much acclaimed sense of "fair play" and the actions resulting from their government's policy in Palestine.⁵¹ Compared to the King David bombing, the selection of the targets of violence were more discriminate during the Irgun's campaign against the judicial system. Accordingly, the target audiences (see Figure 5-2) were somewhat

⁵¹Rayford, p. 198.

different: the targets of violence were British soldiers, not a material structure like the King David Hotel; the targets of terror were either those individuals most closely related to the target of violence or those individuals most responsible for executing the unorthodox punishments (hanging, flogging, and martial law), the target of demands




Figure 5-3
The Campaign Against the Judiciary: Target Audiences

was the British colonial administration, because it was they who had the authority to change these policies; and the targets of attention and opportunity remained the same

Inevitably, the Irgun intended to expose the contradictory character of the British judicial process--hangings, flogging, and martial law--to the targets of attention and opportunity.

a. Floggings

In December 1946, two Irgunists were sentenced to 18 year prison terms and 18 lashes of the whip. While flogging may have been a common practice during British colonization and symbolic of imperial mastery, it was not to be an acceptable punishment in the Mandate. "Was an oppressor now to whip us in our own country," asked Begin?⁵² The Irgun's initial response was to publicize through wall posters this ridiculous, inappropriate, and out-dated form of punishment. The Irgun published a warning to the British stating:

For hundreds of years you have been whipping natives in your colonies--without retaliation. In your foolish pride you regard the Jews in Eretz Israel as natives, too. You are mistaken. Zion is not exile. Jews are not Zulus. You will not whip Jews in their homeland. And if British authorities--officers will be whipped in return.⁵³

The first was followed a second publication of Irgun's anti-flogging ultimatum:

⁵²Begin, p. 231.

⁵³Ibid., p. 233.

WARNING!

A Hebrew soldier, taken prisoner by the enemy, was sentenced by an illegal British Military "Court" to the humiliating punishment of flogging. We warn the occupation Government not to carry out this punishment, which is contrary to the laws of soldiers' honour. If it is put into effect--every officer of the British occupation army in Eretz-Israel will be liable to be punished in the same way to get 18 whips.

HARGUN HAZVAI HALEUMI (N.M.O.)

b'Eretz-Israel⁵⁴

Despite the Irgun's propaganda efforts, on 27 December 1947 the British flogged one Irgunist. On 29 December, the Irgun answered the British flogging with the abduction of one British major and three British non-commissioned officers, subsequently flogged and released them.⁵⁵ The Irgun followed with a communique stating, "we shall no longer answer with a whip. *We shall answer with fire.*"⁵⁶ One week later, floggings were abolished as part of British punishment.⁵⁷ As Begin best summarizes, all target audiences from the Yishuv to Frenchmen to Russians to Canadians to Americans to brother-Jews throughout the world rejoiced in the British humiliation.⁵⁸

⁵⁴Reproduced in Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, pp. 252-53; and Rayford, p. 215.

⁵⁵Begin, pp. 234; Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, pp. 184-86; and Hurewitz, p. 281.

⁵⁶Begin, p. 234.

⁵⁷Jewish Agency tried for 25 years to have floggings cease, but violence paid: Center for Research in Social Systems, p. 421; and Kimche, p. 193.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 235.

b. The Threat of Martial Law

The mainstream concerns for the British ability to crush the Yishuv were based on their continual threat of imposition of martial law. In the Spring of 1947, the Irgun decided to challenge the British martial law threat. They reasoned that martial law could not be any worse than the curfews, cordon and search operations, and arrests that swept the Mandate the previous year (refer Appendix A, Table A-1). On 1 March 1947, the Irgun initiated 16 attacks on British facilities which resulted in British casualties numbering 20 dead and 30 wounded. In London the *Sunday Express* headline read: GOVERN OR GET OUT.⁵⁹ The next morning, the British selected an authoritarian version of former, proclaiming martial law. They imposed a 24 hour curfew, cut services, initiated search operations, limited gatherings to six persons, replaced civilian courts with military courts, and warned that martial law would not be terminated until the dissidents were crushed.⁶⁰

Despite the severe measures, the Irgun and the Stern Gang were able to conduct operations every day while martial law was in effect: three attacks on 3 March, attacks in Haifa, Jerusalem and Rehovet on the 5th; three attacks in Tel Aviv on the 8th; sniping, arson, roads mined, and hand grenade attacks throughout the

⁵⁹Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, p. 190; and Katz, *Days of Fire*, p. 125. See also: *The Times*, 3 March 1947: "British must get out of Palestine and stay out. Britain, unlike Nazi Germany, cannot repay terror with counter-terror..." Also, note that by the end of 1946, the dissident Irgun and the Stern Gang had killed 373 persons, most of whom were British.

⁶⁰For the British martial law plan: Begin, p. 320.

Mandate on the 9th; and seven attacks on 12 March. On 17 March martial law ended.⁶¹ The British had arrested seventy-eight terrorists: fifteen Sternists, twelve Irgunists, and fifty-one suspects; none of whom were of critical importance.⁶² All considered, martial law was a miserable failure, the dissidents continued their acts of terror unimpeded by British security measures. As Bell notes, Churchill's question to the House of Commons, "how long will this squalid warfare with all its bloodshed go on."⁶³

The dissidents' acts provoked the intended consequences, the target of demands (the British administration) imposed martial law, the targets of attention were impressed, and the international community prepared to intervene. The failure of martial law to stop dissident acts of terror was a severe blow to British prestige, so much so that the Secretary of the Colonies, Arthur Creech-Jones requested to the UN General Assembly that a UN special committee be set up to investigate the status of the Mandate.⁶⁴ Furthermore, General Sir Gordon MacMillan (commander of the British security forces) banned the use of the word "terrorist" to describe the dissidents, because in his opinion such a word suggested bravery, heroism, and "moreover the word aroused fear in the British troops."⁶⁵ The British public (target of attention) was

⁶¹Rayford, pp. 215-216.

⁶²Rayford, pp. 216-217; Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, pp. 189-91.

⁶³Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, p. 191.

⁶⁴UN agreed on September 1947 for consideration, but in the face of continued dissident assaults the Secretary of the Colonies requested the date be moved to 28 April.

⁶⁵Begin, p. 59; and *The Times*, 4 March 1947.

dismayed by the Mandate's inability to control the terrorists. The London Times reported martial law proved to be "useless as a weapon against terrorism and only strangles the economic life of the country."⁶⁶

c. Hangings

In response to the hanging sentences of two Irgunists on 13 June 1946, the Irgun issued a warning stating: "Do not hang the captive soldiers. If you do, we shall answer gallows with gallows."⁶⁷ Five days later, the Irgun kidnapped five British officers from an officer's club in Tel Aviv. The sentences were eventually commuted, which prompted the Irgun's release of the captives. On 16 April 1947, one Irgunist and three Sternists were secretly executed in Acre Prison. Once the Irgun received word of their execution, they warned, "the execution of prisoners of war is premeditated murder. We warn the British regime of blood against the commission of this crime."⁶⁸ Nonetheless, the Irgun could not answer gallows with gallows, because the British were confined to their bases. Frustrated by the inaccessibility of appropriate targets of violence to be sent to the dissidents' gallows, the Irgun and the Stern Gang tightened its noose around other terrorist activities to keep the psychological tension at fevers pitch (refer Appendix A, Table A-1: bombings, mines deposited, ambushes, sniping).

On 4 May 1947, the dissidents breached the Acre prison, leading to the escape of 251 detainees. Located in the Arab quarter of the old city of Acre, the

⁶⁶*The Times*, 17 March 1947.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, p. 245.

⁶⁸Begin, p. 255.

prison was a refurbished Ottoman fortress, surrounded by a moat, seventy foot walls topped with barbed wire, and a single steel entrance gate. The dissidents' ability to breach such a structure combined with strong British defenses was another blow to British prestige. Accordingly, Begin quotes *Haaretz* as stating

The attack on the Acre Jail was received here as a serious blow to British prestige after the hangings on the eve of the UN session were to have demonstrated Britain's resolute control of the situation.⁶⁹

Bell summarizes the influence the breach of the impregnable fortress had on the targets of opportunity (international public opinion):

The *New York Herald Tribune* reported that the execution of this most dangerous and difficult mission was perfect. The attack was spread all over the front of the British newspapers as well. Outrage was expressed in the Commons. Members felt it was impossible for the government to impose order merely by force.⁷⁰ A Member of Commons stated: There has never been anything like it in the history of the British Empire.⁷¹

As Begin had stated, through daring and spectacular acts he would erode the occupier's prestige and communicate to the world the desperation of an oppressed peoples' desire for a homeland. Nonetheless, neither the Acre prison break nor continued dissident threats could persuade the British to give up their gallows as a symbol of "firm and resolute authority."⁷²

⁶⁹Begin, p. 327.

⁷⁰Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, p. 218. See also: Rayford, pp. 218-222.

⁷¹Begin, p. 238.

⁷²Ibid., p. 327-328.

On 12 June 1947, the British again sentenced three more Irgunists to death by hanging , but this time the world was watching. The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine had arrived to make recommendations for a resolution of the Palestine question and the feasibility of a partition. The Irgun had sent a letter informing the Committee of the British sentencing and requested their assistance in gaining a reprieve. The Committee expressed their concern to the British administration concerning the potential unfavorable repercussions that the execution of the death sentences may provoke. Nonetheless, the British did not listen and three Irgunists awaited the gallows.⁷³

Since 12 June, the Irgun had been trying to abduct British officers to hold as leverage for the death sentences of the three Irgunists, but as Begin put it "the Army dug in deeply into their hiding places."⁷⁴ Once the British authorities denied the Committee's request for reconsideration, the Irgun continued its efforts to abduct an officer, but was unsuccessful. On 14 July 1947, the Irgun kidnapped two British non-commissioned officers, as an appropriate substitute. The British responded with imposing a curfew and searching from house-to-house for the abducted soldiers, but

⁷³Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, pp. 223-225. Note: the Irgunists sentenced to death were involved in the Acre prison break.

⁷⁴Begin, p. 274.

they too were unsuccessful.⁷⁵ The Jewish Agency deplored the act and Members of Parliament appealed for their release. Samuel Katz summarizes the Irgun's response:

We recognize no one-sided laws of war. If the British are determined that their way out of the country should be lined by an avenue of gallows and of weeping fathers, mothers, wives, and sweethearts, we shall see to it that in this there is not racial discrimination. The gallows will not be all one colour... Their price will be paid in full.⁷⁶

On 29 July 1947, the British again ignored the warning and hung the three Irgunists. Accordingly, the Irgun answered gallows with gallows and hanged the two British NCOs and booby-trapped their bodies.⁷⁷

The British popular response (target of attention) to the latest bad news from the Mandate was mixed with revenge and despair. The *Daily Express* stated that "not in the black annals of Nazi wickedness is there a tale of outrage more vile." The British public responded with the following acts of vengeance: outraged editorials, anti-Semitic demonstrations, Jewish businesses looted and vandalized, and synagogues and Jewish cemeteries desecrated. By contrast, the headlines of the *Manchester*

⁷⁵Meanwhile, the British were humiliated elsewhere. On 14 July 47, a British destroyer rammed the *Exodus*, a Jewish immigration ship, off the coast of Palestine, killing one and wounding over 100 others. A general strike broke out in Tel Aviv. The refugees were subsequently deported. Owing to Bevin's, the British Foreign Secretary, policy of repatriation the Jewish refugees were to be returned to their European points of departure. In France on 29 July 1947, the international press arrived in droves to report on the deplorable conditions aboard ship and plight of these peoples without a home. Neither the French government wanted to repatriate them nor did many of the refugees want to disembark. The next stop for the refugees was Hamburg Germany, the press waited. Upon arrival (9 Sept), one thousand British troops backed by fifteen hundred German police escorted the refugees off the ships. By returning the Jews from their promised land back into the hands of their Nazi exterminators, the British were defeating themselves.

⁷⁶Katz, p. 169.

⁷⁷Begin, pp. 283-90; Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, pp. 178-81, 303-309; and Dan Kurzman, *Genesis 1948: The First Arab-Israeli War* (Cleveland, OH: World Publishing, 1970), p. 172.

Guardian expressed British popular despair by stating "Time to Go," which was indicative of the eroding popular support for the British continued presence in Palestine.⁷⁸

Meanwhile, in Palestine the British security forces (the target of terror) ran amok, shooting civilian cars and buses, destroying cafes, smashing windows, and indiscriminately attacking passers-by. All totaled five Jews were killed, fifteen wounded, and scores of others bruised or badly shaken. Nonetheless, the Yishuv was paying a small price for the Irgun's campaign of terror that eventually paid big political dividends. Eight weeks later, the British government (target of demands) announced the surrender of the Mandate.⁷⁹

The cumulative effect of the Irgun's campaign against the British judicial system was the deterioration of British authority and the popular will to maintain their presence in the Mandate. The Irgun's exposure of the British flogging as an out-dated form of punishment humiliated them in front of international audiences. The failure of martial law to crush the dissidents exposed to the world in general and the British public in particular that the subjected peoples were being oppressed by an illegitimate authority. In June 1947, while a UN Special Committee was in Palestine considering a political partition, the flogging and hanging incidents were in full view

⁷⁸Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, p. 238-239.

⁷⁹Katz, p. 164; and Begin, p. 330

and consequently became the focus of world attention.⁸⁰ The logical result was the British discontinuation of these practices at the immeasurable cost of lost prestige. The Irgun's ability to expose the British sense of "fair play" in all its contradictory glory, positively influenced the ultimate target of attention--British public opinion

⁸⁰Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, pp. 178-81, 303-9; Rayford, pp. 222-23; and Begin, pp. 283-90.

VI. THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE

The following section will comparatively examine the roles, objectives, target selection, and the target audiences of the Palestinian mainstream and dissident terrorist groups. Like the Jewish resistance, the Palestinian resistance can be sub-divided into mainstream and dissident groups. Al-Fatah represented the Palestinian mainstream. The mainstream al-Fatah's nationalist platform manifested in a distinct Palestinian nationalism, whereby the withdrawal of the Israeli occupier would be facilitated by the radicalization and mobilization of the Palestinian masses in the refugee camps and the occupied territory. In other words, the success of al-Fatah's armed struggle relied more on the revolutionary potential of the Palestinian masses than a broader pan-Arab mobilization. Accordingly, the feature that distinguished the dissidents from the mainstream was their claim that Israel could not be driven into the sea until all the Arab states bordering Israel in particular had been radicalized.

Therefore, the Palestinian dissidents, the PFLP and the PFLP-GC (among others), expanded the scope of radicalization to include Arab states for the former and the international community for the latter. Furthermore, the dissident Palestinians viewed direct involvement in Arab politics as a necessary pre-condition for the removal of the Israeli occupier. The mainstream al-Fatah, on the other hand, sought to adhere to a policy of non-intervention in Arab state affairs, but this was easier said than done. Nevertheless, like the Jewish dissidents, it was ultimately the Palestinian

dissidents' acts of indiscriminate violence that focused the attention of world audiences on the Palestine problem. Accordingly, a comparison of the Palestinian mainstream and dissident groups will illustrate the similarities and differences relative to the Jewish resistance groups, illuminating those characteristics or circumstances that may account for the formers' inability to achieve the ultimate political objective--statehood.

A. THE PALESTINIAN MAINSTREAM

The role of the Palestinian mainstream was not as clearly differentiated as the Jewish mainstream's role. As will become clear as the analysis progresses, al-Fatah became consumed by indiscriminate acts of terror, supporting the dissident's attempt to overthrow the Jordanian government in the early 1970s and internationalizing its campaign of terror under the cover of Black September. Gabriel Ben-Dor emphasizes the indiscriminate terror typical of all Palestinian terrorist organizations when he states:

The Palestinian terrorist organizations have been extremely indiscriminate with respect to the target country (Israel) as well as bystanders, on occasion; and, in that sense--i.e., in terms of the indiscriminate means, not only the target and the goals--the Palestinian organizations must be recognized as an extreme case.¹

While this is true in a general sense, al-Fatah can not be characterized as an extremist or dissident group until after 1971. Prior to 1971, the mainstream role of al-Fatah can best be understood by first considering its rise to prominence relative to other Palestinian groups in general and Arab states in particular. This will be illustrated by a brief discussion of al-Fatah's role in the Battle of Karamah.

¹Gabriel Ben-Dor, "The Strategy of Terrorism in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Case of the Palestinian Guerrillas," In Yair Evron (ed.) *International Violence: Terrorism, Surprise and Control* (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1979), p. 138.

The Israeli occupation of the West Bank after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and their subsequent pacification efforts, forced the fedayeen (Palestinian terrorists) to withdraw to Jordan's East Bank.² On 18 March 1968, an Israeli school bus ran over a land mine, killing two adults and wounding twenty-eight children.³ This incident provided the Israelis pretext to launch a raid on the fedayeen headquarters in the East Bank town of Karamah. Both the al-Fatah and the PFLP occupied this town, as well as some eighteen-thousand civilians. The word of an impending attack sent the PFLP into the hills, leaving a 300-400 man al-Fatah contingent to defend against the Israeli assault.⁴

On 21 March 1968, fifteen-thousand Israeli forces attacked and despite their numerical and technological superiority, the battle lasted the entire day. Al-Fatah combined with two Jordanian infantry brigades fought valiantly against the Israeli onslaught. Despite conflicting casualty and equipment losses between the fedayeen and the Israelis, the battle provided the Palestinians with a moral and a psychological victory. The Karamah battle reclaimed for the Arab world a glimmer of pride they had

²As briefly mentioned in Chapter II, the West Bank Palestinian were culturally linked to Jordan, which basically accounts for the difficulty al-Fatah and the PFLP had in igniting a popular revolution, as well as Israeli counter-insurgency efforts. For a discussion of the Palestinian Resistances' activities immediately following Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Janet and John Wallach, *Arafat: In the Eyes of the Beholder* (New York: Carol Publishing, 1990), pp. 201-205; Helena Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power, and Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 37-41, 170; Gérard Chaliand, *The Palestinian Resistance* trans. Michael Perl (New York: Penguin Books, 1971), pp. 60-63; and Yaari, pp. 127-131

³Gordon F. Rayford, *Righteous Executioners: A Comparative Analysis of Jewish Terrorists of the 1940s and Palestinian Terrorists of the 1970s* (New York: City University, P.H. D. Dissertation, 1980), p. 439.

⁴John Laffin, *Fedayeen: The Arab-Israeli Dilemma* (New York: The Free Press, 1973), pp. 30-32; Cobban, pp. 41-42

lost, due to their humiliating defeat at the hands of the Israelis the previous year.⁵ Furthermore, the United Nations' condemnation of the Israeli attack added further prestige to al-Fatah's valiant stand. John Laffin summarizes the psychological effect of the Battle of Karamah:

The guerrillas burst on the scene as a major factor in the Arab-Israeli confrontation...Karamah was responsible for restoring Arab self-esteem and for showing the Palestinians that they not only could face the Israelis militarily but that only through armed struggle could they ever hope to defeat Zionism. The battle marks the beginning of large scale Palestinian resistance, it was instrumental in bringing to light the existence of the Palestine Movement of National Liberation, better known as Fatah, and to cause a ground swell of pro-resistance feeling throughout the Arab world.⁶

From the psychological victory of Karamah, al-Fatah reaped tangible benefits.⁷ The leadership of Fatah decided that it was essential to emerge from the underground and present a public image. On 16 April 1968, the Fatah High Command designated Yasir Arafat as "its official spokesman and its representative for all official questions of organization, finance, and information."⁸ In the summer of 1968, Egypt's President Nasser included Yasir Arafat, al-Fatah's leader, among the members of the United Arab Republics delegation that visited the Soviet Union.⁹ Al-Fatah's rise to mainstream

⁵John K. Cooley, *Green March, Black September: The Story of the Palestinian Arabs* (London: Frank Cass, 1973), pp. 100-103; and Edgar O'Ballance, *Arab Guerrilla Power, 1967-1972* (Hamden, CN: Archon Books, 1974), pp. 46-50.

⁶Laffin, p. 32.

⁷Chaliand, pp. 63-64. Note: 'Karamah' in Arabic means 'dignity'. Cooley, p. 102.

⁸Cited in: Cooley, p. 102. Al-Fatah's statement carried by major news agencies.

⁹William B. Quandt, *Palestinian Nationalism: Its Political and Military Dimensions* R-782-ISA (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, November 1971), p. 15.

prominence also manifest in its numeric growth, increasing from 2,000 members in 1967 to 10,000 in 1969¹⁰ Furthermore, the Arab Gulf states began contributing extensively to Fatah activities. The increased financial resources and numerical strength enabled Fatah to escalate its attacks against the "Zionist occupier." From August 1968 to December 1968, Fatah conducted nine-hundred and twenty two raids into Israel, twice the 1967 total. By the end of 1969, they claimed that its attacks on Israel had tripled the previous year's total; 2567 total missions in 1969 compared to previous year's 922.¹¹ In the end, Fatah's political recognition by Nasser, its numerical strength, and escalation of attacks against Israel paid political dividends. On 3 February 1969, Yasir Arafat was elected chairman of the newly formed Executive Committee of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, with his al-Fatah winning a majority of the seats in the Executive Council.¹²

As Chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Yasir Arafat was in a position to exercise Fatah's mainstream role. Arafat's and Fatah's intents were best expressed by a manifesto issued in 1969:

¹⁰Ehud Yaari, *Strike Terror: The Story of Fatah* (New York: Sabra Books, 1970), pp. 278-282; O'Ballance, *Arab Guerrilla Power*, p. 50; Quandt, p. 14; Cobban, p. 49; and Laffin, p. 39. O'Ballance and Laffin indicate that Fatah's membership may have been as high as 20,000 by the end of 1969.

¹¹Laffin, p. 38; and contradictory figures: Hanon Alon, "Countering Palestinian Terrorism in Israel: Toward a Policy Analysis of Countermeasures N-1567-FF (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, August 1980), p. 44; total number of Palestinian acts of terror for 1968 was 808 and 1969, 1480.

¹²Thomas Kiernan, *Arafat: The Man and the Myth* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976), pp. 194-195, 211-213; Yaari, pp. 228-232.

- Al Fatah, the Palestine National Liberation Movement, is the expression of the Palestinian People and of its will to free its land from Zionist colonisation in order to recover its national identity
- Al Fatah, the Palestine Liberation Movement, is not struggling against the Jews as an ethnic and religious community. It is struggling against Israel as the expression of colonisation based on theocratic, racist and expansionist system of Zionism and colonialism.
- Al Fatah...rejects any solution that does not take account of the existence of the Palestinian people and its right to dispose of itself.
- Al Fatah...solemnly proclaims that the final objective of its struggle is the restoration of the independent democratic state of Palestine...
- The struggle of the Palestinian people, like that of the Vietnamese people and other peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America is part of a historic process of the liberation of the oppressed peoples from colonialism and imperialism.¹³

These "Five Points" translated into campaign of terror directed at the Israeli occupier and indirectly intended to mobilize the Palestinian masses by violent example, which combined to ultimately facilitate the "Return" of the Palestinian diaspora to their historic homeland.¹⁴ While the return of the Palestinian diaspora to historic Palestine was the principle goal of the Palestinian mainstream, it was not unequivocally tied to

¹³Laffin, p. 34.

¹⁴Ibid., and Cobban, p. 40.

the total occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip or the pre-1967 Israeli territory. In other words, the mainstream Fatah would accept a compromise, whereby the minimal return of the occupied territories--the so-called mini-state idea--would suffice for the short-term, with the eventual long-term objective being the establishment of an democratic Palestinian state in which Palestinian Arabs were no longer the minority.

Accordingly, Fatah committed itself to a campaign of terror that was organizationally and instrumentally intended to achieve the ultimate political result--the "Return" of the Palestinian diaspora to historic Palestine. Instrumentally, Arafat's Fatah used sabotage to provoke Israeli retaliation and repression of the Palestinian population in the occupied territories and the refugee camps, hoping that this would liberate the Palestinian masses and ignite popular resistance against the Zionist occupier. This objective is articulated by Fatah's "Revolutionary Studies and Experiments," entitled *The Liberation of the Occupied Lands and Struggle Against Direct Imperialism*:

The liberation action is not only the removal of an armed imperialist base, but more important--it is the destruction of a society. [Our] armed violence will be expressed in many ways. In addition to the destruction of the military force of the Zionist occupying state, it will also be turned towards the destruction of the means of life of Zionist society in all their forms--industrial, agricultural and financial. The armed violence must seek to destroy the military, political, economic, financial and ideological institutions of the Zionist occupying state, so as to prevent all possibility of the growth of a new Zionist society. The aim of the Palestine liberation war is not only to inflict military defeat but also to destroy the Zionist character of the occupied land, whether it is human or social.¹⁵

¹⁵Ben-Dor, p. 140.

Therefore, al-Fatah's targets of violence were the collective manifestations of Israeli occupation. By committing acts of terror in Israel's home territory, the Fatah would provoke the occupying authority to introduce repressive measures that would expose to the world audience the contradictory policies pursued by the Israeli occupier. While Fatah's acts of terror were intended to be demoralizing, provocative, and disruptive to the Israelis, they were also intended to have a morale building and a persuasive impact on the Palestinian masses and their Arab host governments.

Although Fatah continued to represent the Palestinian mainstream in a strategic sense throughout the period considered, after 1971 they assumed a dissident role in the both the tactical and the psychological sense. Like the Irgun, the Fatah attacked all manifestations of the occupying authority in order to expose their illegitimate claim to a land that rightfully belonged to their oppressed peoples.¹⁶ Furthermore, Fatah did not commit itself to controlling the dissidents' indiscriminate acts of violence. Moreover, al-Fatah waged a campaign of indiscriminate terror in the name of Black September, a role neither feasible nor comparable with the Jewish terrorists, mainstream or dissident.

As time progressed, al-Fatah's sabotage operations failed to generate the intended effect, there was neither a popular revolution in the occupied territories nor any indication that the Israeli's were preparing to withdraw. Furthermore, while Battle of Karamah provided Fatah with legitimacy and prestige among the Palestinian peoples and the Arab governments, it was one of many Israeli operations that neither the

¹⁶By mid-June 1970, the Israeli government announced its official casualties from Arab action since the 1967 War: 543 soldiers and 116 civilians killed and 1,763 soldiers and 629 civilians wounded. Cooley, p. 109.

mainstream nor the dissidents had exploited for any political gain beyond the Middle East. Inevitably, Fatah's sabotage operations were answered by Israeli reprisals that targeted fedayeen base camps in the bordering Arab states. These reprisals provoked the targeted countries--Jordan and Lebanon primarily--to place restrictions on the fedayeen activities, which led to open and violent confrontations between the host Arab governments and the fedayeen. In Jordan for instance, anti-Jordanian activities had been fomenting as early October 1968, when George Habash adopted the political motto, "the road to Tel Aviv runs through Amman."¹⁷ Accordingly, it was not long until Arafat's policy of non-intervention in Arab politics and Fatah's mainstream role were put to the test as a result of tension between the dissident PFLP and the Jordanian government. Before discussing the Jordanian crisis and its effect on the Palestinian resistance, an introduction to the dissidents is necessary.

B. THE PALESTINIAN DISSIDENTS

The dissident Palestinian factions consist of numerous splinter groups, many of whom are organized and equipped by the Arab regimes bordering Israel, but for our purposes we are most concerned with only two. The first is the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).¹⁸ The leader of the PFLP is Dr. George Habash, who unlike Arafat, was opposed to any territorial compromise. Although Habash recognized the "Return" as the desirable end-state, the means by which he employed to achieve

¹⁷Wallach, p. 210.

¹⁸The PFLP's international terror has been disguised by numerous names: *Popular Struggle Front*, *Sons of the Occupied Territory*, *Arab National Youth Organization*, and *Organization of Victims of Zionist Occupation*...

that end were decidedly different than Arafat's. Habash's PFLP intended to radicalize the Arab states as a necessary pre-condition to liberating Palestine, whereas Arafat opposed intervention in Arab state affairs, liberating Palestine would be exclusively a Palestinian armed struggle. Furthermore, whereas al-Fatah's targets of violence were legitimized by attacking targets representative of Israeli authority, Habash's PFLP possessed no clear distinction between combatants and non-combatants. The PFLP's targets of violence encompassed a broad range of target audiences, from pro-Western regimes in the Arab world and Anglo-American interests in the region to Zionist manifestations the world over, innocence was irrelevant.¹⁹ Habash summarizes:

We are struggling against imperialism, especially the American form...We are struggling against Zionism--and therefore Israel--which is the ally of imperialism...[and] We are struggling against Arab reaction, because the governing classes in our countries are either involved in imperialism, or quite incapable of solving the vital problems of our societies.²⁰

As Habash strove to radicalize the anti-Zionist sentiment among the Arab states and promote anti-imperialist revolution by expansion of his attacks outside the Middle East, Arafat remained content on attacking the Israelis directly.²¹ Accordingly, Habash decided to internationalize the Palestinian problem, because:

We intend to attack Imperialist and Zionist interests wherever we find them in the world. They are all legal targets²²...When we set fire to a stone

¹⁹Yaari, p. 214.

²⁰Chailand, pp. 165-166.

²¹Wadi Haddad, until 1978, was the leader of PFLP's international wing: Yonah Alexander and Joshua Sinai, *The PLO Connection* (New York: Crane Russak, 1989), pp. 186, 189.

²²Christopher Dobson, *Black September: Its Short, Violent History* (New York: MacMillan, 1974), p. 77

in London, those flames are worth the burning down of two kibbutzim because we force people to ask what is going on...²³

Although the Jewish dissidents conducted international operations in order to arouse popular support for their cause, they are not comparable in scale to that of the Palestinian dissidents.²⁴ But like the Jewish dissidents, the Palestinian dissidents in general and the PFLP in particular recognized the merits of spectacular and lethal acts of terror that were capable of gaining world-wide attention. In defense of his international operations, Habash states:

At the time, the Palestinian cause was not well known in the world. There were probably fewer than half the American people who were even aware of it...We wanted people to do something that would force people to ask, why we are they doing this?...We felt we had the right to attack any targets that would harm Israel and Zionism because they were linked together outside Israel [he boasts]...we achieved our goal: the Palestinian problem instantly known all over the world.²⁵

The second Palestinian dissident faction was the PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC). The PFLP-GC broke away from the PFLP in October 1968, because of a disagreement over the latter's desire for Arab-unity as a necessary pre-condition to liberating Palestine. Therefore, while less interested in radicalizing the Arab states, the PFLP-GC was more interested in arousing international support for the reversal of the historic processes that brought the Jews to Palestine and displaced the Palestinians. But like the PFLP, the PFLP-GC led by Ahmed Jibril who, like Habash, was opposed to

²³Laffin, p. 45; and Rayford, p. 444. For original citation: Oriana Fallaci, an Italian Journalist, reporting for *Life*, 22 June 1970.

²⁴For a discussion of the Irgun's international operations: Samuel Katz, "The Irgun in Europe," *Days of Fire* (New York: Doubleday, 1968), pp. 99-115; and Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, pp. 180-181, 282, 303-304.

²⁵Wallach, p. 211.

territorial compromise and supported the ultimate "Return" of the Palestinian diaspora to the homeland they were forced to evacuate. Unlike Habash, Jibril was not particularly concerned with the political aspects of the struggle, concentrating more on the military operations, which reflected his prior military service in the Syrian army. But, like the PFLP, the distinction between combatant and non-combatant was equally not clear in the PFLP-GC's selection of targets of violence. Ultimately, the intent of the Palestinian dissidents' acts of terror was to arouse anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist (targets of opportunity) sentiment throughout the World in order to bring both regional and international pressure to bear on the process of decolonization of the Israeli imperialist outpost.

C. TARGET AUDIENCES

Again, the Palestinian target audiences were similar to those of the Jews discussed in the previous chapter. The target audiences included: the target of violence, the physical or material object of violence, the target of terror, those individuals or groups of people that identify most with the target of violence by virtue of their close proximity, either physically or psychologically; the target of demands, the occupying authority and in some instances his allies; the target of attention, their own people or those national or international audiences that identify most closely with the target of violence or the terrorist group; and the target of opportunity, typically neutral or potentially friendly, foreign or international public opinion.

The following section will analyze the target audiences' response to specific incidents of Palestinian acts of terror. The incidents include the February 1970 mid-air explosion of a SwissAir jetliner, the September 1970 hijacking of three international airliners to Jordan, the September 1972 kidnapping of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games, and the March 1973 seizure of the Khartoum Embassy. The September 1970 hijacking of three international airliners is important for three reasons. First, the incident demonstrates the vulnerability of the international community to acts of terror in that five governments became immediately involved; the three owning the aircraft, and the Jordanian and Israeli governments. Second, the hijacking signaled the beginning of the eventual showdown between the Palestinian dissidents and the Jordanian government, which concluded in the suspension of Palestinian resistance activities emanating from Jordan. Third, the mainstream Fatah became embroiled in the dissident quagmire to such an extent that it too lost Jordan as a sanctuary and launching pad for sabotage operations in Israel, which forced Fatah to internationalize its acts of terror under the guise of Black September while consolidating its base camps in Lebanon.

The remaining incidents are important because they demonstrate the psychological warfare and the propaganda effect of terrorism on multiple audiences. The motive behind each of the incidents was driven by either an organizational or instrumental objective, such as the release of prisoners, the attention of a world forum for the Palestine question, or the disruption of peace negotiations in which the Palestinians were not appropriately represented. All incidents were conducted outside

the source of dispute--being Israel. In each of the cases a wide array of audiences were involved, which reflected a certain level of identification with either the target of violence or the terrorist group, or a perceived vulnerability to future acts of Palestinian terrorism.

From 1968 to 1974, the Palestinian mainstream and dissident terrorist conducted a combined total of 97 acts of international terrorism, which represented less than 3 percent of all their domestic and international acts of terrorism. While the other 97 percent of the incidents were occurring on Israel's home turf, the widening of the playing field through acts of international terror introduced the spectators necessary to achieve the desired political result nonetheless. The Israeli-Palestinian dispute was not going to be resolved by either of the two parties, because neither one nor the other recognized other's right to exist. As the fedayeen continued their raids from Jordan and Southern Lebanon, the Israeli's did not sit passively awaiting the next fedayeen foray, they instituted intense counter-measures: air and ground reprisal raids, patrolling, border police, home guards, fencing, flood lights, paving roads, sentries, and so on. Consequently, as the Israeli's occupied an active defense, the Palestinian went on the international strategic offense.

1. Mid-air Explosion of a SwissAir Jetliner

Fly EL AL and the Popular Front commandos are at your service!²⁶

This warning from the PFLP was no exaggeration. From the summer of 1968 to the spring of 1970, El Al airplanes or El Al passengers in airport terminals had been the targets of violence on four separate occasions. On 23 July 1968, members of the PFLP hijacked an El Al 707 from Rome to Tel Aviv and diverted it to Algeria. This hijacking was followed by other attacks involving El Al aircraft: on 23 December 1968, an El Al 707 was attacked at the Athens international airport; and on 18 February 1969, an El Al airliner preparing to take-off from Zurich to Tel Aviv was riddled with bullets and fire-bombed.²⁷

On 29 August 1969, the PFLP shifted its target of violence to the United States' Trans-World Airlines (TWA), skyjacking a 707 enroute from Paris to Athens. Then on 21 December 1969, a PFLP attempt to hijack a TWA plane bound from Rome to New York was foiled by Italian airport security.²⁸ Accordingly, the PFLP shifted to more accessible targets of violence by attacking El Al passengers in the

²⁶Demaris, p. 153.

²⁷By March 1969, the international community had begun to enact preventive measures against hijackings: the International Civil Aviation Organization voted on 3 March 1969 to consider the subject of "unlawful interference" with airliners; by January 1970, the International Air Transport Association, representing 103 scheduled airlines had asked governments of its member airlines to seek "UN action in regard to armed intervention involving aircraft in scheduled service; and on 26 March 1970, the International Federation of Airline Pilots Associations, representing 44,000 pilots in 54 countries adopted a resolution threatening reprisals against states that refused to institute "appropriate punishment" against hijackers. For more details on these and other initiatives to prevent hijacking and other forms of international terrorism: Lester A. Sobel (ed.), *Political Terrorism Volume 1* (NY: Facts on File, 1975), pp. 279-283.

²⁸A PFLP statement justified this shift to non-Israeli airliners: "Any aircraft of any company that flies to Israel is a target for us": Dobson, p. 154.

Munich airport terminal on 10 February 1970. One week later, on 17 February 1970, the PFLP tried its hand at hijacking again, yet this attempted seizure of El Al airliner was thwarted as well.

Considering the difficulties of the PFLP, the PFLP-GC shifted to explosives as the most appropriate method of gaining access to the target of violence-- El Al aircraft. On 21 February 1970, in its first international operation, the PFLP-GC planted a bomb on a SwissAir jetliner enroute from Zurich to Tel Aviv. The bomb exploded in mid-air sending smoke into the crew's compartment, which clouded the pilot's vision and he crashed. All 47 passengers and crew were killed, including 14 Israelis and six Americans. On the same day a PFLP bomb exploded in an Austrian plane carrying mail from Frankfurt to Tel Aviv.




Figure 6-1.
The Bombing of a SwissAir Jetliner: Target Audiences

In combination, these recent attacks and the preceding assaults on international airlines and El Al agencies provoked a wide array of responses from the target audiences. Figure 6-1 above illustrates the connection between the target of violence and the various target audiences. The Palestine Liberation Organization (the target of attention) condemned the attacks and claimed to have no connection with the operations. Indicative of the target of opportunity's attitude toward the recent wave of Palestinian assaults on international airlines was their suspension of airtraffic to Israel and restrictions on Arab flights into their airports. On 22 February 1970, several European airlines suspended cargo flights to Israel, SwissAir imposing the longest ban lasting until 5 March. Furthermore, the Swiss government placed restrictions on entry into Switzerland of Arab nationals. On 23 February, Olympic Airways of Greece followed suit with a similar ban. On 24-25 February 1970, ground crews at London's Heathrow airport refused to service airlines of 8 Arab countries and Israel's El Al airline for apparent safety reasons. Israel, as the target of demands, responded as expected, raiding fedayeen staging areas in Jordan on 5 March and base camps in southern Lebanon on the 7th of March.

While the restrictions on air travel to Israel, Israel's reprisals, and the PLO's denial of involvement are indicative of the negative consequences of the Palestinian dissidents' act of violence, there were two intended consequences that were consistent with the Palestinian dissidents' organizational and instrumental objectives. First, the dissident's bombing was intended to disrupt the on-going peace process

between the Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian governments in which the PLO hoped to be a party.²⁹ The dissidents were adamantly opposed to a compromise solution that could potentially be worked out if the PLO were to take part in the peace process. Therefore, the indiscriminate bombing of the SwissAir jetliner undermined the PLO's possible participation in spite of their condemnation of the act and the apparent lack of knowledge. The second intended consequence was the building of organizational morale among their Palestinian and Arab constituents. Invariably, the scale of the international operations provided the Palestinian's in the refugee camps the only glimmer of hope for an eventual solution to their desperate situation, because Fatah's border raids were consistently answered with Israeli reprisals to whom the Palestinian masses bore the brunt.

In May 1970, President Nasser of Egypt invited the United States to renew political initiatives in spite of the Palestinian campaign of international terror. On 6 August 1970, Egypt agreed to a cease-fire with Israel, which went into affect the following day. This action closed the Egyptian-Israeli border to further fedayeen infiltration, which increased the importance of the Jordanian border exponentially. The fedayeen raids from Jordan had provoked numerous Israeli reprisals, which destabilized the Jordanian government considerably. Accordingly, King Hussein of Jordan placed

²⁹On 18 December 1969, US Secretary of State William Rogers expanded the planned settlement of the Egypt-Israeli (Roger's Plan) dispute by devising a parallel settlement between Jordan and Israel. The Rogers Plan (which was accepted by Egypt and not by Israel) proposed that Israel withdraw behind her pre-1967 borders, and that the UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967 be implemented. The PLO rejected Resolution 242 because it referred to the Palestinians as refugees and not to their right to return to their homeland.

restrictions on the Palestinians' activities limiting them to certain areas, prohibiting the carrying of arms, and wearing of uniforms. From June to September 1970, the Palestinian dissidents' demanded greater freedom of maneuver, which led to open clashes with the Jordanian military who were not willing to submit to the dissidents' desires (refer Chronology, Appendix B, Table B-1). Furthermore, the PFLP called on the Palestinian masses to revolt against Hussein's government. Amid these clashes and anti-Hussein pronouncements, Yasir Arafat found himself further drawn from the mainstream mantle as indicated by his Fatah bearing the brunt of the casualties--200 dead and 500 wounded.³⁰ Therefore, it wasn't surprising that the mainstream Fatah refused to take coercive action against the dissidents. Ultimately, the Jordanian government and the Palestinian resistance showdown came during Black September.

2. The Hijacking of Three International Airliners to Jordan

On 6 September 1970, the PFLP hijacked a SwissAir DC-8, a TWA 707 and PanAm 707.³¹ The SwissAir and the TWA 707 were flown to Dawson field in Jordan, while the PanAm 707 was eventually flown to Cairo where it was blown up minutes after the crew and passengers disembarked. The PFLP held the 306 occupants of the SwissAir and the TWA airliners as hostages for the release of imprisoned commandos in Israel, Switzerland and West Germany. A PFLP spokesman stated that the TWA and the PanAm airliners were seized:

³⁰Rayford, p. 450.

³¹Wallach, p. 151. A fourth hijacking of an El Al plane bound for Amsterdam was thwarted when Israeli skypolice shot one and arrested the other (Leila Khaled). For a full account of this hijacking attempt: Dobson, pp. 32-33.

To give the Americans a lesson after they supported Israel after all these years and retaliation for the US peace initiative in the Middle East

The spokesman added that the SwissAir hijacking was in retaliation for the sentencing of three terrorists for their 18 February 1969 attack on a plane in Zurich (see above)³²

On 9 September 1970, a British Overseas Airways Corporation VC-10 was hijacked after taking off from Bahrain and eventually joined the SwissAir and TWA planes at Jordan's Dawson field. A PFLP spokesman stated the plane and the 105 passengers were being held for the release of a imprisoned female commando in a London jail. In less than three days, the PFLP had directly involved the three governments represented by the aircraft (US, Great Britain, Switzerland), two holding Palestinian prisoners (Israel and West Germany), and the Jordanian government in a terrorist drama that lasted until 25 September 1970.³³

The successful hijacking of four airliners was clearly the most spectacular act of international terrorism to date, but did it produce the intended consequences: did the target audiences respond positively toward the Palestinian cause. Figure 6-2 depicts the target audiences, but what it can not show is each audiences' level of identification with the target of violence. As early as 8 September, the International community (the target of opportunity) became directly involved.³⁴ The International Red Cross

³²For details of the trial: Edgar O'Ballance, *The Language of Violence: The Blood Politics of Terrorism* (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1979), pp. 72-74.

³³Lester A. Sobel (ed.), *Political Violence Volume 1* (New York: Facts on File, 1975), pp. 26-28.

³⁴As a result, on 16 December 1970, the Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft met in the Hague to redefine aircraft jurisdiction and modify the offense of aircraft piracy to conform to specific requirements: Louis G. Fields, Jr, "Terrorism: Summary of Applicable US and International Law," In Yonah Alexander and Robert A. Kilmarx (eds.) *Political Terrorism and Business: The Threat and Response* (NY




Figure 6-2.

The Hijacking of Three International Airliners: Target Audiences

established a committee to negotiate a release of the hostages. Meanwhile, airports around the world tightened security in order to avoid being one of the PFLP's future targets of violence. The US, British and the Swiss ownership of the aircraft was indicative of a high level of identification with the target of violence, which pulled them into the fray as the target of demands; typically a spot reserved for Israel. Furthermore, the Jordanian government can be considered along with the others as a target of demands, for the obvious reason that the three hijacked aircraft were on its

territory. Furthermore, although Figure 6-2 does not illustrate any significant changes in the targets of attention or opportunity, the fact that there were 580 total passengers victimized by the hijacking had to represent more than the seven countries directly involved. Therefore, the propaganda effect of this incident was weak, whereas the psychological warfare effect was intense due to the number of audiences that identified with the target of violence.

The general response was outrage. The Kuwaiti ambassador to the United States stated that the hijacking "do not serve the cause of the Palestinian people." And an Egyptian newspaper summed up the Arab attitude of the target of attention.

One of the main goals of the battle is to gain world public opinion on the side of the Palestinian struggle and not to lose it. It is evident that the attack on international civil aviation does not encourage world feeling of solidarity with the Palestinian cause.

The PLO, exercising its mainstream muscle, suspended the PFLP's Executive Committee membership.³⁵ The Jordanian government (the target of demands) was determined to liquidate the dissidents. They placed a reward of \$12,000 for the heads of Habash and Hawatmeh, leaders of the dissident PFLP and the PDFLP respectively.³⁶ On 7 September fighting broke out between the Jordanian Army and the fedayeen, which lasted for 21 days. During this crisis, Arafat compromised his mainstream position by siding with the dissidents' demand for popular revolution and dissolution of the national authority in Jordan. As Arafat became more enmeshed in the dissident

³⁵On 12 September, the SwissAir, TWA and BOAC airplanes were blown up: Cooley, p. 113; and Yaari, p. 236.

³⁶Cooley, p. 117-118.

quagmire, he stated "the Palestine Revolution will fight to defend itself to the end and until the fascist military regime is overthrown."³⁷

On 16 September 1970, Hussein appointed a military government charged with the duty of driving the Palestinian resistance out of the country. As clashes intensified and 54 passengers remained hostages, the US, Israel, and Syria planned to intervene. The US Sixth Fleet was ninety miles off the Israeli coast, with the aircraft carrier *John F. Kennedy* enroute. The US 8th Infantry Division and a task force from the 82d Airborne Division were put on alert. The Israeli army moved to the Jordanian border. The Syrians sent in a tank brigade, which the Jordanian airforce beat back.³⁸ On 25 September, the Arab League arranged a truce, which left the Jordanian military to clean out the remainder of the fedayeen base camps. Subsequently, the remaining 54 hostages were released in exchange for seven terrorists held in Britain, West Germany, and Switzerland (16 on the 15th, 32 on the 26th, and 6 on the 29th of September), the Israelis did not release any Palestinian prisoners. And the three aircraft were blown up, at a cost of \$35 million dollars.³⁹

The unconventional hijacking that began on 6 September 1970 nearly cost the Middle East another conventional war. The effect on all target audiences was psychological warfare, the PFLP had no friendly audiences. The international

³⁷Rayford, p. 455.

³⁸Jillian Becker, *The PLO: The Rise and Fall of the Palestinian Liberation Organization* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984), p. 76; Dobson, pp. 34-36.

³⁹O'Ballance, *Language of Violence*, p. 91; and Richard L. Clutterbuck, "The Politics of Air Piracy," *Living With Terrorism* (New York: Arlington House, 1975), p. 101.

community continued to express indignation for the act. On 1 October 1970, the International Civil-Aviation Organization adopted a resolution stating that governments failing to cooperate with international extradition law and safety of aircraft and passengers would be suspended from international civil air transportation services. The Jordanian crisis concluded with both Arafat and King Hussein losing substantial flexibility over the Palestinian problem. The fedayeen would lose Jordan as a base of operations from which it could no longer launch attacks into Israel. Organizationally, the Palestinian resistance was bankrupt, the confrontation with the Jordanian military cost the fedayeen the largest land border with Israel and constrained them to Lebanon. Instrumentally, international and domestic public opinion hardened and the Palestinian cause became associated more with terrorism than with the desperate people living in the squalor of refugee camps. By June 1971, the Jordanian Army concluded its "maneuvers with live ammunition," killing over 200 fedayeen and taking captive twenty-three hundred. The Jordanian Army's harsh treatment of the fedayeen inevitably cost Hussein the allegiance of the West Bank Palestinians, but at a price he was willing to bear.⁴⁰ This was Black September, a name taken in revenge by al-Fatah to further internationalize the Palestinian problem.⁴¹

⁴⁰Ovid Demaris, *Brothers In Blood: The International Terrorist Network* (New York: Charles Scribner's, 1977), pp. 172-174.

⁴¹Black September's first (revenge) operation was the assassination of the Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi Tal in Cairo on 28 November 1971. Wasfi Tal was the Jordanian military commander who was in charge of the drive to rid the country of the fedayeen from September 1970 to July 1971.

3. The Munich Massacre

In a summer when no body thought anything much was happening, and when the only flame that has really been attracting attention is the Olympic one, the fires of potential conflict in the Middle East...have quietly started to burn lower, and the world may be much easier...*The Economist*, 2 SEP 72

In the early morning hours of 5 September 1972, eight members of the Palestinian Black September organization entered the Israeli dormitory in Munich's Olympic Village, taking hostage 9 Israeli athletes. The subsequent 22 hour drama was played out by extensive news coverage of approximately 6000 journalists, who generated front page headlines and live broadcasts of the hooded terrorists on the balcony of the Israeli dormitory. This was the most sensational terrorist act ever committed, and television brought it into the comfort of home. Neither the before mentioned Dawson field hijacking nor the Irgun's spectacular bombing of the King David Hotel were a match for this symbolically devastating act. The presence of the Games in West Germany was intended to erase the memory of Hitler's 1936 Berlin Games and one of Hitler's most notorious extermination centers just minutes from Munich, Dachau.⁴² Ultimately, the drama culminated in a gun battle between the terrorists and German security forces, resulting in the deaths of all nine hostages and five of the eight terrorists, the remaining three terrorists were taken into German

⁴²Furthermore, the kidnapping was a further embarrassment of the W. German government, because they had coined the slogan "The Games of Joy and Peace." O'Ballance, *The Language of Violence*, p. 117; and Cooley, p. 126.

custody.⁴³ Figure 6-3 below depicts the target audiences involved in the Munich kidnapping.




Figure 6-3.
The Munich Kidnapping: Target Audiences

On 7 September, 1972, the Israeli Olympic team returned to Tel Aviv with their slain comrades in coffins. Mrs Golda Meir thanked the West German government for its efforts and submitted statement condemning the International Olympic

⁴³Note: two other Israelis were killed by the terrorists during the initial seizure of the athletes. Furthermore, one of the Israeli athletes killed was David Berger from Cleveland Ohio. For a full account, see: Dobson, pp. 80-88; Laffin, pp. 152-156; O'Ballance, *The Language of Violence*, pp. 115-125; and Serge Groussard, *The Blood of Israel: The Massacre of the Israeli Athletes, the Olympics, 1972* (NY: William Morrow, 1975). See also: *The Economist*, Sept 9, 72.

Committee for continuing the Games. Indicative of the indignation felt by the target of demands, Yosef Burg, the Minister of Interior, stated that "Israel's blood is not for the taking." Subsequently, Golda Meir added her feeling when she stated that "we have no choice but to strike at them,"⁴⁴ which manifested in the "biggest-ever" Israeli air strikes on Palestinian base camps in Lebanon and Syria, killing an unknown number of people.⁴⁵ King Hussein of Jordan was the only Arab target of attention to openly condemn the incident. He stated on Amman radio that "the crime was planned and carried out by sick minds that had nothing in common with humanity."⁴⁶ On 14 September, The PLO declared that it was not responsible for the Munich killings, insisting that their objective "was only aimed at pressuring Israel to release detained guerrillas from Israeli jails." Yet, Arafat's Voice of Palestine broadcasted:

All glory to the men of Black September. The gold medal you have won in Munich is for the Palestine nation⁴⁷... The world must accept violence as the way to counter Israeli violence.⁴⁸

While these contradictory claims made it hard to determine where the Palestinians stood on the Munich incident, the Libyan government made its position clear. On 12 September 1972, the Libyan government provided the five slain terrorists a hero's welcome and a burial with honors, and Qaddafi reportedly gave Arafat a \$5

⁴⁴Dobson, p. 88; Cooley, p. 129; and Rayford, p. 479.

⁴⁵8 September 1972: Lester A. Sobel (ed.), *Palestinian Impasse: Arab Guerrillas and International Terror* (New York: Facts on File, 1977), pp. 121-22; and Cooley, p. 129.

⁴⁶*The Economist*, "Black September," 9 September 1972, p. 34; and Cooley, p. 128.

⁴⁷Ovid Demaris, *Brothers In Blood* (New York: Charles Scribner's, 1977), p. 183.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, p. 34.

million reward for the success of the operation.⁴⁹ Nonetheless, Arab sentiment eventually turned against the Palestinian terrorists in general and international public opinion hardened toward the Palestinian cause in particular.⁵⁰ Letters to *Time* magazine, 2 October 1972 were indicative of international public opinion

Once again, the legitimate interests of the Arab people have been betrayed--by Arabs. If the Arabs have had an argument to which reasonable people would listen, it is now gone for ever.⁵¹

The Israeli, the United States, and the West German governments created special counter-terrorist organizations in order to deal more effectively with similar situations in the future.⁵² The Israeli government fired three senior officials of the Shin Bet, the Department of Internal Security, and established a special anti-terrorist unit composed of army and secret service personnel--the Wrath of God (*Mitzan Elohim*).⁵³ The United States submitted a draft convention and resolution to the United Nations General Assembly regarding terrorist acts committed by individuals and their prevention and prosecution.⁵⁴ Similarly, West Germany's Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim called on

⁴⁹Laffin, p. 155; Dobson, p. 87; and O'Ballance, *The Language of Violence*, p. 124.

⁵⁰Rayford, 478.

⁵¹Cited in: Laffin, p. 156.

⁵²By January 1974, European anti-terrorist units and police had captured 50 Arab terrorists, yet they were able to obtain few convictions. Of the 50 captured, only 7 were convicted and 7 awaited trial, the others were released for various reasons: Paul Wilkinson, "Terrorism versus Liberal Democracy: The Problems of Repsonse," In Shaw et al. (eds.) *Ten Yers of Terrorism: Collected Views* (NY: Crane, Russak, & Co., 1979), p. 28; and Sobel, p. 68.

⁵³Dobson, p. 86; and O'Ballance, *The Language of Violence*, p. 125.

⁵⁴For a discussion of the UN dilberation on the US proposal: M. Cherif Bassiouni (ed.), *International Terrorism and Political Crimes* (IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1973), pp. 496-501. For domestic legislation on terrorism--On October 24, 1972 the US amended the Criminal Code (Title 18, USC) by adding crimes directed

the UN to institute "measures to prevent terrorism and other forms of violence which endanger or take innocent human lives or jeopardize fundamental freedoms."⁵⁵ Further indications of the West German government's attitude toward terrorism in general and Palestinian terrorism in particular manifested in the subsequent deportation of 100 militant Palestinian university students and the disbanding of the General Union of Palestinian Workers and the General Union of Palestinian Students.⁵⁶ Although the Soviet Union recognized the rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination, Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, condemned the act stating:

It is certainly impossible to condon the acts of terrorism by certain elements from among the participants in the Palestinian movement which have led, notably, to the recent tragic events in Munich...These criminal actions deal a blow also to the national interests and aspirations of the Palestinians...Acts of violence which serve no positive ends and cause loss of human life.⁵⁷

Like the Jordanian crisis, the Munich kidnapping had a minimal propaganda effect, and had a maximum psychological warfare impact. Instrumentally, the act was disruptive, suspending the Olympic Games for two days. Yet, the Games

against foreign officials and official guests of the United States: Louis G. Fields, Jr., "Terrorism: Summary of Applicable US and International Law," In Yonah Alexander and Robert A. Kilmarx (eds.), *Political Terrorism and Business: The Threat and Response* (NY: Praeger Publishers, 1979), p. 161-162.

⁵⁵Sobel, p. 279.

⁵⁶As mentioned in Chapter II, Arafat attended the University of Stuttgart where the General Union of Palestinian Students formed its European branch (the other major branch was in Egypt). Consequently, the Palestinians had a relatively large support base in W. Germany. As of 1972, there were 4000 Palestinians studying in W. German universities and 37,000 Palestinians working in German factories. However, on 29 October 1972, the West German government gave into the Palestinian terrorists demands during the hijacking of a Lufthansa airliner and threat to blow it up and kill 17 passengers if the three Munich BSO terrorists were not released. The West German government released the terrorists.

⁵⁷Sobel, p. 280.

did go on with the flags of 122 participating nations flying at half-mast. In the end, the Palestinians did not get a single medal out of the 1,109 medals awarded. What they did get was the Wrath of God, the Israeli anti-terrorist unit that systematically killed six Palestinian leaders in Europe over the course of the next year and an international community turned cold to the Palestinian cause (see Chronology, Appendix B, Table B-1).⁵⁸ Palestinian terrorism had won few friends and made many enemies. Yet, Munich did provide the Palestinians access to the media, whereby their cause was heard. But the cause remained faceless. The plight of the Palestinian people became obscured behind the mask of hooded terrorist. This became the image of the Palestinian problem, a problem many wanted to ignore. The target audiences had an image to attach to the Palestinian cause--the hooded terrorist on the balcony of the Olympic village--the challenge to the Palestinian leadership became one of changing images.

Organizationally, the wave of hijackings and Munich did produce the intended effect among a small minority within target of opportunity. Unquestionably, these actions had a morale building and a competitive impact on the Palestinians in the camps and international terrorist community. The dissident Palestinian factions' and Black September's spectacular acts of violence had become the standard by which all domestic and international terrorism would be measured. Nonetheless, the Palestinian

⁵⁸Dobson, pp. 89-109.

question in the occupied territories was left unanswered. The desired political result was neither generated by Palestinian mainstream nor dissident terrorist action.

4. The Seizure of the Khartoum Embassy

On 21 February 1973, Israeli Phantoms shot down a Libyan Boeing 727 lost in a sandstorm over the Israeli-occupied Sinai, killing the 106 passengers and crew. The world was outraged. Despite Israeli claims that warnings were issued to the Libyan plane, the incident provided the Arab world in general and the Palestinians in particular an immediate propaganda coup. Qaddafi vowed to seek revenge stating: "by all objective standards the deliberate shooting down of a civilian airliner cannot be allowed to pass unpunished." This killing of innocence blemished Israel's reputation and the Arab nations felt that for the first time world opinion had turned in their favor.⁵⁹

Yet, the success of terrorism as a psychological operation hinges on the ability to exploit the negative and enhance the positive. This Israeli action provided the Palestinians an opportunity to enhance the shift of world opinion by provoking additional acts of Israeli retaliation that would exploit the negative image this atrocity projected on Israel. Nonetheless, the propaganda potential of this Israeli atrocity was erased by the seizure of the Khartoum Embassy on 1 March 1973.⁶⁰

⁵⁹Dobson, pp. 111-112.

⁶⁰Note: Laffin points out the symbolic significance of the day, it was the eve of the first anniversary of the peace settlement of the 17-year war with the southern Sudanese: Laffin, p. 157.

On the evening of 1 March 1973 during a farewell dinner for the departing US Deputy Chief of Mission, Mr George Curtis Moore, members of the Black September Organization stormed the Saudi Embassy in Khartoum. Once the initial shock of their assault wore off, the terrorists made their demands. They demanded the release of sixteen Black Septemberists being held in Jordan, Sirhan Sirhan in the United States, Baader-Meinhof prisoners in West Germany, and various other Arab commandos held Israeli jails. In exchange, the Black September terrorists held hostage five embassy diplomats: the Saudi, the Jordanian, the US, and the Belgian charge d'affaires, the US Ambassador to Sudan, and Mr. Moore for whom the affair was dedicated. The negotiations continued through the night, but the Israeli, the US and the Jordanian governments refused to give in to the terrorist's demands.⁶¹

Figure 6-4 below illustrates the audience involvement. President Nixon's statement was representative of the attitude of the target of demands: "The US would do everything we can" to have the hostages released, but it would "not pay blackmail."⁶² Similarly, the Jordanian Foreign Minister stated "the Jordanian Government will not give in to pressure, no matter what the circumstances; nor is it ready to bargain over any demands."⁶³ Subsequently, amid stalled negotiations, the terrorists shot and killed the two American diplomats and the one Belgian diplomat. Again, the Palestinian terror produced a psychological warfare effect. The US and the

⁶¹Sobel, pp. 59-60; Dobson, pp. 112-115; Laffin, pp. 157-160; and Clutterback, p. 41.

⁶²Sobel, p. 60; and Laffin, p. 159.

⁶³Laffin, p. 159.

Israelis became openly committed to liquidating the dissidents, manifest in the CIA's secret involvement in subsequent operations against the Palestinian terrorists. The targets of attention and opportunity were appalled. President Sadat of Egypt said in disbelief:

We always do it. No sooner do we gain an advantage [referring to the Israeli downing of the Libyan airliner] than we destroy it ourselves. No sooner do we take a step forward than we hurl ourselves backwards...How can we be so self-destructive.⁶⁴




Figure 6-4.
The Seizure of the Saudi Embassy in Khartoum: Target Audiences

⁶⁴Dobson, p. 112.

The Saudi Arabian king, one of the principal financiers of the fedayeen activity for the past decade, described the operation as "harmful to the Arab cause."⁶⁵ Although the PLO condemned the attack and Arafat expressed that Fatah was not connected in any way, a Sudanese raid on the PLO headquarters in Khartoum uncovered documents linking both the PLO and al-Fatah to the operation. Accordingly, the Sudanese government banned the PLO and al-Fatah from its country. While Arafat suspected CIA involvement in the Sudanese counter-terrorist activities (which may have been true), his worst fears were yet to come. Meanwhile, Black September issued a statement after the Khartoum affair:

War against Zionist and American imperialism and their agents in the Arab world will continue. Our rifles will remain brandished against both the substance and the shadow.⁶⁶

And that they did. During the remainder of March 1973 and once in April, the Black September attacked targets of violence representative of Zionist and US interests in Lebanon, the US, and France before an Israeli counter-terrorist force struck (see Chronology Appendix B, Table B-1 for details). On 10 April 1973, Israeli commandos raided Palestinian bases in the center of Beirut and in the coastal town of Saida, in southern Lebanon. Twelve persons were killed during the assault including three key Palestinian leaders. Furthermore, documents found during the raid identified Palestinian contacts in Israel and the occupied territories, which eventually dealt a crippling blow to future Palestinian resistance activities in Israeli territory.

⁶⁵Laffin, p. 159.

⁶⁶Dobson, p. 117.

Significantly, this operation was the first Israeli anti-terrorist operation that was openly admitted; as demonstrated by Mrs Golda Meir's statement before the Knesset, "We killed the murders who were planning to kill again." As Dobson puts it:

Individual assassinations were judged to be within the limits set by world opinion and American pressure but anything larger was taboo. But then came Khartoum and, backed by the blazing anger of the United States, the Israelis saw the green light for a major operation inside the city.⁶⁷

The Sudanese raid on the PLO headquarters and the Israeli raid on Beirut led the Arab world to suspect US direct involvement in these major counter-terrorist windfalls.

Arafat continued the suspicion and his threats: "Revenge will come soon...and it will be terrible." The Voice of Palestine announced "death to Americans."⁶⁸

5. Summary

From the hijackings in the late 1960s to the seizure of the Saudi Embassy in Khartoum, the Palestinian resistance engaged in a campaign of terror that produced psychological warfare effects on both domestic and international audiences. The hijacking of the four international airliners in September 1970 gripped the world's attention for over three weeks, but failed to generate an answer to the Palestinian question. During this incident, the mainstream Fatah became embroiled in the dissident PFLP's quagmire with the Jordanian government, which eventually led to loss of Jordan as a sanctuary and a launching pad for raids into Israeli territory. While consolidating in Lebanon, Fatah internationalized its struggle against Zionism manifest

⁶⁷Dobson, p. 120.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 125.

in the Munich massacre. And again, the world was captivated, but the message was blurred behind the mask of Black September. The world knew of only the Palestinian terrorist who threatened an international sporting event dedicated to peace among nations. The response was outrage and the Israelis went to war against the Palestinian terrorists. But once again Black September struck at Khartoum and this time the United States became more directly involved, facilitating the Sudanese and Israeli counter-terrorist raids. The Palestinian resistance became victims of the technological age, believing that guns, bombs, and planes could somehow combine to produce the answer to their problem. The answer was not forthcoming because the targets of attention and opportunity were not propagandized, they were victimized and feeling threatened they fought back or failed to respond to the positive benefit to the Palestinian cause.

VII. CONCLUSION

Terrorism provided the Jewish and the Palestinian resistance a means to convey a political message to multiple target audiences and compensated for their physical and material weaknesses. The key to the Zionist's successful use of terrorism was the targeting of the occupying authority's sources of power, which included Britain's popular constituency and the United States. By comparison, Palestinian terrorism failed to appropriately target similar Israeli sources of power, victimizing these constituencies at the expense of their own oppressed peoples destined to remain under occupied control and in the squalor of the refugee camps. The following will conclude with a few comments on the differences between the Zionist and the Palestinian terrorist campaigns and the unique features that accounted for the former's success.

The first period considered the British Administration's response to the Jewish Revolt in Mandate Palestine from 1944 to 1947, during which the indigenous Jewish minority population and the immigrating European Jewish community were attempting to establish a homeland in all or part of Palestine. The second period considered was the Israeli response to the Palestinian campaign of terror from 1968 to 1973, during which the Palestinian diaspora attempted to reclaim the homeland they were forced to evacuate. Consequently, during each of their respective periods, first the Zionists and then the Palestinians, each attempted to lay claim to the same territory. The distinct difference between the two cases was whether or not the terrorist's "inevitable" victory

was within the realm of the possible. The European anti-semitism, the Holocaust, and international Zionism were historic forces that made the Jewish terrorists' inevitable well within the possible. By contrast, the Palestinian terrorists wanted to reverse the processes of history by radicalizing Arab nationalism and viewing the Jewish state in Palestine as a Western colonial outpost, which made their inevitable not entirely possible.

The intent of this analysis was to demonstrate how terrorism is a psychological operation, and as a psychological operation, how terrorism generates psychological warfare and propaganda effects on specific target audiences. The propaganda effects are informative, persuasive, and compelling on neutral or friendly audiences, whereas the psychological warfare effects are disruptive, demonstrative, and provocative to enemy or hostile audiences. Each of these effects parallels the conventional wisdom's instrumental and organizational perspectives of terrorism. The instrumental perspective is essentially oriented toward psychological warfare, the disruptive, disorienting, demonstrative, provocative, and vengeance related functions of terrorism. The organizational perspective relates to the propaganda impact of terrorist violence, the morale-building, competitive, coercive, and persuasive, group-centric functions of terrorism. Ultimately, these perspectives were synthesized within the preceding analytical framework that considered the psychological warfare and propaganda effects of terrorism on neutral, friendly, and hostile audiences.

In both cases, we observed the organizational and instrumental functions of terrorism. The basis of Jewish and Palestinian terrorism was instrumental reason,

which manifest in the use of terrorism to achieve a rational political end--statehood. As a strategy of a minority, terrorism compensated for the inherent organizational weaknesses of the two resistance movements: their dispersed populations, lack of conventional means to confront the occupying authority, and the inability to use less violent means of political expression due to their disenfranchised political status. Consequently, terrorism provided both of the resistance movements an organizational means to generate support and compensate for weakness among its own constituents and potential sympathizers, and an instrumental means to confront the occupying authority.

Ultimately, Zionist inspired terrorism in mandate Palestine was instrumental in the forcing British withdrawal and subsequent establishment of a Jewish state. By contrast, Palestinian terrorism failed to force a similar Israeli response and has been unable to reclaim any portion of the territory they were forced to evacuate. Although recent developments have made this previous point somewhat negligible, the purpose of this inquiry was to illustrate the fundamental differences between the two campaigns in order to reveal to how Jewish inspired terrorism motivated audiences to respond consistent with their intended consequences and Palestinian terrorism did not. Jewish terrorism was effective because it avoided the enemy's strengths, targeted its weaknesses: the British sources of power rather than center of power, and most importantly anticipated target audience response and controlled for the psychological effects multiple audiences. By comparison, the Palestinians neither targeted the Israeli

sources of power nor controlled for the psychological effects on domestic target audiences in general and international target audiences in particular.

Ultimately, terrorism represents Clausewitz's politics by other means where "propaganda of the deed" and "armed struggle" are the only means of conveying a message to specific audiences. The terrorist's armed struggle serves as the instrumental means to achieve the desired political ends, whereas propaganda of the deed is generally an organizational means of arousing support for the terrorist's cause. Instrumentally, the provocative, disruptive, and demonstrative characteristics of terrorism are designed to destroy the will of the enemy. For instrumental terror to have the intended consequences it must directly victimize the targets of terror and demands, while controlling for the psychological warfare effects on the targets of attention and opportunity. The psychological warfare effects on the targets of attention and opportunity are regulated by selecting a target of violence whose identification with the targets of attention and opportunity is low. Only in the case of the Irgun's campaign against the British judicial system did we observe this dynamic at work, where audiences not victimized by the dissident's terror were free to relish in British humiliation. By comparison, the Palestinian's propaganda windfall after the Israeli downing of a Libyan airliner was subsequently undermined by the psychological warfare effects of the seizure of the Saudi Embassy in Khartoum. The level of discrimination in the selection of the target of violence was the key feature of Jewish terrorism that controlled for the psychological warfare effects on the targets of attention and opportunity. Ultimately, Palestinian terrorism created a psychological

state of mind among many audiences; in the terrorist's mind total war, the Israeli government's mind annoyance, in their public's mind a horror, and in the world's chaos--a phenomenon with a psychological life of its own.

Therefore, the violent impact of terrorism has the potential to assume a life of its own, independent of the perpetrators intentions. The act generates a message, framed in the context of the historical moment, which is transmitted by the media to multiple audiences. These audiences shape this message through preexisting images and analogies, which in turn shape their response. For audience response to be positive relative to the terrorist's cause, it must be a component of a larger strategic campaign that is cognizant of the images and analogies held by their target audiences. The number of audiences and the environment was infinitely more complex for the Palestinians than the Jews. The expanse of electronic media served as an asset and a liability for the Palestinian terrorists. For example, a typical American family could watch footage of US soldiers being killed in Vietnam on one television channel, and see a Palestinian terrorist hijacking a plane from a European airport on another. While hijacking could not control for multiple viewing audiences, it did serve as an effective transmitter of the Palestinian message during a period when there was intense competition for media coverage with a multitude of world events (i.e. Vietnam, Soviets in Czechoslovakia, student demonstrations, etc.). By comparison, the Jewish terrorists did not have the benefit of visual imagery in order to portray their oppressive circumstances to a world audience.

The benefits of the media and the target selection were factors considered by both the mainstream and dissident leadership. The Jewish resistance possessed a strategic framework that appropriately considered these factors relative to the domestic and international audiences, whereas the Palestinians possessed only a moderate consideration of the importance of the media's ability to shape a particular violent event. No matter the incident, from the Irgun's bombing of the King David Hotel to Black September's kidnapping of the Israeli athletes at Munich, acts of violence perceived as indiscriminate were counter-productive--possessing little propaganda value. In both cases, international outrage precipitated a drive to liquidate the terrorists. But only in the Zionist case did we observe a concerted effort by the mainstream to control the dissidents' indiscriminate acts of terror. During the two *Saasons*, the Zionist mainstream pinned Jew against Jew at a cost of taming the dissidents, which facilitated further dialogue with the British and the international Zionist community, at a price low enough to reap the psychological benefits of more highly selective dissident terrorist acts. The mainstream Palestinians, on the other hand, were not willing to tame the dissident fringe, which led to the near destruction of the entire Palestinian resistance movement during their clashes with the Jordanian military in 1970 and the Israeli reprisal raids on southern Lebanon and Beirut.

Jewish terrorism was successful in achieving its ultimate political objective, because of their ability to anticipate audience response and indirectly attack sources of British power and prestige. The British Administration in Palestine derived its power not from the Mandate, but from the British public and Great Britain's alliance with the

United States. Consequently, the social and economic devastation brought on by the second World War II increased Britain's dependence on both of these sources of power. The Jewish terrorists avoided direct confrontation with British security forces, attacking targets of symbolic of British prestige. The short-term objective of the Zionist mainstream was to drive a wedge between British and American public opinion by attacking targets symbolic of British immigration policy and exploiting the Mandate Authority's tendency to over-react in the face of continued dissident violence.

The efficacy of Jewish and Palestinian terrorist campaigns depended on the roles played by mainstream and dissident factions. The mainstream and dissident roles for both the Jews and the Palestinians were remarkably similar. The mainstream typically espoused some form of territorial compromise, a "Return" (immigration) of the diaspora, the maintenance of diplomatic dialogue with either regional or international powers, and the endorsement of the selective use of terrorism against the manifestations of authority in the occupied region. The dissidents espoused the indirect approach by raising the conscious recognition of the plight of their peoples to international audiences. In doing so, they rejected territorial compromise and negotiations with the occupying authority, but like the mainstream they supported the idea of the "Return" of their peoples to historic Palestine. Furthermore, the dissidents were less discriminate in their selection of a target of violence (attacking all manifestations of the occupying authority) than the mainstream terrorists. Despite these similarities, however, there are some unique differences that deserve mention. These differences will be indicative of the efficacy of the Jewish campaign of terror.

The Jewish mainstream's use of the Haganah to attack manifestations of British immigration policy was more selective in nature than can be attributed to the Palestinian mainstream, al-Fatah. Al-Fatah's choice of attacking all manifestations of Israeli authority was more like the dissident Irgun than the mainstream Haganah. Ben-Gurion recognized the counter-productive aspects of terrorist violence that could provoke British reprisal. He, therefore, restrained the Haganah's actions to the initiation of incidents that would frustrate British authority and not provoke a counter-productive response. By contrast, Arafat exhibited no such restraint in his attacks on the manifestations of Israeli authority, doing more to harden Israeli resolve than to weaken their grip on control. Furthermore, Ben-Gurion would not be tarred with the dissident brush, which led to open collaboration with the British during their drive to liquidate the dissident, facilitating the maintenance of diplomatic dialogue and exploiting controlled dissident violence to political advantage. By contrast, Arafat was not willing to pin Fatah against the dissident Palestinian factions. He compromised his mainstream platform by getting inextricably involved in the dissident operations in Jordan (1970) such that he nearly sacrificed the entire Palestinian resistance.

The Irgun, on the other hand, differed from the Palestinian dissidents in one important respect. Begin understood that in order to gain and maintain popular support, tactics were never used with the intention of creating non-combatant casualties. As a general rule, when attacks were conducted in close proximity to civilian by-standers warnings were issued. Neither the Palestinian mainstream nor the Palestinian dissidents possessed a similar rule. In fact, the distinction between combatants and non-

combatants was never quite clear regarding both Palestinian mainstream and dissident terrorist groups. Finally, the Jews and the Palestinians possessed a moral imperative to establish a homeland in all (or part) of Palestine, justified by the Holocaust for the former and the "exodus" of 1948 for the latter. Therefore, we turn to "audience response" in order to observe how each of the cases informed their audiences about the moral claim of their oppressed constituents to a homeland.

The occupation of the West Bank and Gaza by the Israeli Defense Forces after the Six-Day War provided the Palestinian terrorists (fedayeen) two strategic advantages that had not previously existed. The first was the number of Palestinians under Israeli domination had quadrupled, which intensified a sense of Palestinian nationalism. And second, it provided the fedayeen a potential base of popular support for future attacks against the Israeli occupation forces. In spite of these strategic improvements, the defeated Arab states did not renounce their claims to the newly Israeli-occupied territories. Many West Bank Palestinians held onto a hope of a Jordanian settlement and Egypt's "war of attrition" in the Sinai and Gaza resulted in escalating Israeli reprisals at the expense of Palestinian unity. The Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian involvement in Palestinian affairs undermined fedayeen efforts to establish a popular support base which forced them further underground. While the plight of the Palestinian refugees was given international attention, the ability of the fedayeen to overcome regional disputes, avoid Israeli reprisal raids, and launch a unified "armed struggle" was difficult at best. Therefore, the fedayeen's inability to wage a successful terrorist campaign was undermined by internal and external rivalries, denying them the

ability to communicate violent message from a clearly identifiable source and accurately target the Israeli sources of power

During the Jordanian crisis, Arafat compromised the mainstream policy of non-intervention, leading to the fedayeen loss of Jordan as base of operations. US peace initiatives, the Rogers Plan, generated a cease-fire in the Sinai which further restricted the fedayeen's freedom of maneuver. In apparent hope not to be overcome by events, the fedayeen placed their emphasis on international terrorism, which continued to provoke Israeli reprisals without much notice from the world community. Ultimately, the fedayeen's frustration created Munich. With a television audience of more than two million viewers, the world took notice. But the inevitable result was negative, the Palestinian cause became synonymous with terrorism. Unfortunately, from 1967 to 1973 the Palestinian historical processes were not aligned in such a way as to permit a successful attainment of their goals. The fedayeen neither threatened Israeli sources of power nor correctly anticipated audience response.

From 1944 to 1947, the Jewish mainstream endorsed the selective use of terrorism in order to force British acceptance of the Jewish Agency's (Jewish quasi-government in mandate Palestine) immigration demands and created "incidents" that would frustrate British attempts to maintain control. The British policies were attacked by three organizations. The mainstream Haganah (with its offensive force--the Palmach) focused on countering British immigration policy and the dissident Irgun and Stern Gang attacked symbolic manifestations of British authority. The Stern Gang's assassination of Lord Moyne illustrated the counter-productive aspects of dissident

violence, whereby the murder was perceived as highly inappropriate considering the British involvement in the second World War. While the Irgun's attack on the King David Hotel severed any hope of unified action against the British, the subsequent British overreaction manifest in General Barker's anti-semitic statement provided the Irgun an immediate propaganda windfall and concrete evidence for the Yishuv of the British prejudices. The dissident campaign against the judiciary was a crucial factor in the deterioration of British authority in the Mandate. It exposed to the world in general and the British public in particular the contradictory character of British policy, which drove a wedge between British popular will and continued British presence in the Mandate.

The terrorist acts committed by the Jewish dissidents were guided within the confines of Ben-Gurion's and Begin's strategic framework. Neither saw it useful to confront the British in a conventional contest, nor did they want to commit the Yishuv to such a useless ordeal. Consequently, Ben-Gurion and Begin saw the utility of the indirect approach, the former focusing on the United States and the latter on the British public. This combined strategy enabled the Jewish resistance to target British sources of power and prestige. They exposed to the United States and the British public the illegitimate and repressive policies of the British Administration in Mandate Palestine. The ability to understand target audience response became crucial in their selection of targets of violence. The discriminate character of their attacks combined with propaganda transmitted a positive image to the target audiences, which made the Jewish resistance a more credible force. This credibility inevitably led to the

deterioration of the British authority in the Mandate and the subsequent creation of a Jewish state.

Terrorism is a psychological process that systematically uses violence to achieve political ends, involving the efficient roles played by mainstream and dissident factions, the discriminate selection of a target of violence, the anticipation of audience response and the control for the psychological effects on multiple audiences. Only in the case of the Jewish resistance did we observe a differentiation between mainstream and dissident roles, which tailored the dissidents' selection of targets of violence consistent with the mainstream's psychological and political objectives. On the terrorist's psychological battlefield success can not be assured without considering the psychological impact of violence on multiple audiences. The Jewish terrorists successfully targeted vulnerable audiences along domestic and international fronts exploiting psychological vulnerabilities that previously existed or manipulating those conditions they created. The Jewish strategy of terrorism directly targeted the British administration in the Mandate and indirectly targeted audiences removed from the source of dispute. The impact of Jewish terrorism on the British authority was psychological warfare; destroying British will to resist and eroding their cherished imperial prestige. Jewish terrorism propagandized the British sources of power by selecting targets of violence that did not victimize international audiences--innocence mattered. Palestinian terrorism was psychological warfare for effect, victimizing domestic and international audiences at the expense of a solution to the Palestine question. Jewish terrorism resolved the Palestine question by committing to a

campaign of terrorism designed as a psychological operation, which demanded a direct answer to their question from the targets of terror and demands using its psychological warfare potential and informed and persuaded international audiences (targets of attention and opportunity) by propaganda of the deed. This balance of propaganda and psychological warfare gave the Jewish terrorists their answer on 14 May 1948--Israel, the ultimate political objective. Terrorism is a psychological operation.

TABLE A-1.
THE CHRONOLOGY OF JEWISH RESISTANCE
(MANDATE PALESTINE, 1922-1948)

DATE	GROUP	LOCATION	INCIDENT	RESPONSE
24 July 22	British	Palestine	League of Nations placed Palestine under a British Mandatory government. The League Council reiterated its favor "of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine."	
7 Sept 35	Zionists	Vienna	Vladimir Jabotinsky's Revisionists formed an independent worldwide Zionist movement-New Zionist Organization. Concerned with the plight of the diaspora (<i>millions</i>), in 1937 Jabotinsky preached his maximalist position: Palestine Jews would occupy Palestine on both sides of the Jordan river, which became the line of the dissident Irgun and Stern Gang yet to emerge.	In Poland, BETAR emerged as the militant wing of the Revisionists
July 36	Haganah-B	Tel Aviv	Attack on a trainload of Arabs in retaliation for a similar Arab attack.	Haganah-B emerged as faction of the mainstream Haganah. The leadership of the Haganah-B opposed the Jewish Agency's policy of restraint, which later resulted in the formation of the Irgun (Spring 1937)
14 Mar 37	Haganah-B	outside Tel Aviv	Bombing of an Arab coffee house in retaliation for Arab sniping.	
August 37	Irgun	?	Failed bank robbery: 3 Jews arrested and 1 escaped.	
14 Nov 37	Irgun	Mandate	Number of retaliatory strikes resulted in ten Arabs dead and ? wounded.	Jewish Agency outraged, accusing the Revisionists of "marring the moral record of Palestine Jewry, hampering the political struggle and undermining security" [ref. Bell, <i>Zion</i> p. 39]
16 Apr 38	Arabs	Jerusalem	3 Jews machine gunned to death.	
21 Apr 38	Irgun	Jaffa	2 Irgunists fired on an Arab bus.	2 were captured. In their defense, Mr S. Landman of the N/O said they fired in apparent frustration caused by two years of Arab violence [ref. <i>Times</i> , 5 June 38] British responded with imposing the death sentence on two imprisoned Irgunists. Ben-Yosef became the Irgun's first martyr.
Spring 38	Mandate	Arabs	Killed 5 Jews in their sleep. 16 more killed, 7 in an attack on a settlement and 9 on a bus.	Irgun retaliated in kind
4 July 38	Jerusalem Tel Aviv	Irgun	Attacked Arab quarters, killing and wounding 20 Arabs.	
6 July 38	Haifa	Irgun	Disguised as an "Arab" porter, an Irgunist bombed a market, killing 23 Arabs and wounding 79 others.	

29 June 38	Jerusalem	British	Hung, Ben-Yosef, for an attempted ambush of an Arab bus. Ben-Yosef was hung on Rosh Hodesh, a Jewish holiday, whereby no rabbi could give him consolation. Consequently, the British determination to hang a subversive gave the Jewish resistance its first martyr.	The hanging eroded the moderate center of the Irgun, believing then that Jewish freedom would come by way of the sword. The Irgun increased its retaliatory strikes (see below).
15 July 38	Old City Jerusalem	Irgun	Bombed a market, killing 10 Arabs and wounding 29 others.	
25 July 38	Haifa	Irgun	Multiple bombings resulted in the deaths of 39 Arabs and injuries to 46 others.	
26 July 38	Old City Jerusalem	Irgun	Bombing attempt similar to 6 July foiled.	
Sep 38	Mandate	Irgun	In response to the murder of 3 Jews by Arab fedayeen, counter-attack killed 13 Arabs.	In October 38, the British took serious steps to curb the violence: reinforcements arrived and established military control over Jerusalem and all road traffic.
1 Jan 39	"	?	Sir C. Tegart escaped death while G.D. Sanderson was assassinated by unknown assailants.	
4-6 Jan 39	Mandate	?	Blum and Bernstein assassinated by unknown assailants and Keith-Roach escaped a similar fate [ref: Kirkham et al, p. 311].	
6-7 Mar 39	Mandate		Adnan Nashashibi and Dr. Sternberg were assassinated by unknown assailants [ref: Kirkham et al, 312].	
31 Mar 39	Haifa	Security Forces	British intern 700 illegal immigrants from the <i>Aghaia Nikolooz</i> (immigrant ship); the first Aliyah Beth.	Inflames Jewish Agency and Yishuv, providing a catalyst for the sanction of anti-immigration assaults by the Haganah and Irgun
17 May 39	Britain	British	Announced another White Paper, placating the Arab demands for a reduction in the immigration of European Jews to Palestine...	
17 May 39	Mandate	Irgun	Bombing of Palestine Broadcasting Studios.	British White Paper announcement; signifies a yielding to the Arab fedayeen, whereby violence works.
18 May 39	Mandate	Yishuv	Riot erupts at the Immigration Office in response to British internment of illegals on 31 March and the announcement of the White Paper on 17 May.	
23 May 39	Jerusalem	Irgun	Killed their first policeman.	
29 May 39	Jerusalem	Irgun	Bomb detonated at an Arab movie theater.	
June 39	Tel Aviv Haifa Jerusalem	Irgun	Telephone booths bombed.	Leads to the arrest of the Irgun leader, David Raziel. Stern assumes command

12 Jun 39	Mandate	Irgun	Main post office and Arab coffee houses bombed. And an Arab quarter was sniped.	7 August 39, Stern pronounced a death sentence on Ralph Cairns for alleged torture of imprisoned Irgunists
30 Jun 39	Jerusalem	Irgun	Radio station sabotaged.	
8 Aug 39	Haifa	Haganah	Bomb destroyed <i>Sinbad II</i> , a British vessel.	
August 39	Mandate	Irgun	Commander of the Jewish Department of CID and another British officer killed by a trap mine explosion.	31 August 39, 6 Irgunists arrested (Stern included)
22 Aug 39	Mandate	Irgun	Ralph Cairns killed by a landmine.	Jan 40, David Raziel released from Sarafand detention camp. Subsequent disagreement over continued anti-British operations between Raziel and Stern led to the formation of a splinter group--Stern gang (I.F.I.I.)
5 Sept 39	Europe	Britain	World War II	Jabotinsky announced full NZO support for the British war effort. The NZO took initiatives to have the Irgun High Command released from prison. In June 40, the Irgun prisoners were released by the British authorities in the Mandate.
Sep 40	Jerusalem Tel Aviv	Stern	Robbery at the Anglo-Palestine bank. Robbery at an Arab bank failed.	
20 Nov 40	Mandate	British	Two ships containing illegal Jewish immigrants were expelled to the island of Mauritius.	Subsequently, the British transferred the illegals to a British ship, the <i>Patria</i> in Haifa harbor. On 25 Nov 40, the Haganah placed a bomb on the <i>Patria</i> which inadvertently exploded killing 250 passengers. One illegal ship did make it to Mauritius.
19 Dec 40	Haifa	Stern	Bombed Immigration office in protest for the deportation of illegal immigrants to Mauritius.	
26 Dec 41	Jerusalem	Stern	2 daylight robberies.	
9 Jan 42	Tel Aviv	Stern	Raid on Histadrut bank collapsed in gun fire, when an employee refused to turn over the money, resulted in the deaths of 2 Jewish bank employees.	Yishuv outraged, referring to the Stern as a "criminal gang." Subsequent searches and arrests led to the arrest of 2 Sternists. And a price was put on Stern's head (\$5000)
20 Jan 42	Tel Aviv	Stern	3 CID operatives (2 Jews) killed and 1 wounded in a trap mine explosion	Yishuv incensed. Police sought revenge, announcing an open season on the Stern gang.
12 Feb 42	Jerusalem	British	Stern is killed by British CID agents following an extensive manhunt	Remainder of Stern gang determined to avenge Stern's murder. Yet the death of Stern led to the capture of 25 more of Stern's followers (200) imprisoned in detention camps throughout the Mandate) (overwhelming preponderance of Jewish opinion opposed the Stern Gang)
22 Apr 42	"	Stern	Attempted assassination of the Assistant Inspector General of Police. McConnell failed, killing an Arab instead.	
Spring 42	Mandate	Irgun	Raided British army depot making away with only 14 rifles.	The Irgun's subsequent propaganda message admits their folly.

1 May 42	Jaffa	Stern	Failed assassination of the Chief of CID Morton, when a bomb electronically detonated but failed to his passing car.	
9-11 May 42	New York	WZO	Met to discuss the plight of European Jewry amid news from Europe that only 25 percent of the endangered Jews might survive and April's mass deportation of illegal Jewish immigrants in Palestine by the British.	
1 Sep 42	Mitra	Stern	2 Sternists tunneled out of Mitra detention camp (Itzhak Yizernitaky and Elahu Gil Adi).	
13 Feb 43	Latrun Detention Camp	Stern	1st Anniversary of Stern's death, Sternists prison break was foiled by the British due to unexpected inspection of the prison cells.	21 Oct 43, twenty one Sternists finally escaped (see below).
Sep 43	Mandate	Stern	Assassinated a Jewish CID agent who had allegedly collaborated with the British about the Stern gang.	Yishuv mildly supportive.
31 Oct 43	Latrun	Stern	21 tunnel out of Latrun detention camp (including Nathan Friedman-Yellin).	1 Nov 43, British renounced the Biltmore Program.
Jan 44	Mandate	Irgun/Stern	Irgun and Stern gang agreed to form a tacit alliance--"the Revolt."	
19 Jan 44	Haifa	Irgun	Broke into the garage of the British Steel company and sabotaged government cars with mines.	1 Feb 44, Begin's proclamation.
12 Feb 44	Jerusalem Haifa Tel Aviv	Irgun-Stern	1st operation of the Revolt, incendiary bombs go off simultaneously in three Palestine cities in the offices of the Department of Migration, no casualties.	Symbols of British "closed gates" policy. The Jewish Agency was dismayed
14 Feb 44	Haifa	Stern	2 Sternists putting up wall posters shot 2 constables who attempted to stop them.	Stern insisted on arming all members 18 Feb 44. British CID patrol shot and killed an innocent Jew who failed to reply quickly enough to the patrol's challenge.
16 Feb 44	Haifa	Stern	2 policemen shot and killed.	20 Feb 44, a Sternist killed by British police
24 Feb 44	Mandate	Stern	Chief of CID Morton was slightly injured and his car demolished in the 4th assault on his life. A second explosion wounded four CID men in a follow-up on car.	
25 Feb 44	"	Stern	2 police cars are blown up.	
27 Feb 44	Jerusalem Haifa Tel Aviv	Irgun-Stern	Income tax offices in three Palestine cities bombed.	
2 Mar 44	Mandate	Irgun	Constable shot while trying to arrest 5 Irgunists putting up wall posters.	On 19 March, British police shot and killed a Sternist will resisting arrest
13 Mar 44	Ramat Gan	Stern	CID man shot 5 times and killed.	
19 Mar 44	Tel Aviv	Stern	In retaliation for British killing of a Sternist, they shot 3 CID officers, killing 2 and wounding the other.	British appalled, announced pen season on the Stern gang which frightened the Yishuv

23 Mar 44	Tel Aviv	Stern	2 British constables shot; 1 fatally wounded and the other seriously injured.	British Authority orders a general military stand-by and the execution of armed patrols.
24 Mar 44	Haifa	Stern	Explosion wrecked CID Headquarters; 3 Brit constables killed and three wounded.	British imposed 3PM to 5AM curfew in Jewish quarter of Jerusalem and announced a reward for information leading to the arrest of the resistance. canceled on 7 April after the arrest of 60 suspects
	Jaffa	Stern	Blew up one wing of the 3-story CID headquarters; casualties unknown.	"
	Jerusalem	Stern	A wave of bombings and shooting incidents resulted in the deaths of 2 British police and the wounding of 2 others	26 March 1944, British Authority imposed a general curfew
1 Apr 44	Mandate	Stern	1 constable killed and an inspector wounded.	
April 44	Haifa	British	Yerachmiel "Elisha" Aaronsen, Lehi commander in Haifa, ambushed by British police.	The next day, with 10 Stern vengeance squads on the street, the British security forces stayed in their barracks and police in their stations. 6 April, Jewish Agency cooperated with the British authorities which led to the identification of a Stern safe-house; 1 killed during the British assault and 2 killed themselves rather than risk capture
9 Apr 44	Tel Aviv	Stern	Police station bombed, wounding 3 police.	
10 Apr 44	Tel Aviv	Stern	Assassination attempt on the inspector of police failed.	
17 May 44	Ramat	Irgun	* Anniversary of White Paper, attacked the central broadcasting station.	British rounded up suspects and ran long identity parades. The death sentence, enacted in 1936 but elapsed, was invoked for possessing arms and placing explosives. While the Jewish Agency was appalled, the Yishuv was impressed by the dissident militancy and the British ineffectuality
Summer 44	Mandate	Stern	Sporadic attacks on police and CID inspectors continued, from Jan-Aug 44 15 persons had been killed	British and the Jewish Agency's reactions hardened due to the continuing assaults. 5 April 44, British captured a Latrun escapee (26 June 44 sentenced him to death)
14 July 44	Jerusalem	Irgun	Quitted Land Registry Office; 2 Arab constables were killed.	
15 July 44	Mandate	Irgun	Seized a British explosive truck, killing a British constable in the process.	
8 Aug 44	Jerusalem-Jaffa Road	Stern	Failed assassination attempt on British High Commissioner MacMichael resulted in the wounding of 3 staff members (this was the 6th attempt on MacMichael's life).	
10 Aug 44	Mandate	Irgun-Haganah	Begin meets with Dr Moshe Sneh and Eliyahu Golomb	
13 Aug 44	"	Stern	Assassination attempt on High Commissioner Sir Harold MacMichael failed.	
23 Aug 44	Jaffa	Irgun	Arms raids conducted on CID barracks netting only 14 rifles.	On 5 September 1944, British mounted their first huge cordon and search operation in Petah Tikva (haven of the Irgun)

27 Sep 44	Jerusalem	Irgun	British are challenged by the resistance to interfere with the "day of atonement" at the Wailing Wall, which provides a diversion for Irgun assaults throughout the Mandate.	British allow the Jew's their day.
	Haifa Beit Dragon Katra Qalqilya	Irgun	Four separate attacks on police stations; 2 British soldiers and 2 constables killed, and 5 Irgunists wounded.	British stunned, responded with serious steps: deportations of detainees (see below) and pressure on recognized Jewish institutions to inform on the dissidents; pushing Jewish Agency toward an anti-Irgun policy.
29 Sep 44	Jerusalem	Stern	British police officer shot and killed.	Despite the tension in the Mandate, British War Cabinet authorizes a Jewish Brigade.
6 Oct 44	Tel Aviv	Irgun	Stole textiles from a local warehouse and distributed the loot to needy families, sold some for weapons money, and some were later recovered by the British. A total of \$500,000 worth of textiles was stolen.	British call for active collaboration with the forces of law and order: a reward put on Begin's head; 20 October Haganah opened an anti-Irgun training course for 170 men; 21 October British security forces removed 237 detainees from Latrun camp and 14 from Acre prison and deported all 231 to Eritria; and in spite of the Jewish Agency's protest against the deportations, on 25 October the Inner Zionist Council announced drastic measures were to be taken against the dissidents.
12 Oct 44	Mandate	Stern	CID chief TJ Wikin assassinated.	
	"	Stern	Assassination attempt on High Commissioner Sir Harold MacMichael failed.	
20 Oct 44	Mandate	Haganah	Jewish Agency and Haganah begin active collaboration with the British security forces in their campaign against the dissidents: the "Season."	By the end of October 1944, 118 Irgun suspects had been detained forcing the dissidents further underground.
6 Nov 44	Egypt	Stern	Unable to make their mark in history by assassinating MacMichael, they assassinated Lord Moyne, British Minister of State for the Middle East. His driver was also killed, sparing a Arab witness.	Yishuv's reaction: "They have done more by this single reprehensible crime to demolish the edifice erected by three generations of Jewish pioneers than is imaginable." The Times, 9 Nov 44.
Nov 44	Mandate	Irgun-Stern	Raided Sarafand Military camp to steal arms; 2 Jews captured.	Haganah and British declare war on the Irgun, the "Season." 279 Irgunists captured/deported to Eritrea. The 2 captured at Sarafand were sentenced to death under the "emergency regulations."
Jan 45	Egypt	British	Lord Moyne's assassins trial.	18 Jan 45 sentenced to death
12 May 45	Jerusalem Bet Dragon	Irgun	British discovered clockwork mortars, which were set to go off at the government printing office, the King David Hotel, and a police station. Fortunately, these devices were deactivated by the rain.	Note: 8 May 1945, the war ends in Europe.
14 May 45	Mandate	Irgun	Widespread sabotage destroyed 400 telephone poles throughout Palestine.	
	"	Irgun	Haganah foiled attempt to place 20 explosive charges on the oil pipelines.	Davar, mainstream Zionist paper, condemned the attacks.
May 45	Mandate	Irgun-Stern	More telephone poles exploded and a mortar attack on Haifa police station.	
June 45	Mandate	Haganah	Anti-dissident campaign, the "Season," ended, because of the anticipated change in British immigration policy and the British Labour pro-Zionist stance.	August 1945, 200,000 American Zionists held a mass open air protest against the British policy in Palestine in Madison Square Park

Sep 45	Italy	Irgun	Mission sent to Europe to rescue refugees, recruit soldiers, procure arms, and undertake sabotage operations against Britain.	
16 Sep 45	Jerusalem	Irgun	3 propaganda bombs exploded, killing 1 and injuring 9 potential readers.	28 September 1945, security forces reinforced by the 6th Airborne Division.
29 Sep 45	Mandate	Irgun	British constable shot during a post office robbery.	
9 Oct 45	Mandate	Haganah	Kol Israel (Voice of Israel) began broadcasts: Haganah's clandestine radio station.	
10 Oct 45	Athin Detention Camp	Palmach	Liberated 208 interned illegal immigrants; 1 British soldier killed.	
Fall 45	Haifa Jerusalem	Yishuv	Half-day strike and demonstrations.	
11 Oct 45	Rehovat	Rekesh	Armaments wing of the Haganah raided a military camp, making away with 200 rifles, 50 sub-machineguns, and 200 bayonets.	Kol Israel calls for active resistance.
31 Oct 45	Mandate	Kol Israel	Proclaimed the existence of the Jewish Resistance (Haganah-Irgun-Stern).	
31 Oct-1 Nov 45	Haifa Jaffa Lydda Jerusalem Tel Aviv	Resistance	Simultaneous attacks: 500 explosive charged created 242 breaks in the railway system, destroyed 3 police launches, attacked train stations and railyards destroying 1 locomotive and damaging 6 others, blew up a telephone installation, consolidated refinery blown up, station master's house bombed, and petroleum wagon bombed.	Jewish Agency appalled and Parliament outraged. British government forms a committee of inquiry introducing the UIS (Peel Commission). 2 Nov 45 more airborne units arrived in Haifa.
25 Nov 45	Synda Ali Gavut Olga	Haganah	2 coast guard stations and a police station were sprayed with automatic fire and bombed.	26 November, British security forces--6th ABN, Police mobile force, etc.--mounted a 10k man cordon-and-search operation.
Nov 45	"	Irgun	Under the British noses, the Irgun purchased and shipped 5 tons of Chilean nitrate, which disappeared into the Irgun's explosive factories, leaving an uncollectible bill.	
23 Nov 45	Mandate	Irgun	Two truck loads of arms stolen from an RAF camp.	
Nov 45	Mandate	Resistance	Haganah-Irgun-Stern joined forces to create a combined resistance.	Ends 29 June 1946.
25 Dec 45	Bet-Naballah	Irgun	Attempted raid on Bet-Naballah army camp failed because the guards did not fall asleep after being given spirits doctored with sleeping pills.	
	Nahariya Beach	Haganah	252 refugees smuggled ashore from the <i>Hannah Simech</i> ; 2 drowned.	

27 Dec 45	Jerusalem Jaffa Tel Aviv	Irgun-Stern	7 police and CID headquarters, and REME workshops were bombed; resulting in 10 British constables and 9 dissidents killed and 12 British constables wounded.	British wanted swift action: cordon-and-search operations, curfew (lifted 5 Jan 46), and identity checks. British security forces questioned all males ages 16-50: in Ramat Gan 682 questioned, 38 detained, and 30 arrested for breaking curfew; in Jerusalem 1455 questioned and 59 detained--no dissidents discovered.
12 Jan 46	Benyamina	Resistance	Destroyed a train injuring 3 constables.	
13 Jan 46	Haifa	Resistance	Train derailed and payroll was stolen (35K British pounds sterling).	Jan 46 cordon-and-search operations continued in Jerusalem and the curfew remained in effect; 400 detained and 30 arrested.
15 Jan 46	Tel Aviv	"	Warehouse watchman chloroformed and 10 tons of nitrate soda stolen.	
19 Jan 46	Jerusalem		Attempted prison break failed concluding in a gun-battle.	
20 Jan 46	Jerusalem	Stern	At the Palestine Broadcast Studios Assistant Superintendent of Police Elson and a Royal Army captain killed.	
20 Jan 46	Givat Olga Mt Carmel	Haganah	Mine detonated at a Coast Guard station. Sabotage attempt of a radar station failed.	28 January 1946, British High Commissioner Sir Allen Cunningham imposed the death penalty "on any persons convicted of being a member of a terrorist gang--any group of persons, any of whom have committed offenses contrary to the new defense regulations." Furthermore, life imprisonment was invoked for the unlawful wearing of a uniform (a tactic Irgun employed frequently).
28 Jan 46	Aqir	Irgun	200 machine-guns were stolen during a raid on a RAF camp.	31 Jan 46, British dismissed all Jewish drivers of RAF lorries.
Feb 46	France	Irgun	Dr Simuel Ariel (Elhanan) arrived in Paris as the Irgun representative.	
3 Feb 46	Tel Aviv	Irgun	Dressed in British uniforms, Irgun overpowered 2 guards and 3 RAF men, bound and gagged them, departed with two sacks of weapons: 4 Sten guns, 11 rifles, and 3 pistols.	
5 Feb 46	Safed	Irgun	Attacked police headquarters.	
6 Feb 46	Holon	Irgun	Attack on King's African Rifles resulted in the killing of one British officer and an African soldier.	African soldiers rioted attacking a near-by Jewish settlement, killing two Jews and wounding four.
20 Feb 46	Mt Carmel	Haganah	Radar station blown up; injuring 9 RAF soldiers.	
21 Feb 46	Haifa	Palmach	3 police outposts attacked; 4 Palmach killed.	
25 Feb 46	Mandate	Haganah	Conducted simultaneous assaults on police stations and radar installations.	Funeral following day witnessed 50k Jew marching with the coffins
26 Feb 46	RAF Airfields	Irgun-Stern	Raided RAF airfields in Qalnsia, Petah Tiqva, and Lydda destroying 13 "Halifax" bombers, 7 "Spitfires," 2 "Ansons," and other light aircraft. The RAF was targeted because the RAF was detecting illegal immigrants on the high seas and was responsible for transporting illegals into exile.	

6-7 Mar 46	Sarafand	Irgun	Dressed as airborne troops, raided an army barracks making away with a truckload of arms.	10 March 1946, British security force commander relieved.
8 Mar 46	Mandate	British	Anglo-American Committee arrives.	
2 Apr 46	Rehovet Ashdod	Irgun-Stern	An estimated 100 dissidents blew bridges, destroyed police stations and raided army camps. 3 dissidents wounded and 31 captured.	
23 Apr 46	Ramat Gan	Irgun	Attack on police armory: Arab constable killed and 2 wounded, 3 Irgunists wounded and 1 captured.	Security force search turned up 9 Irgunists (including 2 wounded men and 2 women). British sentence one captured Irgunist to death.
25 Apr 46	Tel Aviv- Jaffa	Stern	Attack on 6th ABN car park resulted in 6 British soldiers dead, 1 soldier and a British constable wounded.	Road curfew (lifted 12 May) and searches ordered. British Parliament denounced the murders. On 26 April, off-duty British troops ran amok through the out-skirts of Tel Aviv (Naynayah and Beer Tuveyah) smashed stores, trampled people on the streets, and wrote anti-semitic slogans on walls.
1 May 46	Mandate	British	Anglo-American Committee issued report.	Arabs and Jewish dissidents opposed, versus the mainstream Zionist were fore.
20 May 46	Nablus	Irgun-Stern	Robbed Barclay's Bank.	
June 46	Mandate	Irgun-Stern	More trains derailed throughout Palestine.	Combined resistance begins to come apart.
10 June 46	Lydda	Irgun	3 trains attacked; ten coaches burned out, one engine blown up, and another derailed.	
	Jerusalem- Jaffa	Irgun	Train stopped and dynamited between Sarafand and Tel Aviv.	
	outside Tel Aviv	Irgun	Jaffa to Jerusalem train attacked.	
	Haifa	"	Destroyed a locomotive.	
13 June 46	Mandate	British	Trial of two Irgunist for Sarafand raid (6-7 Mar 46): capital charges imposed for discharging firearms, depositing a bomb, and stealing weapons.	
16-17 Jun 46	"	Irgun-Stern	In 21 hours, 11 road and rail bridges destroyed; eleven Sternists killed.	
18 Jun 46	Tel Aviv	Irgun	4 British officers and 1 RAF officer kidnapped from the officer's club as leverage of the British imposition of the death penalty on condemned Irgunists.	24 hour curfew imposed. all Jewish premises declared out of bounds until the officers were recovered. Curfew and search operations were conducted of suspected areas--the streets were literally flooded with security forces. 2 Jews were killed and 7 injured, but no dissidents or sign of the officers were found. Jewish Agency condemned the attacks and requested that the hostages be released. On 12 July 46, British High Commissioner granted reprieve of sentences and commuted them to life imprisonment. Irgun released three.

19 June 46	Jerusalem	Irgun	The Area Security Officer, MAS H.P. Chadwick, was abducted (escaped 20 June 1946).
26 June 46	Mandate	Irgun	A 30-man raiding party stole nearly 40k Brit pounds sterling in diamonds from a polishing plant.
29 June 46	Tel Aviv	Irgun	Two hostages released along with a message that if the two condemned dissidents for the Sarafand raid were executed, so would be the three remaining kidnapped officers.
30 Jun 46 "Black Saturday"	Jerusalem	British	Raided the headquarters of the Jewish Agency capturing documents that implicated them in dissident activity, which led to the arrest of the Jewish Agency's leadership (Ben-Gurion was in Paris) and 4000 Haganah.
3 July 46	Mandate	British	High Commissioner Cunningham commuted the sentences of the Sarafand detainees.
4 July 46	Tel Aviv	Irgun	3 kidnap victims released.
July 46	Mandate	Irgun Stern	Violence continued: pipelines cut, supply trains blown up, banks robbed, police and soldiers were ambushed and killed, and roads were mined.
22 July 46	Jerusalem	Irgun-Stern	Bombing of the King David Hotel killed 91 British, Arabs and Jews, and wounded 45.
Sept 46	Tel Aviv	Irgun	13 attacks on branches of the Ottoman Bank and the Central Police Station in Jaffa.
	Mandate	Irgun	Attacks on rail lines, 3 bridges downed, shot into a train outside Jerusalem, and mined the Ras el-Ain-Kalkilya line; Arab temp constable killed, a police superintendent fatally shot, and 3 British soldiers injured removing a mine.
13 Sep 46	Jaffa	Irgun	Bank robbery; 2 Irgunists captured.
21 Sep 46	Haifa	Irgun	Destroyed rail station.

A massive British search was initiated and a total curfew throughout all Jewish quarters was imposed. Security forces made a number of arrests and clashes with the Jews resulted in 3 deaths and an unknown number of injuries. Tenuat Hameri (united resistance) began to collapse.

Dusk to dawn curfew in effect, Jerusalem. By 1 July 1946, 2718 arrested, 4 killed, and 8 injured.

12 July 46, a mass demonstration was held in Madison Square Park under the auspices of the American Zionist Emergency Council expressing solidarity with the Jewish resistance movement in Palestine. Similarly, 100 Jewish war veterans marched on Washington on 14 and 15 July 1946, demanding an immediate entry of 100,000 Jews into Palestine.

Yishuv and the Jewish Agency were outraged. The British initiated another curfew (lifted 7 Aug) and cordon-and-search operations. Furthermore, they authorized the search of every Jewish house. By 24 July, 376 Jews detained and the reward for Begin's head was doubled. On 23 August 46, the united resistance (Tenuat Hameri) was officially dissolved.

British sentenced them to 18 years in prison for violating the "emergency regulations" against carrying arms, and further sentenced them to 18 lashes of the whip.

Oct 46	Mandate	Irgun	Series of attacks: electronically detonated mines on the Haifa-Jaffa road, a buried charge in a parapet of a road culvert, a mine near Kfar Sirkin, and a failed attempt to blow up the Jerusalem rail station resulted in the wounding of 4 Irgunists, 4 captured, and the death of a British constable while disarming a bomb.	
31 Oct 46	Italy	Irgun	Two bombs exploded in the British Embassy in Rome causing slight damage and minor injuries. This was their first international terrorist act.	Italian police began sweeps on the known Jewish refugees in Rome, which led to the arrest of 3 and the detention of 2 others. On 24 Nov 46, more Jews were arrested in Genoa.
5 Nov 46	Jerusalem	Irgun	3 police killed and a British sergeant fatally wounded by a trap bomb. Throughout the city more mines were discovered and a suitcase bomb detonated in Petva Tikva-Ras-el-Ain railway station.	
14 Nov 46	Mandate	Irgun	<i>Palestine Post</i> reported widespread attacks with electrically detonated mines on the railway system and serious casualties.	Unofficial response: troops smashed up several cafes in Tel Aviv injuring 29 Jews.
17 Nov 46	Tel Aviv	Stern	3 British policemen and an RAF sergeant were killed, and four policemen and an RAF man wounded when their police truck hit a mine.	The chief rabbi appealed for an end to terrorism: "Not by bloodshed will Zion be built, or the nation by murder [ref: Bell, <i>Zion</i> , p. 183]. The far-left within the Jewish Agency appealed for a political approach.
24 Nov 46	Mandate	Arabs	Prominent Arab political leader, Fawzi Husenini, assassinated.	
26 Nov 46	Mandate	Haganah	The deportation of 3,900 illegals ended with two Jews dead and 45 in the hospital and 30 British soldiers injured.	
Nov 46	Jerusalem	Stern	Detonated taxi and truck bombs near British installations, one of which detonated prematurely killing the sabotage team. Assassination of General Barker failed. Two RAF enlisted men killed by an electronically detonated mine, while a British sergeant died of wounds. A British constable was shot and killed.	
27 Dec 46	Jaffa Jerusalem	Irgun	Attacked Central Headquarters of Police and CID.	
	Mandate	Stern	CID chief I. Levin assassinated.	
	"	?	Prominent Arab political leader, Emir Mohammed Zeinati, assassinated.	
28 Dec 46	Mandate	Irgun	Begin issued warning against the flogging of the imprisoned detainees.	On 28 Dec 46, more arrests were made in Italy. 29 Dec 46, an Irgunist was given 18 lashes of the whip.
29 Dec 46	Natanya	Irgun	British major abducted from a Hotel lobby and taken a short distance, whipped and returned.	
	Rishon-le-Zion	Irgun	Army sergeant abducted from a cafe walked outside, whipped and released.	

29 Dec 46	Tel Aviv	Irgun	Two sergeants taken from the Armon Hotel driven a short distance were also whipped and released.	Cordons were established and intensive search operations initiated. 5 Irgunists were captured and one wounded at a British roadblock. Four were eventually sentenced to death and the other life imprisonment.
30 Dec 46	Mandate	Irgun	Issues another warning: "if the oppressors dare in the future to abuse the bodies and the human and nation honour of Jewish youths, we shall no longer reply with the whip. We shall reply with fire [ref: Bell/Zion, 185]."	British authorities announced amnesty for an Irgunist and 16 Arabs. The World press noted the British humiliation. The British would not flog another Jew.
2 Jan 47	Tel Aviv Jaffa Haifa Kiryat Haim	Irgun	Military headquarters in Citrus House and the district police headquarters were attacked. A British officer was killed by a bomb in Haifa. 5 soldiers were bombed and machine-gunned from a car at Kiryat Haim. The attacker's car was hit by fire and blew up.	Cordon and search operations continued, by the close of 1946 the British netted 248 detainees.
12 Jan 47	Haifa	Irgun	Police station blown up.	On 15 Jan 47, the British announced the Third Division would be moved into the Mandate. Restrictions were placed on security force movement in order to reduce their vulnerability: walk in groups of no less than 4; avoid large areas, cafes, and cinemas. Security zones were extended: more barb wire, barricades, sand bags, guards and check points.
	Italy	Irgun	Anti-British propaganda, bomb warnings, and fake cardboard bombs planted in British installations.	24 Jan 47, an Irgunist (Dov Gruner) sentenced to death.
26 Jan 47	Jerusalem	Irgun	Kidnapped a retired Major H. Collins and a British judge Ralph Windham in response to the British death sentence of Dov Gruner. (also the day of the London Conference)	British authorities again imposed a curfew and added the threat of martial law. Yet, on 28 Jan 47, Gruner's execution post-poned (note: Gruner had american relatives). The Irgun released the judge. On 29 Jan 47, Collins was released.
14 Feb 47	London	British	Announced that they had decided to refer the problem of Palestine to the United Nations General Assembly.	On 10 Feb 47, 3 other Irgunists sentenced to death are confirmed by the departing General Barker.
1 Mar 47	Mandate	Irgun-Stern	Attacked 4 military camps, military vehicles throughout Palestine, and blew up the O-Club at Goldschmidt House in Jerusalem; 80 persons injured.	2 March 47 (lifted 16 Mar), the British declare martial law in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Ramat Gan, and Peteh Tiqva.
1-16 Mar 47	"	"	Vehicles mined, buildings demolished, and the Schneller building (Jerusalem) was attacked.	4 March 47, Secretary for the Colonies requested a UN special committee to investigate the status of the Mandate. Later requested to move the special session of the UN General Assembly from September 1947 to 28 April 1947.
31 Mar 47	Mandate	Irgun	Shell refinery blown up	16 April 1947, 1 Irgunist (Gruner) and 3 Sternists were hung at Acre prison.
17 Apr 47	Tel Aviv	Irgun	Irgun radio warning against hangings. 2 other dissidents remained on death row while the Irgun searched for their victims	British confined to their bases, making Irgun retaliation not possible.
21 Apr 47	Acre Prison	Irgun	2 condemned Irgunists committed suicide in their jail cells.	
	Mandate	Irgun-Stern	Military cars attacked in 3 places in Palestine, and two jeeps hit mines	

Apr 47	Mandate	Irgun-Stern	Series of attacks in Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Natanya.
23 Apr 47	"	Stern	<i>Palestine Post</i> reported a major ambush on the Cairo-Haifa railway, 8 killed and 27 wounded.
24 Apr 47	South Jaffa	Irgun	4 soldiers injured when their truck hit a mine.
	Tel Aviv	Irgun	Kidnapped an englishman from a hotel bar, but returned because he was jewish.
25 Apr 47	Sarona	Stern	Bomb killed 4 and wounded 6 in an attack on a police billet.
26 Apr 47	Haifa	"	CID Chief shot and mortally wounded while driving in his car.
	Tel Aviv	Stern	Police inspector and 3 constables killed
Apr 47		Irgun-Stern	Acre Prison break: 5 Irgunists captured, 1 escapee shot and mortally wounded, an Arab and 3 British soldiers injured by a mine.
	Mandate	Stern	A.E. Lonquest assassinated.
6 June 47	Benyamina	Stern	Train blown off the tracks.
9 June 47	Galei Oil	Irgun	Police sergeant and a constable abducted from a swimming pool; 19 hours later the two escaped.
16 June 47	Mandate	British	Trial and sentencing of 5 Irgunists captured at Acre: 2 received 15 years and the remaining 3 sentenced to hang.
22 June 47	Jerusalem	Stern	Assistant superintendent of police escaped kidnapping.
24 June 47	Tel Aviv	Irgun	Irgun leadership met with members from UNSCOP
end June 47	Tel Aviv Haifa	Stern	British soldiers fired on at a cinema, wounding 2 and killing 2 others. Random fire on a cafe wounded 3 officers and injured the barman from flying glass.
25 June 47	Tel Aviv	Stern	An administration officer escaped capture after a struggle.
2 July 47	Tel Aviv	UNSCOP	Requested a stay on the hangings of the 3 Irgunists sentenced on 16 June.
8 July 47	Mandate	Irgun	Threatened to answer hanging with hanging.
14 July 47	Natanya	Irgun	Kidnapped two sergeants and a War Department clerk (later released). Irgun combined this kidnapping with a radio message stating that the soldiers would not be released until the Irgunists' sentences were commuted.
18 July 47	the Med	British	Rammed the Jewish immigrant ship, the <i>Exodus</i> . Mini-"Season" ended.
			Curfew.
			Roadblocks setup. UN General Assembly met in a special session and appointed the Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) in order to best determine how best to divide the Mandate.
			Tel Aviv placed out of bounds. Mayors of Tel Aviv, Ramat Gan, and Petva Tikva pressured to give information on the dissidents and have their constituents do the same. Numerous roadblocks were erected. Jew Agency and Haganah called on the Yishuv to help repulse the dissidents.
			UNSCOP arrived.
			8 July 47, British confirmed the sentences
			Martial law imposed in Natanya and twenty outlying settlements, 1,427 interrogated and 19 detained. Jewish Agency deplored the act and members of Parliament appealed for their release.

18 July 47	Tel Aviv	Yishuv	General strike initiated.	
	Jerusalem	Haganah	Clash with British soldiers resulted in the death of one soldier and wounding 3 others.	
19 July 47	Mandate	Irgun	7 attacks on railway lines and the headquarters of the 1st Infantry Division was mortared.	20 July 47, curfew imposed.
	Haifa	"	British soldier and constable killed and 3 soldiers wounded in a fire-fight.	
	Jerusalem	Haganah	Six attacks throughout the city, one killed and 3 wounded.	
20 July 47	Natanya	Stern	British staff car sprayed with machine-gun fire.	
	Raanana	Irgun	Mine killed one soldier and wounded 3.	
	Jerusalem	Irgun	Police armored car detonated a mine.	
end July 47	Mandate	Irgun-Stern	Ambushes, mine explosions, night raids, and sniping created a wave of security force casualties: 2 British soldiers killed and 8 wounded by a mine explosion, and 19 soldiers injured when the <i>Empire Lifeguard</i> sank (a Haganah operation).	Only one terrorist was killed in over 100 terrorist attacks.
29 July 47	Mandate	Irgun	In retaliation for the hanging of the dissidents, 2 British sergeants were hung, notices of their executions followed.	British public opinion was outraged.
5 Aug 47	Jerusalem	Irgun	3 British constables killed while attempting to remove a bomb from the Labor Department.	
Sept 47	Mandate	?	Samir Taha assassinated.	
29 Sep 47	Kingsway	Irgun	In a dramatic action, a barrel bomb exploded killing ten and wounding 54, 13 seriously.	
13 Oct 47	Jerusalem	Irgun	Bomb tossed at the American Consulate injuring two employees.	
end Oct 47	Rishon-le-Zion	Haganah	Shot two Irgun.	
	Barclay Bank Jerusalem	Stern	2 British police shot.	
		Stern	Jewish CID man killed.	
5 Nov 47	Haifa	Stern	Outdoor café strafed with automatic fire killing a British sergeant and 3 policemen.	20 British soldiers sought revenge by encircling and firing upon a suspected safe-house, killing 5 teen-agers and taking two captive
13 Nov 47	Jerusalem	Yishuv	2 British policemen, 1 killed the other wounded, as they approached suspicious crowd of Jews on the street.	
	Jerusalem	Irgun	In a café, 1 British soldier was mortally wounded and 27 others injured by automatic fire and grenades.	
	Mandate	?	4 British civilians shot on the street, 2 died at the scene and 2 enroute to the hospital.	
14 Nov 47	"	Stern	2 more British policemen and 2 soldiers shot in the street.	

24-29 Nov	Lake Success	UN	Subcommittees met, deliberated, and voted over the partitioning of Palestine.	Arab general strike. Yishuv jubilant. The first two weeks after the UN vote 93 Arabs, 84 Jews, and 7 members of the security forces were killed.
end Nov 47	Mandate	Stern	Detective killed on Jaffa Road, wild shooting most nights, and killed 4 people suspected of divulging the location of a safe-house.	British authority responded with more searches and a curfew.
30 Nov 47	Outside Jerusalem	Arabs	7 Jews killed in a bus	This incident signaled the beginning of Arab anti-Jewish resistance and eventual conventional conflict with neighboring Arab states. By the final armistice was signed by Syria on 17 July 1949, more than 6,000 Jews had been killed (1 out of every 100) [ref: Schiff, pp. 21-22].
1 Dec 47	Tel Aviv	"	Burning and looting of Jewish shops erupted into a day-long fire fight between the Jewish resistance and the Arab fedayeen; 5 Jews, 3 Arabs, and 1 British constable killed.	British security forces kept their distance, while an average of 50 Jews were killed per week.
2 Dec 47	Tel Aviv		Arab-Jewish clashes continued: 6 Arabs killed and 23 wounded, and 14 Jews killed and 21 wounded. In the countryside, Jewish settlements had come under Arab sniper fire.	All Jewish road traffic required armed escort. The locus of these clashes was Jerusalem, Haifa, and Tel Aviv-Jaffa--the battleground.
10 Dec 47	Jerusalem Haifa	Arabs Haganah Arabs	Jewish convoy ambushed: 10 Jews killed and 9 wounded. 6 Arabs killed and 21 wounded. 3 Arabs killed during an assault on the Old City.	
11-12 Dec 47	Mandate	Jewish Resistance	36 Arabs, 11 Jews, and 2 British soldiers were killed during continued violence.	
11 Dec 47	Mandate	Irgun	Conducted a series of offensive operations: attacked Arab village of Tineh killing 13 Arabs and wounding 6; similar attacks took place at Yazur near Tel Aviv, Shaafat near Jerusalem, Yehudiyeh on the Tel Aviv-Lydd Road--all centers of Arab fedayeen activity; bomb detonated in Haifa killing 6 Arabs and wounding 40; in Jerusalem, bomb detonated in a crowd in front of the Damascus gate killing 15 Arabs and 2 British constables, and wounding 50 Arab by-standers.	Davar responded with a "senseless provocation." Haganah patrols blew up houses to encourage Arab evacuation, attacked Arab villages, and ambushed Arab patrols.
15 Dec 47	Tel Aviv	Irgun	Begin met with members of the Jewish Agency, Mapai, and Miztrachi.	
	Jerusalem	Arabs	Blew up waterpipes.	
16 Dec 47	Negrev Jerusalem	"	Kibbutzim attacked.	
		Arabs	6 Jews killed by sniper fire.	Jews responded with firing on a mosque.
21 Dec 47	Mandate	Jewish Resistance	A wave of retaliatory violence: sniping in Jaffa, bus ambush, firing in Haifa, and a gun-fight on King George's Ave in Jerusalem; all totalled left 11 Arabs dead	
29 Dec 47	Jerusalem	Stern	Bomb explosion at Damascus Gate killed 15 Arabs and wounded 50 others. 2 British officers rushing to the scene were shot and killed.	

30 Dec 47	Haifa	Stern	Bomb tossed into an Arab crowd in front of an oil refinery.	2000 Arabs responded by running amok in the refinery slashing and clubbing to death 41 Jewish workers, 7 mangled but lived.
7 Jan 48	Hadassah	Arabs	Hospital bus shot up, all eleven passengers and the driver were wounded.	
	Irgun	Jerusalem	Bombing killed 17 Arabs and wounded 50. One Irgunists killed and one captured by British police.	
Jan 48	Mandate	Haganah	Irgun man kidnapped.	Irgun retaliated with the kidnapping of a Haganah intelligence officer in Haifa.
12 Jan 48	"	Haganah	Requested a prisoner exchange.	Haganah man released. Irgun man was not, body found in an Arab village on 15 January 1948. Irgun requested a committee investigation and submerged desires to retaliate.
Late Jan 48	Mograbbi Square Tel Aviv	Haganah	At an Irgun rally, grenades tossed in the assembled crowd causing serious injuries.	
1 Feb 48	Mandate	Arabs	<i>Palestine Post</i> building blown up.	
20 Feb 48	Latron	Stern	8 Sternists and 4 Irgunists broke out of Latrun detention camp.	
22 Feb 48	"	"	Bombing killed 52 Jews and wounded more than 100.	Irgun responded by bombing of supposed havens of Arab fedayeen, killing 26.
5 Mar 48	Mandate	British	1800 British troops departed, followed by 200 more on 7 March.	18 March 1948, Chaim Weizmann met with President Truman in order to obtain US support for the partition.
8 Mar 48	"	Haganah-Irgun	Operational agreement reached, whereby in static defense, the Irgun would be under Haganah's orders through Irgun officers; Haganah would approve Irgun offensive operations against the Arabs or reprisals against the British; arms raids would be joint, and the Irgun would be free to raise funds.	Awaited ratification by the Zionist General Council. David Ben-Gurion wanted no agreement and ratification was thereby continually postponed.
11 Mar 48	Tel Aviv	Arabs	Bomb detonated in the courtyard of the Jewish Agency: thirteen people in the civilian wing killed.	
20 Mar 48	Haifa	Irgun	Raid on armaments warehouse.	British established roadblocks and conducted searches.
24 Mar 48	outside Jerusalem	Arabs	Jewish convoy bound for the besieged Jewish quarter of Jerusalem was ambushed by fedayeen: losing 16 trucks, 2 armored cars, and their cargo.	25 March 48, relief convoy made it through with a cost of 5 Jews killed and 9 wounded during Arab attacks.
28 Mar 48	"	Arabs	Another Arab ambush caused heavy losses on both sides: 13 dead and 40 wounded Jews versus 135 dead Arabs and an unknown number wounded.	
9 Apr 48	enroute Jerusalem	Irgun-Stern	Attacked the Arab village of Deir Yassin. When finished, 250 Arab corpses remained.	The Jewish Agency and the Haganah refused to accept responsibility, claiming the dissidents were accountable for the atrocity.
25-30 Apr 48	Jaffa	Haganah-Irgun	Joint operation to seize the city of Jaffa.	The Irgun's final role within the Jewish resistance, greater challenges lied ahead. Stern

14 May 48	Israel	British-Jewish Agency	Great Britain officially terminated her responsibility for security of Palestine and announced the final withdrawal of her military forces. The same day, the state of Israel was proclaimed by the Jewish Provisional Council of Government as the state called for by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 (II).	US recognition. Arab states denied the existence of such an entity and the war commenced
June 48	Israel	Irgun	The IDF (Haganah) sank a ship carrying arms destined for the Irgun--the <i>Albatross</i> Affair--several Irgun killed. Begin refused to allow his men to fire on other Jews.	Resulted in bitter animosity between Begin and Ben-Gurion
August 48	Codsall, England	Stern	Package bomb exploded, intended for Maj. Farron, and killed his brother Mr. Rex Farron.	
10 Aug 48	Jerusalem	Yishuv	Picketed the presence of Count Folke Bernadotte, President of the Swedish Red Cross and Mediator for Palestine.	Moshe Dayan dispersed the crowd.
16 Sep 48	Mandate	Stern	Assassinated Count Bernadotte and killed a French Colonial Andre Serot as well.	
21 Sep 48	Israel	Irgun	Members disbanded with some becoming soldiers in the IDF.	

Sources: J. Boyer Bell, *Terror Out of Zion* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977); Samuel Katz, *Days of Fire* (New York: Doubleday, 1968); Robert B. Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History Vol 2* (New Jersey: Doubleday, 1975); Menachem Begin, *The Revolt: The Story of the Irgun* (New York: Schuman, 1951); Kirkham et al., *Assassination and Political Violence* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), pp. 311-317; and Ze'ev Schiff, *A History of the Israeli Army: 1974 to the Present* (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1974), pp. 1-45.

TABLE A-2.
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF JEWS KILLED DURING THE HOLOCAUST.

Country	Estimated Total Population prior to the Holocaust.	Estimated Jewish Population Exterminated.	
	Number	Number	Percent
Poland.....	3,300,000	3,000,000	90
Baltic.....	253,000	228,000	90
Countries.....	240,000	210,000	90
Germany/Austria.....	90,000	80,000	89
Protectorate.....	90,000	75,000	83
Slovakia.....	70,000	54,000	77
Greece.....	140,000	105,000	75
The Netherlands.....	650,000	450,000	70
Hungary.....	375,000	245,000	65
SSR White Russia.....	1,500,000	900,000	60
SSR Ukraine.....	65,000	40,000	60
Belgium.....	43,000	26,000	60
Yugoslavia.....	600,000	300,000	50
Rumania.....	1,800	900	50
Norway.....	350,000	90,000	26
France.....	64,000	14,000	22
Bulgaria.....	40,000	8,000	20
Italy.....	5,000	1,000	20
Luxembourg.....	975,000	107,000	11
Russia.....	8,000	--	--
Denmark.....	2,000	--	--
Finland.....			
Total.....	8,861,800	5,933,900	67

Source: Lucy S. Dawidowicz, *The War Against the Jews: 1933-1945* (New York: Bantam Books, 1975), p. 544.

TABLE A-3
JEWISH CASUALTIES IN MANDATE PALESTINE
 (Percentage of Total Jewish Population)

Period	Jewish Casualties		Total Jewish Population
	Fatalities	Wounded	
April 1920.....	25 (.037)	200+ (.29)	67,000
May 1921.....	47 (.056)	146 (.17)	83,000
June-September 1929.....	234 (.15)	439 (.28)	156,000
1936-1939 Arab Revolt*.....	620 (.14)	1108 (.25)	445,000
1947-1948 Civil War.....	1256 (.2)	2102 (.3)	628,000
Total.....	2182	3995	---

Sources: Cited from Hanan Alon, *Countering Palestinian Terrorism in Israel: Toward a Policy Analysis of Countermeasures* (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, August 1980), N-1567-FF, p. 10. * 10,000 Arab Palestinians took part in the Arab Revolt, of whom 4,000 were killed or wounded; James P. Jankowski, "The Palestinian Arab Revolt of 1936-1939," *Muslim World* (July 1973): Vol. LXVIII, No. 3, pp. 228-229; and for a concise breakdown on the Arab Revolt's casualty figures Walid Khalidi, *From Haven to Conquest* (Washington, DC: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987), pp. 846-849.

Notes: Prior to the Arab Revolt, fedayeen attacks were limited to specific areas of the Mandate: 1920 in Jerusalem; 1921 and 1929 in Jaffa; and the revolt began in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem (19 Apr 36) and spread throughout the Mandate.

TABLE A-4.
THE STRENGTH AND SUPPORT OF THE JEWISH RESISTANCE
(as of 1945)

Organization	Armed Men	Major Sources of Aid	
		Regional	International
Haganah (Defense Force)	10,000	Jewish Agency	World Zionist Organization
.....Palmach (Strike unit)	1,900	"	25 Countries
Irgun or IZL (National Military Organization in Palestine)	600	Jewish Community and Robberies	New Zionist Organization Italy, France, Czechoslovakia, Austria
Stern Gang or LEHI (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel)	200	Bank and Jewelry Store Robberies	No International Organization Poland, Italy


Sources: Bell, *Terror Out of Zion*, pp. 144-145. In 1945, the total fighting strength of the Jewish resistance was a little more than 3,000; the remaining numbers provided replacements and support. By 1948 and the war of independence against the Arab Armies, the Jewish resistance (Israeli Defense Force) had acquired 10,000 rifles, 3,500 submachine guns, 160 medium machine guns, 885 light machine guns, 670 mortars, and 84 three-inch mortars by smuggling, arms raids against the British, local fabrication, purchase and foreign arms deals: Ze'ev Schiff, *A History of the Israeli Army: 1874 to the Present* (New York: MacMillan, 1974), p. 22. For more on the Jews' smuggling of weapons into Palestine: Leonard Slater, *The Pledge* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970).

TABLE A-5.
JEWISH IMMIGRATION TO THE U.S. AND PALESTINE,
(1932-1943).

Year	Jewish Immigration to the US and percentage of total American Immigration		Jewish Immigration to Palestine
1932	2,755	7.74	9,533
1933	2,372	10.28	30,327
1934	4,134	14.03	42,359
1935	4,837	13.84	61,854
1936	6,252	17.21	29,727
1937	11,352	22.59	10,536
1938	19,736	29.07	12,868
1939	43,450	52.35	16,405
1940	36,945	52.21	4,547
1941	23,737	45.85	3,647
1942	10,608	36.86	2,194
1943	4,705	19.83	8,507


Source: Walid Khalidi, *From Haven to Conquest* (Washington, DC: The Institute For Palestine Studies, 1987), p. 855; See also: Center for Research in Social Systems, *Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict*, Volume 1 (Washington, DC: The American University, 1967), p. 59; and *The Middle East*, 1958, 6th Ed. (London: Europa Publications, 1958), p. 216.. Note: In 1939, the British issued a White Paper that restricted the flow of Jewish immigrants to Palestine. From May 48 to July 57, Jewish immigrants to Palestine totaled 383,000 and from Asia and Africa, 477,000.

FIGURE A-1.
ORGANIZATION OF THE ZIONIST MAINSTREAM



Sources: Ze'ev Schiff, *A History of the Israeli Army* (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1985), pp. 2-20; Andrew R. Molnar et al., *Undergrounds in Insurgent and Resistance Warfare* (Washington, DC: American University Press, November, 1963), 334-338; Samuel M. Katz, *Soldier Spies: Israeli Military Intelligence* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1992), pp. 11-56; Yona Goldberg, *Haganah or Terror* (New York: Hechalutz Organization of America, 1947), p. 4-5.

FIGURE A-2.
ORGANIZATION OF THE JEWISH DISSIDENT, IRGUN



Sources: J. Boyer Bell, *Terror Out of Zion: Irgun Zvai Leumi, LEIII, and the Palestine Underground, 1929-1949* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), pp. 43, 110-112; Doris Katz, *The Lady was a Terrorist* (New York: Shiloni Publishers, 1953), pp. 38-39, and Andrew R. Molnar et al., *Undergrounds in Insurgent and Resistance Warfare* (Washington, DC: American University Press, November, 1963), pp. 314-318.

NOTE: as of 1944, the Irgun was divided into two units: white squad was composed of new recruits whose duties were propaganda dissemination; black squad (Jews who looked like Arabs and spoke Arabic) were the fighters. Furthermore, there were two varieties of volunteers, those in the Hok Division (combat element, 200 personnel) and others (support, 400 personnel).

TABLE B-1.
A CHRONOLOGY OF THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE
(1965-1974)

DATE	GROUP	PLACE	INCIDENT	RESPONSE
5 Sep 63	Arab League	Cairo	Announced that "the time had come for the Palestinian people to take responsibility for the solutions to its problems."	Feb 64, Arab Summit in Cairo approved the setting up of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) appointing Ahmed Shukari as the chairman.
22 May 64	PLO	Jerusalem	1st Palestine National Council (PNC) meeting drafted the National Covenant, which established their right to "Return" to historic Palestine.	24 May 64, five underground Palestinian organizations merged with Al-Fatah
2 Jan 65	Fatah	Israel	3 Fatah placed ten gelignite sticks at the Israeli National Carrier (a pumping station designed to move water from the Sea of Galilee to the Negev desert), which was foiled by a water company employee who discovered the charges.	Israeli security forces pursued the Fatah to the border. Saboteurs escaped into Jordan, where one was killed by a Jordanian border guard. Thus, Fatah's first casualty was at the hands of other Arabs
Jan-Mar 65	Fatah	Israel	Conducted ten sabotage raids: 7 from Jordan and 3 from Gaza.	
Apr-Dec 65	Fatah	"	Conducted 25 raids into Israel, nearly all civilian targets; 21 from Jordan and 4 from Gaza.	Sabotage operations were given little exposure, particularly from Jordan and Egypt because of the Israeli reprisal raids they provoked. Lebanon press association publicized some of Fatah's exploits. May 1965, Israeli forces attack three Jordanian frontier villages.
April 1966	Fatah	Israel	Conducted 5 raids: 3 from Jordan.	Israel complained about these provocations to the United Nations. UAR, Jordan and Kuwait opposed Fatah's operations in fear of Israeli retaliation. April 66, Jordanian authorities arrested 200 "subversives." 29-30 April 1966, Israeli forces attacked a Jordanian border village and destroyed 19 houses. 16 May 66, Israeli government charged Syria at the United Nations with being the source of training and the principle arms supplier of Al-Fatah's military arm, <i>Fil-Astha</i> . 18 May 66, the Syrian government granted the PLO diplomatic status and allowed them to open an office in Damascus. 14 June 66, King Hussein ruled out any further cooperation with the PLO; the PLO and Syria responded by calling for the liberation of Jordan as an essential step in the liberation of Palestine.
7 Nov 66		Egypt	Egypt and Syria signed a mutual defense pact, (United Arab Republic).	13 Nov 66, Israeli forces attacked 3 Jordanian border villages, killing three civilians and 15 soldiers, and wounding dozens of others and destroying over 140 buildings. Israel suffered one dead and ten wounded.
Jan-Dec 66	Fedayeen	Israel	Total of 41 fedayeen attacks from Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria	
Jan-Jun 67	Fatah	Israel	Conducted a total of 37 operations: 13 from Syria, 13 from Jordan, and 11 from Lebanon. By May 1967, 11 Israeli's killed and 62 wounded versus 7 fedayeen killed and 2 captured.	In the wake of these assaults, Israel responded by uniting in the face of impending danger. 7 Apr 67, Israeli fighter bombers attacked a Syrian artillery battery on the Golan Heights. Syrian MIGs scrambled in support, but six MIGs were shot down in a clash with Israeli jetfighters. May 67, PLO allowed to resume operations in Jordan.

May 67	Egypt	Sinai	15 May 67, Egyptian forces moved into the Sinai. 22 May, Nasser closed the Straits to Israeli shipping. Subsequently, King Husayn of Jordan visited Egypt and signed a mutual defense pact.	Israel attacked.
6 June 67	IDF	Israel	2nd Arab-Israeli War: IDF occupied Jordan's West Bank, Egypt's Gaza Strip and the Sinai to the Suez, and Syria's Golan Heights.	Radio Baghdad screamed: "kill the Jews." 22 Nov 67, UN Security Council adopted Resolution 242.
1 Nov 67	PFLP	Israel	Conducted their first operation [ref: Chailand, <i>The Palestinian Resistance</i>].	
21 Dec 67	Fatah	Israel	Widespread terrorist campaign thwarted by Israeli security forces, netting 54 suspects and killing two.	
Jan 68	Iraq	Baghdad	9 Jews were hung and 68 others were tried as spies.	
23 Feb 68	Fatah	West Bank	5 Arab infiltrators were compromised, which led to an exchange of fire with Israeli security forces; all five were killed 5 miles north of the Allenby bridge near Jericho.	
1 Mar 68	Fatah	Israel	Israeli druse killed.	Conducted searches and increased border security: 3 Mar 68, Israeli troops killed 35 infiltrators and captured 15 others; 6 Mar 68, Israeli's blew up safe-house of captured infiltrator's commander in the West Bank; 7 March, seized two suspected Fatah commanders, arrested 15 others, and located arms caches, killing two fedayeen in the process.
11 Mar 68	Fatah	Syria	Fatah conducted 1st clandestine radio broadcast.	
18 Mar 68	Fatah	Israel	2 Israeli adults and 28 children injured, when their bus hit a land mine in the Negev.	21 Mar 68, 15k man Israeli force attacked Jordanian town of Karameh. Fatah and PFLP base area: conflicting casualty figures, the apparent fedayeen military defeat produced a psychological victory, regain Arab prestige and UN condemnation of the Israeli assault.
28 Mar 68	Fatah	West Bank	4 Israeli farm workers and several others injured when their tractor hit a land mine.	
22 Jun 68	Fatah	West Bank	11 fedayeen and one Israeli killed in an armed clash near Jericho.	
	PFLP	Jerusalem	Explosion in a Jerusalem market killed 14.	
1-17 July 68	PLO	Cairo	4th PNC announced the establishment of the Palestinian National Charter, denouncing United Nations Resolution 242.	
18 July 68	PFLP	London	Jewish-owned Marks and Spencer department stores in London were firebombed.	
23 July 68	PFLP	Italy	El Al 707 from Rome to Tel Aviv hijacked and diverted to Algeria	Hostages (5 crew members and 5 Israeli male passengers) were released after 16 sentenced terrorists were handed over by Israel two weeks later. * This was the Palestinians first international operation

26 July 68	Fatah	West Bank	In a confrontation similar to 22 June, 7 fedayeen and 2 Israelis killed near Jericho.	
28 July 68	Fatah	Jordan River	Sabotage unit intercepted by an Israeli patrol resulted in 2 fedayeen deaths.	
1 Aug 68	"	Israel	Israeli soldier killed and three others wounded in an ambush at Maez Haiyim, near a Jordan Valley settlement.	4 August 68, Israeli forces conducted a reprisal raid into Jordan; bombings were conducted against terrorist bases in the Salt Region: Jarash, Irbid, Ein el-Khanzir, Dibbin, Shubak, and the Amman region.
8 Aug 68	PFLP	Jerusalem	"The Night of the Grenades." Five booby-trapped grenades were planted in garbage cans in Jerusalem. Three went off; two were discovered and dismantled. Fourteen passers-by were wounded.	
4 Sep 68	"	Israel	Bomb exploded in a bus station killing one and injuring 51 others.	31 Oct 68, Israeli cross-border raid into Egypt by helicopter borne forces on a transformer station and a bridge, both destroyed.
2 Nov 68	al-Sai'gh	Jordan	Allegedly incited a mob attack on the US Embassy in Amman.	Same day arrest of its leader, Taher Dahlan. Jordanian government restricted fedayeen freedoms within Jordan; making Amman out of bounds and submitting to government checkpoints--16 Nov 68 Jordan Commando Pact.
11 Nov 68	PFLP	Jerusalem	In the Jewish market, a car bomb explosion killed 12 (10 Jews and 2 Arabs) and injured 55.	By 25 Nov, 500 Arabs detained and 30 remained in custody.
23 Nov 68	Fatah	Israel	Launched 15 rockets at Sodom potash works.	1 Dec 68, helicopter-borne forces and jets destroyed two bridges 60km inside Jordan. 1-2 Dec 68, Israeli and Jordanian artillery and tank duel.
Nov 68	Fatah/PFLP	Lebanon	Palestinian guerrillas began to establish themselves in Lebanon.	
	PFLP	"	Ahmed Jibril broke away and formed the PFLP-GC.	
26 Dec 68	PFLP	Greece	Attack on an El Al plane at Athens airport killing 1 and wounding 1.	28 Dec 68, Israel responded with helo-borne assault on Beirut airport, blowing up 13 passenger aircraft. UN Security Council condemned Israel for the attack. Pope Paul VI deplored the act.
29 Dec 68	Fatah	Israel	In retaliation for the Beirut attack, five Israeli settlements were shelled.	
31 Dec 68	Fatah	Israel	Israel settlement of Kiryat Shmona shelled.	Israeli authorities further implicated Lebanon in these retaliatory strikes
Jan-Mar	PLO	Israel	In this two month period from Jordan, Israel reported over 600 acts of aggression including 40 attacks by artillery, 107 by mortars, 17 by tanks, 17 by Soviet-made Katyusha rockets and 7 anti-tank missiles. The Israeli's reported killing 66 guerrillas and taking 20 prisoners.	Israel issued warnings and then retaliated with air strikes and commando raids.
1 Jan 69	Fedayeen	Israel	Five Katyusha rockets hit the town of Kiryat Shmona, killing three and wounding one.	
1-4 Feb 69	PLO	Cairo	5th Palestinian National Congress (PNC): Fatah assumed de facto control of the PLO by winning a majority of the seats in the Executive Council. (See below, 3 Feb 69)	

2-3 Feb 69	"	Gaza	Arab students staged riotous demonstrations, 90 injured.	Riot in response to the sentencing of three girls with apparent connections to terrorist activity. On 3 Feb, Israeli authorities released the girls on the condition that they conclude their connections with such organizations
3 Feb 69	Fedayeen	Gaza	Grenade attack in a crowd square killed two Arab boys and wounded 10 others.	
3 Feb 69	PLO	Cairo	Al-Fatah leader, Yasir Arafat elected chairman of the newly formed executive committee.	
18 Feb 69	PFLP	Switzerland	El Al plane preparing for take-off from Zurich to Tel Aviv attacked. Five passengers and three crewmen injured, and the co-pilot was killed.	Israeli security guard aboard the plane shot and killed one terrorist. Three other terrorists, including a woman were captured by Swiss police. Israeli authorities contended that international moderation against the Athens hijacking led the terrorists to conclude that such actions will be permitted in the future and Israeli response was the subject of their concern. 22 Dec, 3 terrorists sentenced to 12 years in prison by a Swiss court.
21 Feb 69	PFLP	Jerusalem	On the Jewish Sabbath in a supermarket, an undisclosed number of persons were injured by a bomb explosion (one of the injured was an Australian Major on UN observer duty).	24 Feb 69, first Israeli air strike on Syrian territory since June 67. Initiated in retaliation for increased terrorist attacks from Syrian bases
25 Feb 69	PFLP	E. Jerusalem	Earlier a bomb was found in front of the British consulate and disarmed.	
	PFLP	Golan Heights	Tapline blown up.	
	PFLP	E. Jerusalem	Bomb explosion heavily damaged the British Consulate.	3 Arabs detained for questioning.
Feb 69	PFLP	Israel	In Lydda, bomb explosion injured one.	
	PFLP	Lebanon	Naif Hawatmeh broke away and formed PDFLP (see Nov 68 above).	
6 Mar 69	PFLP PDFLP	Jerusalem	A bomb exploded in the cafeteria of the Hebrew University wounding 29 Israelis, most of them students.	
		West Bank	Israeli National Bank was damaged by a fedayeen hand-grenade, one person injured.	6 Mar 69, Israeli security forces destroyed five Arab houses in East Jerusalem found to have contained arms, explosives and other terrorist equipment. 26 Mar 69, 18 civilians were killed by an Israeli retaliation strike in Jordan. 1 Apr, the UN censured Israel for the raid.
23 Mar 69		Sinai	1st attack by a new terrorist group, the Arab Organization of the Sinai, attacked Israeli defense force positions.	
27 Mar 69	PFLP	Jordan	Vowed to avenge the Israeli reprisal raids by urging foreigners not to travel on Israeli planes or ships "so we may have a free hand in striking at Israeli communications lines."	
31 Mar 69	ALF	Iraq	Iraq forms their own Palestinian group the Arab Liberation Front in order to retain some influence within the Palestinian struggle.	Arafat and Iraqi government relationship weakening

8 Apr 69	Jordan	Israel	Israeli town of Eilat shelled by Jordanian artillery, wounding 13.	
24 Apr 69	PLO	Lebanon	Pro-commando demonstrations pressure Lebanese government to permit raids on Israel from Lebanese territory.	24 April 69, helicopter-borne troops damaged the Nag Hammadi dam, two bridges and 6 electrical pylons near Luxor, Egypt. 29 Apr 69, Al-Sai'qah surrounds Lebanese army post in order to pressure government to continue support for Palestinian raids and sanctuary.
2 May 69	Fatah	Israel	Fatah conducted a tactical shift from the characteristic hit-and-run operations of previous years to a hit-and-stay operation. This was observed by the detonation of a number of constructions in the bathhouses at El-Kham:	
9 May 69	Fatah	Cairo	Voice of Fatah broadcast called for the Lebanese masses to rise against government's prohibitions of Palestinian terrorists freedom of action.	8-12 May 69, Arafat meeting with Lebanese officials in Beirut failed to guarantee freedom of movement for Palestinian guerrillas.
15 May 69	Fedayeen	Gaza	35 Arab residents of the Gaza strip, many of them women, were injured by grenades and other explosive devices that were thrown into market areas by Arab terrorists. Incidents were related to a general Arab protest marking Israel's Independence Day, which coincided with the lunar Hebrew calendar anniversary of Jordanian Jerusalem's capture by the Israelis in 1967.	
26 May 69	PFLP	Gaza	Assassinated an Arab member of Israel's Gaza border police for collaborating activities.	27 May, 10 members of the PFLP were arrested, accused of terrorizing Gaza Strip residents suspected of collaborating with the Israelis.
27-28 May	Jordan PLO	West Bank	Shelled town of Jericho, injuring an Arab policeman, burning a number of stores and damaging others on the 27th; wounded one civilian and a destroyed a building on the 28th.	Al-Falah claimed that it was an Israeli act.
30 May 69	PFLP	Golan	Section of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline, owned by the Arabian-American Oil Co. (ARAMCO) was blown up and heavily damaged.	Israeli's fought the pipeline blaze until it was finally extinguished on the 31st June, the PFLP was sharply criticized by the Arab world. Egyptian newspaper stated that the act was "incomprehensible," inflicting no harm on Israel but had violated the "logical framework of Arab principle and interests."
5 Jun 69	Fedayeen	Israel	Katyusha rockets fired from Jordan, wounding 13.	
15 June 69	"	Gaza	Israeli lieutenant killed when a fedayeen tossed a grenade at his patrol vehicle.	
16 June 69	Fedayeen	Gaza	Grenade thrown at Israeli vehicles missed and exploded among Arab civilians, killing one and injuring 20 others.	
20 June 69	PFLP	Jerusalem	Three bombs exploded on a street leading to the Western (Wailing) Wall, killing an Arab and wounding five others (including 2 American tourists and an Israeli soldier).	20 suspects arrested. 23 June 69, Israeli commandos severely damaged the Jordanian Ghor Canal.
	"	Gaza	Grenade thrown at Israeli vehicles missed and exploded among Arab civilians, killing one Arab and wounding 16.	
24 June 69	Fedayeen	Haifa	Oil pipeline sabotaged.	
18 July 69	PFLP	Britain	London department stores known to have links with Israel firebombed.	

7 Aug 69	PFLP	Israel	Bus was blown up killing the civilian driver and a soldier, and wounding 12 soldiers. (PFLP claimed it had killed 50 soldiers in the attack)	8 August 69, Airforce strafed Ghor al-Saffi positions in Jordan.
	Fatah	Israel	Attacked 3 Israeli settlements and 3 army posts in the northern Jordan Valley, with conflicting casualty figures.	
7 Aug 69	Fatah	Israel	Attack on the Israeli potash works at Sodom.	8 August, Israeli retaliated with an air strike on guerrilla positions inside Jordan.
25 Aug 69	PFLP	Britain	London office of Zim bomb exploded injuring two persons.	
		Israel	Three rockets struck southern Jerusalem resulting in no casualties or damage.	
29 Aug 69	PFLP	Europe	TWA 707 enroute between Paris and Athens skyjacked and flown to Syria, where the 105 passengers (Americans, Greeks, Italians, and 6 Israelis) were all released by 1 September, except for two Israeli males who were held in exchange for "the release of Syrian comrades in Israeli prison," and the plane destroyed.	26 August 13 other rockets were discovered but failed to go off. The same day Israeli planes bombed Arab guerrilla bases in Jordan in retaliation for the Jerusalem shelling. 28 August 69, Israeli commandos raided Egyptian military headquarters in Marqubad with mortars and machineguns: the 10-hour attack killed 100 to 150 Egyptians, on jet downed.
2 Sept 69	Fedayeen	Israel	Katyusha rockets killed 3 and wounded 7 in Qiryat Shemona and Kfar Giladi.	US Secretary of State Rogers expressed hope that the Syrian government would disassociate itself with such an act. When it did not, the US condemned Syrian for its support of air piracy. 1 September, the International Federation of Air Lines Pilots Association (IFALPA) voted to call a 24 hour worldwide strike unless Syria released the two Israeli passengers. Syria released the hijackers on 13 October and the two Israeli were exchanged for 13 Syrian prisoners in Israel on 5 December.
8 Sep 69	PLO	"	Israeli embassies at the Hague and Bonn, and El Al offices in Brussels bombed.	3 Sept 69, airforce bombed Mt Hermon Area. 4 Sept, helicopter-borne troops killed five and destroyed twelve houses in S. Ekmon.
9 Sep 69	PFLP	Italy	TWA airliner enroute from Rome to Lod hijacked, forced to land in Damascus. 2 Israeli passengers detained for 3 weeks and released in exchange for two Syrian pilots held in Israel.	3 Arabs arrested.
11 Sep 69	Fatah	Israel	Reported to have blown up the Mahraniah irrigation dam, at the confluence of the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers.	
30 Sep 69	"	Israel	Raid on Israeli settlement of Ramat Shalom resulted in the death of an Israeli Druse watchman.	3 Oct 69, Israeli troops retaliated by blowing up buildings in the two villages in Southern Lebanon, suspected of housing Arab guerrillas
Sep 69	PLO	Cairo	6th Palestinian National Council.	Boycotted by the PFLP.
18-25 Oct 69	PLO	Lebanon	Palestinian guerrillas instigated riots and armed clashes in Beirut and Tripoli resulted in scores killed and wounded.	21 Oct 69, Syria pledged support for the guerrillas, closed its border to Lebanon-Syrian travel. 22 Oct 69, Iraq pledged support to the guerrillas. These events combined to prompt the resignation of the Lebanese Premier 24 Oct 69. Syrian troops mass on the Lebanon border
22-23 Oct 69	PFLP	Haifa	Two Israelis civilians were killed and 21 were wounded when Arab terrorist bombs exploded under five apartment buildings.	

25 Oct 69	Fatah	Cairo Lebanon	300 al-Fatah commandos crossed from Syria into Lebanon. Fatah broadcast appealed to the "honest elements" in the Lebanese army to revolt against their officers and "imperialist agents" in the armed forces who "carry out the instructions of the CIA."	Clashes halted after a secret Lebanese-commando peace agreement on 3 Nov 69.
19 Nov 69	Fedayeen	Gaza	Grenade attack on a branch of an Israeli bank killed an Arab boy and wounded 5 other Arabs.	20 Nov 69, Israeli authorities announced the arrest of more than 50 members of five Arab groups suspected of major terrorist incidents in Israel and in the occupied areas in the past few months; all said to have links to Al Fatah.
20 Nov 69	Fatah	Lebanon	Clashes erupted between Palestinians and Lebanese security forces.	
22 Nov 69	Fatah	Israel	Demolished a car in the town of Acre.	Led Jewish youths to attempt to break into the Arab quarter.
27 Nov 69	PSF	Greece	El Al offices in Athens attacked with grenades; wounding 14 and causing heavy damage. One of the injured, a two-year old Greek boy died on the 29th. The others injured included three Americans, 10 Greeks and a Briton employee of El Al.	The Greek Premier Stylianos Patakos condemned the attack, stating "cowardly act by unscrupulous criminals." The terrorist were arrested and convicted of murder by a Greek court.
2 Dec 69	Al Sai'qah	Golan	Ambushed Israeli patrol killing 15 and wounding 30 others.	3 Dec 69, Israeli commandos destroyed an Arab guerrilla base in Southern Lebanon.
21 Dec 69	PFLP	Greece	3 Arabs arrested as they tried to board a TWA plane in Athens bound for Rome and New York.	By 16 Dec 69, Israeli had destroyed 516 homes in the occupied areas in retaliation for Arab collaboration with suspected terrorists: 265 West Bank, 227 Gaza, and 24 in East Jerusalem (Arab leaders claimed 7500 total)
1 Jan 70		Jerusalem	An Arab was killed and five injured by a grenade thrown into a crowded marketplace.	
		Hebron	Grenade tossed at an Israeli army vehicle missed and killed two Arab bystanders.	By 5 Jan 70, 120 Israeli Arabs had been found guilty of collaboration with Arab guerrillas since June 1967. On 8 Jan 70, six Arab suspects were killed, 24 captured, and a huge arms cache was uncovered in a series of Israeli anti-terrorist operations along the Jordan River.
2 Feb 70	PFLP-GC	Switzerland	Swissair plane exploded in mid-air enroute from Zurich to Tel Aviv; killing 47.	
	PFLP-GC	W. Germany	Three terrorists threw grenades into a crowd of El Al passengers at the Munich airport, killing one and wounding eight.	
10 Feb 70	PFLP/AOLP	W. Germany	3 Arabs attacked El Al passengers at Munich airport; killing 1 and injuring 11.	
10-12 Feb 70	PLO	Jordan	30 persons were killed or wounded in clashes between Jordanian troops and Palestinian guerrillas in Amman.	Prompted a meeting between the PLO and Hussein, agreed for continued Palestinian activity with the minor restriction of uniform wear and carrying arms. 23 Feb 70, Hussein's hard-line interior minister removed
16 Feb 70	PFLP	Israel	Bombed a Hospital in Jerusalem killing and injuring a number of Israelis.	
17 Feb 70		W. Germany	Munich police thwarted a hijacking attempt of an El Al airliner.	

21 Feb 70	PFLP-GC	Switzerland	Swissair plane enroute from Zurich to Tel Aviv crashed on take-off, killing 47. The PFLP-GC's first international operation.	The PLO condemned the action and professed having no connection with the act [see 23 Sept 71 for further details]. 5 March 70, Israeli commandos raided fedayeen staging area in Jordan, killing 3 and capturing 3 others.
"	PFLP	Europe	Bomb exploded in an Austrian plane carrying mail from Frankfurt to Tel Aviv.	22 Feb, several European airlines suspended cargo flights to Israel; Swissair imposed the longest ban lasting until 5 March. On 23 Feb, Olympic Airways of Greece followed with a similar ban. 24-25 Feb, ground crews at London's airport refused to service airlines of 8 Arab countries and Israel's El Al airline for safety reasons.
21 Feb 70	PFLP	Israel	Bomb exploded in a Jerusalem supermarket, killing 2 and injuring 9.	7 March, Israeli commandos raided fedayeen base camp in S. Lebanon, killing one and destroying five buildings.
23 Feb 70	PFLP	Israel	Attack on a tourist bus near Hebron.	15 March 70, Israeli helicopter gunships strafed fedayeen camp 32km north of Damascus and then severed a power line. Five dead, 14 wounded.
24-27 Mar	PLO	Lebanon	30 persons killed and 80 wounded in clashes between Palestinians and armed civilian followers of the Christian Phalangist Party, which opposed the presence of the guerrillas in the country.	
28 Mar 70	PFLP	Lebanon	Bombed US Embassy and attacked American Insurance Co. in Beirut, US-owned Medreco oil refinery near Sidon.	
29 Mar 70	PFLP	Lebanon	Attacked JFK library and the Bank of America in Beirut.	3 April 70, eight-hour air and ground strike along Syrian frontier.
March 70	Fedayeen	Gaza	Grenade attacks killed 27 persons and injured 132 others in the bloodiest month in the Israeli-occupied strip since the 1967 war. Most of the attacks were directed at Arabs accused of collaborating with Israel.	
15 Apr 70	PLO	Jordan	US Embassy in Amman attacked.	
25 Apr 70	PLO	Turkey	Bomb exploded in El Al office in Istanbul.	
4 May 70	Fatah	Paraguay	Attack on Israeli Embassy in Asuncion, Paraguay resulted in the death of the 1st secretary's wife and seriously wounding an embassy employee.	
5 May 70	Fedayeen	Israel	An RPG-7 attack on a school bus near kibbutz Baram killed 12 and wounded 19 others.	
22 May 70	PFLP-GC	Israel	Israeli school bus attacked, driver, 2 teachers and 7 children died instantly; another teacher and student died later and the remaining 20 children (age 5-8) were wounded.	US Publication <i>America</i> (6 June 70): "If there is anything like a lunatic, radical fringe in the Palestinian resistance movement it is this splinter group--the GC--which openly admitted responsibility for the most recent atrocity in the Holy Land...and so, once again, the Arabs have succeeded in demonstrating that they can be their own worst enemies."
29 May - 4 Jun 70	PLO	Cairo	112 member Palestinian National Council decided to recognize the commando leadership. PFLP for the first time was represented on the Central Committee.	9 Jun 70, Yasir Arafat elected commander and chief of all Palestinian forces in an emergency meeting of the 27-man Central Committee of the 10 Palestinian commando organizations.
1 June 70	Fedayeen	Israel	Katyusha rocket attack killed one girl and wounded eight.	

6-10 Jun 70	PFLP	Jordan	200 persons killed and 500 wounded in clashes between Jordanian troops and Palestinian guerrillas in and around Amman; 90% of the victims were civilians.	King Hussein yielded to Palestinian demands by ousting two army officers accused by the guerrillas of plotting with the US against the Palestinian cause. 11 Jun 70, Syria pledged support to the Palestinian's against Jordan.
7 Jun 70	PFLP	Jordan	US political secretary, Morris Draper, kidnapped in Amman.	Released unarmed 8 June 70 following talks between the Jordanian government and the terrorists.
7 Jun 70	PLO	Jordan	US military attache and wife slightly wounded by gun-fire at Amman roadblock.	Released 12 Jun 70.
9 Jun 70	PFLP	Jordan	60 foreigners held hostage in two Amman hotels.	
"	"	Jordan	Assassination attempt on King Hussein failed, killing his body-guard and wounding 5 others instead. (Note: by the end of 1968, Hussein survived 8 assassination attempts)	Arafat and Hussein reached an agreed truce, but Ihabash and his PFLP rejected the agreement. 11 June, Arafat-Hussein meeting led to the dismissal of two army commanders, one Hussein's uncle.
10 Jun 70	PFLP	Jordan	US military attache, MAJ Robert Perry, shot in Amman.	Jordan-commando accord worked out with representatives of Egypt, Libya, Sudan, and Algeria.
13 Jun 70	PFLP	Jordan	Assassination attempt on the Jordanian army chief of staff failed, wounding 5 of the general's guards.	
11 July 70	Fatah	Lebanon	Assassination attempt on the PFLP's number two man, Wadi Haddad, failed.	Yasir Arafat denied Al-Fatah involvement.
22 July 70	PSF	Lebanon	Olympic Airways jet enroute from Beirut to Athens hijacked.	
July 70	Arabs	Cairo	Nassar and Hussein accepted the Roger's Plan.	PLO rejected it.
6 Aug 70	PFLP	Jordan	Raided the pro-Nassar Palestine Arab Organization due to its support for the American peace plan.	Motivated by the killing of a PFLP member on 5 Aug in an exchange of fire with the pro-Nassar Action Group for the Liberation of Palestine.
27-28 Aug	PLO	Jordan	Meeting of the Palestinian National Council pledged to continue the military struggle against Israel, denouncing the US Peace initiatives. The council said that anyone opposed to the Palestinians' campaign to destroy Israel "is a traitor to his cause and the revolution and deserves severe punishment."	Clashes continue between Jordanian troops and Palestinian guerrillas.
1 Sep 70	Fedayeen	Jordan	King Hussein escaped an assassination attempt in Amman. The attempt was provoked by his Israeli peace initiatives.	
6 Sep 70	PFLP	Jordan	2 airliners, Swissair DC-8 and TWA 707, hijacked. A third hijack attempt foiled in London and Leila Khaled captured.	Security tightened at airports around the world in the wake of bomb threats and aircraft seizures. Arab press condemned the seizure of these aircraft. (for more see 16 Dec 70). Clashes continued between Jordanian troops and Palestinian guerrillas.
9 Sep 70	PFLP	Bahrain:	BOAC DC-8 hijacked and landed in Amman. The 105 passengers were held in exchange for Leila Khaled. Eventually, joined the other two aircraft seized on 6 Sept 70 (see above).	
11 Sep 70	PLA		USIS official kidnapped.	

12 Sep 70	PFLP	Jordan	The TWA, SwissAir, and BOAC planes, hijacked on 6 and 9 September, were blown up by the terrorists.	12 Sept, the PLO suspended the PFLP membership. Despite international efforts to secure the release of over 300 passengers held captive, by 15 September, 54 remained as hostages held in exchange for the release of comrades held in Britain, W. Germany, Switzerland, and Israel. On the same day, with Arab League mediation a partial truce was arranged between the Palestinians and the Jordanian government. On 16 Sep 70, Hussein appointed a military government.
16 Sep 70	Fatah	Jordan	Announced they would resist the Jordanian military government. Rejected the military government as a product of a "fascist military coup." Central Committee announced the reinstallation of the PFLP and called for a general strike on 17 Sept to help it topple the Jordanian government.	Baghdad and Damascus broadcasts announced their support for the Palestinian guerrillas.
15-25 Sep 70	PLO	Jordan	"Black September:" fierce house-to-house fighting in Amman was followed by an armored push into the desert against the Palestinian guerrillas.	On 25 Sept peace was restored to Jordan, as most of Jordan was in military control. On 27 Sept Arafat and Hussein met in Cairo with Arab chiefs of state and joined them in signing a 14-point agreement that called for an immediate end to the fighting in the 10-day Jordanian civil war. 1 Oct 70, Jordan recognized Al-Fatah as the only legitimate representative of the guerrillas.
25 Sep 70	PFLP	Jordan	Remaining hostages freed in groups (16 on 25 Sep, 32 on 26 Sep, and 6 on 29 Sep) in exchange for 7 terrorists held by Western governments (Britain, West Germany, Switzerland).	International community continued to express indignation concerning hijackers and state sponsorship of such activities. On 1 Oct 1970, the IC/A adopted a resolution stating that States failing to cooperate with international extradition law and safety of the aircraft and passengers would be suspended from international civil air transportation services.
25 Oct 70	Fatah	Israel	Conducted a rocket attack on the border village of Qaliah.	Occupants of an adjacent Lebanese border village staged a demonstration against continued commando raids into Israel in fear of Israeli reprisals. 30 Oct 69, Arafat met with Lebanese officials and agreed on measures restricting their activity.
6 Nov 70	PFLP	Israel	Planted a bomb on a bus station in Tel Aviv, killed two and injured 33. (See 4 Sep 68 for similar assault)	Lebanese support! International community responded to the wave of 1970 hijacking by concluding the Convention on the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft at The Hague on 13 Dec 1970--condemned all acts of aerial hijacking and those involved in such activity (specific groups and states) and pledged to create legal mechanisms to suppress skyjacking...
31 Dec 70	AOLP	Lebanon	Al Fatah man slain by three members of the Action Organization for the Liberation of Palestine.	Al Fatah's police arrested 2 of the 3 suspects and turned them over to Lebanese authorities. They also seized AOLP leader Issam Sartawi, closed AOLP's office in Beirut and seized its arms. 3 Jan 71, Al Fatah announced that it sought closer cooperation with the Lebanese government by closing four offices in the country's refugee camps, and curb the "bourgeois appearance" in the country
1970		Occupied Territories	On 3 Jan 71, Israeli sources reported that 39 Arabs had been killed and 734 wounded by Palestinian guerrilla action.	
6 Jan 71	PLO	Jordan	Two police stations in Amman attacked, three persons killed and nine wounded.	Jordanian army shells refugee camps

7 Jan 71	Fatah	Jordan	Kidnapped two non-commissioned officers and killed one Jordanian soldier.	Jordanian army attacked Palestinian guerrilla camps north of Amman.
11 Jan 71	PLO	Jordan	Clashes between Palestinian guerrillas and Jordanian security forces continued; three civilians and a policeman killed.	Ibrahim Bakr, a member of the PLO Central Committee, said the latest attacks paralyzed the guerrillas ability to mount operations against Israel. Negotiated truce was reached on 13 Jan 71.
28 Feb - 5 Mar 71	PLO	Cairo	8th Palestinian National Council adopted the slogan of a democratic state.	
15 Mar 71	BSO		Gulf oil refinery in Rotterdam sabotaged.	
26 Mar 71	PLO	Jordan	In the most severe fighting between Jordanian forces and Palestinian guerrillas occurred along the northern border (Syria) resulted in the deaths of 10 civilians and 8 Jordanian soldiers.	
28 Mar 71	PLO	Jordan	Guerrilla incited demonstrators provoked Jordanian security forces to fire into the crowd in Amman. Fighting quickly spread to other parts of the capital.	A Palestinian communique on 2 April stated that the fedayeen were fighting to force King Hussein to replace Wasfi Tell as premier and to oust high ranking officers. An Al-Falah newspaper reiterated these demands by stressing that a peace agreement wouldn't be reached until Tell was replaced--"scorched earth."
Mar 71	TPLF/PFLP	Turkey	4 American servicemen were kidnapped by Turkish terrorists demanding \$400,000 illi.	Syria was reported to have warned Jordan that the 6000 regular troops of the Palestine Liberation Army stationed south of Damascus would be permitted to move into Jordan "unless harassment of guerrillas was quickly stopped."
21 May 71	TPLF/PFLP	Turkey	Israeli council general in Istanbul kidnapped and assassinated.	Turkish intelligence captured one terrorist and beat the names of the others out of him; the hostages were released soon thereafter.
1 June 71	PLO	Lebanon	Central Committee statement accused Jordan of mounting an offensive against guerrilla bases "in a conspiracy against the Palestinian revolution." This statement was amid clashes between guerrillas and Jordanian forces that had begun in late March.	2 June 71, Hussein ordered a final crackdown on the guerrillas.
4 June 71	PFLP/ELF	Red Sea	Liberian registry tanker, <i>Corad Sea</i> , attacked in the Bab al-Mandab straits.	
5 June 71	PLO	Iraq	7 Palestinian guerrilla groups (Fatah, PFLP, PDLFP, PFLP-GC, PLO, ALF, PSLE) called for the overthrow of King Hussein's government and the formation of a national union government in order "to prevent a unilateral peace agreement between Jordan and Israel."	By 19 July 71, Premier Wasfi Tell announced the guerrillas had lost all of their bases in Jordan; resulting in the deaths of 31 Jordanian soldiers, wounding 96 others and the capture of 2,300 guerrillas and deaths of 50 others. The Jordanian fighting was so fierce that 72 guerrillas had crossed into the occupied West Bank and surrendered to Israeli authorities.
6 June 71	Arabs	Gaza	Two Arabs shot to death following a grenade assault	
11 June 71	Arabs	Gaza	Arab laborers waiting for a bus were the target of a grenade attack, killing two Arabs and wounding 81 others.	
23 June 71	"	"	Two Arabs killed and 44 were injured by a hand grenade tossed into a market place.	

7 July 71	Fatah	Israel	Rocket attack on a hospital and schoolyard in the town of Petah Tiqva killed four and wounded sixteen.	14 July 71, six Fatah were killed by an Israeli patrol and one escaped into Jordan.
July 71	PLO	Cairo	9th Palestine National Council	King Hussein expelled PLO from Amman.
24 Aug 71	Fatah	Spain	Bomb damaged a Jordanian airliner in Madrid.	International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a specialized UN agency, concluded its work on the unlawful interference with civil aviation with the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, at Montreal on 23 Sept 71 (law concerned with in-flight safety violations resulting from hijacking, refer Feb 70 hijacking of Austrian and Swiss airliners).
8 Sep 71	Fatah	Jordan	Jordanian Alia airliner hijacked.	
9 Sep 71	Fedayeen		Tapline sabotaged.	
15 Sep 71	"		Tapline sabotaged.	
16 Sep 71	Fedayeen	Israel	Hand grenade into a crowd of American tourists in Jerusalem.	
1-3 Oct 71	"	Italy	Representatives of 16 terrorists groups met in Florence to discuss revolutionary strategies. Included in the group were representatives from the IRA, ERP (Argentina), Basque separatists, and various Palestinian groups.	
24 Oct 71	Fedayeen		Tapline sabotaged.	
10 Nov 71	PFLP	Jordan	Intercontinental hotel in Amman damaged by explosives.	
28 Nov 71	BSO	Egypt	Black September's 1st operation: the assassination of Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi Tal in Cairo.	Three gunmen and a lookout were arrested and eventually freed on bail (to be provided by the Palestine Liberation Organization), 29 Feb 72. Hussein stated at the funeral: "the tragedy is not death, but the degree to which cowards and subhumans will stoop."
Dec 71	PFLP	Israel	Parcel bombs disguised as chocolates or books were delivered from Austria to Israeli addresses; resulting in one casualty.	Israeli counter-measures--developed instrument to detect such devices.
15 Dec 71	BSO	Britain	Attempted assassination of Jordan's Ambassador to London, Zayd Rafai.	
16 Dec 71	BSO	Switzerland	3 persons injured by parcel bombs in the Jordanian mission to the UN in Geneva.	
Jan 72	PFLP/GC	Europe	Letter bombs mailed from various European countries to Israeli officials and businessmen.	27 Dec 71, 400 Israeli paratroopers raided Palestinian bases at Yater and Kift, Lebanon. Twelve Arabs killed and 5 wounded.
6-10 Jan 72	PLO	Israel	Lufthansa airliner hijacked. Palestinian guerrillas raided Israeli border towns.	Plan released following the receipt of \$5 million ransom.

8, 10, 12 Jan	PLO	Israel	Palestinian guerrillas shelled the Israeli town of Kiryat Shmona from Southern Lebanon.	10, 11, and 13 Jan 72, Israeli ground and air forces conducted retaliatory strikes on guerrilla bases in Southern Lebanon, destroying 6 buildings, killing and wounding an undetermined number of Arabs. 2 Israeli soldiers were killed during the raids. 15 Jan 72, Palestinian guerrillas reported to have decided to refrain on firing on Israel from inside Lebanon.
2-9 Jan 72	PLO	Vienna	13 explosive parcels were mailed to Israel from Europe, resulting in one casualty during dismantling at a Tel Aviv police station on 3 Jan. Former air force commander, Gen. Ezer Weizman was one of the many prominent recipients.	
2 Feb 72	PFLP	W. Germany	5 Jordanians in Cologne murdered for allegedly spying for Israel.	
6 Feb 72	BSO	Holland	Gas-pumping station and oil tanks belonging to Gulf Oil were sabotaged.	
	"	W. Germany	Plant producing generators for Israeli aircraft in Hamburg sabotaged.	
8 Feb 72	BSO	India	Lufthansa 747 hijacked from India to Aden.	
21 Feb 72	PFLP	Yemen	Lufthansa 747 jumbo jet hijacked enroute from New Delhi to Athens and diverted to Aden, South Yemen Feb 22. All 172 passengers were held hostage, including Joseph P. Kennedy, 3rd son of the late Sen. Robert F. Kennedy. All except the 16 crew members were released later on the 22nd.	The hijackers surrendered to Yemeni authorities on 23 Feb, turning over the remaining 16 hostages. 25 Feb 72, Bonn government disclosed that it had paid \$5 million in ransom for the release of the Lufthansa airliner and crew. Hijackers released by Yemeni authorities on 27 Feb 72.
22 Feb 72	PFLP	W. Germany	Esso Oil pipeline near Hamburg sabotaged.	
	BSO	Belgium	Sabena plane enroute from Brussels to Lod hijacked.	Israeli commando assault led to the release of the hostages. Two terrorists killed and two others taken prisoner.
22-23 Feb 72	PLO	Jerusalem	Three Israeli soldiers and a civilian couple were killed and several other wounded in Palestinian guerrilla ambushes.	25-28 Feb, Israeli ground and air forces carried out heavy reprisal raids against guerrilla bases in Lebanon: 60 guerrillas killed and 100 wounded. UN Security Council adopted a resolution demanding Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.
1 Mar 72	PLO	Golan	Mortar attacks on Israeli settlements.	Israel retaliated with air and artillery strikes on suspected guerrilla bases. Syrian planes retaliated later in the day with raids on Israeli settlements 2 miles inside the heights.
15 Mar 72		Jordan	King Hussein announced his plan for a United Arab Kingdom.	PLO rejected it.
28 Mar 72	PLO	West Bank	PLO boycotted local municipal elections, despite heavy turn-out.	
2 May 72	PLO	"	Again municipal elections experienced a heavy draw and again the PLO staged a boycott.	
5 May 72	BSO	Belgium	Hijacked a Sabena Flight 517 from Brussels to Tel Aviv. The four hijackers demanded the release of 317 Palestinian guerrillas in Israeli prisoners in exchange for the plane and its 87 passengers and 10 crew members, if their demands were not met they threatened to blow up the plane.	9 May 72, Israeli paratroopers assaulted the airliner killing two, wounding another and capturing the fourth terrorist and rescuing 61 passengers and 10 crewmen. (One woman passenger shot accidentally died 18 May) 2 female terrorists sentenced to life imprisonment

9 May 72	PFLP	Austria	Attempted hijacking of a Sabena airliner from Vienna to Athens to Lod International airport foiled; two Arab terrorists killed.	Western world condemned the attack. By contrast, an Egyptian broadcast from Cairo boasted that "the heroes proved they can penetrate the conquered territory to avenge the blood of others. Now Israel has no alternative but to close Lydda [Lod] Airport and prevent tourist visits if she wishes to protect her borders."
30 May 72	PFLP/JRA	Israel	Japanese Red Army and PFLP massacre passengers at Lod airport, killing 24 and wounding 76. Among the dead were 16 Puerto Ricans who arrived on a pilgrimage to the Christian holy places, eight Israelis including Dr Aharon Katzir-Katchalsky—one of Israel's leading scientists.	JRA member Kozo Yamamoto given a life sentence by an Israeli court. Japanese government paid Israel \$6 million in compensation for the victims. 9 July, Israel retaliated with a car bomb that killed Ghassan Kanafani (PFLP's #4-man, propaganda specialist) and a letter bomb severely injured Bassam Abu Sheraf, a front-man for a Palestinian publication in Lebanon. Rome, a previously lax airport regarding travel inspection, tightened security.
30 May 72	BSO/BR?	Italy	Oil storage facility at Trieste burned.	
21 June 72	PLO	Israel	Two civilians were killed in an ambush on a tourist bus.	Israeli armored force struck into Lebanon and captured 5 Syrian officers, a Lebanese officer and three military policemen. The attack coincided with an air and artillery attack on a guerrilla base in southeast Lebanon, killing 14 civilians and wounding 30 others.
8 July 72	PFLP	Lebanon	A PFLP statement accused Zionist and imperialist quarters of the death of a PFLP leader Ghassan Kanafani, killed by an explosion in a car. His 17-year old niece was also killed. The PFLP pledged revenge.	9 July 72, Kanafani, reputed planner of the May 72 Lod Airport massacre was killed by a radio-controlled bomb in Europe.
11 July 72	PFLP	Tel Aviv	Grenade explosion at the central bus terminal wounded eleven people. PFLP claimed this was in retaliation for Kanafani's death.	
5 Aug 72	ANYLP		El Al plane damaged by a bomb.	Unrelated, on 4 July 1972 Israel assailed the British decision to allow a PLO office to open in London.
	BSO/BR	Italy	Trans-alpine oil storage facility at Trieste burned for two days, destroying millions of gallons of oil.	
16 Aug 72	PFLP-GC	Italy	Attempt to blow up an El Al 707 in flight failed, damaging only the baggage compartment.	

5 Sep 72	BSO	W. Germany	Munich Massacre: 11 members of the Israeli Olympic team, one German policeman, 5 terrorists killed and three arrested.	As thousands awaited the return of the Israeli athletes at Lod International Airport, Premier Golda Meir addressed the Knesset stating, "we have no choice but to strike at them." Israeli authorities fired 3 senior officials of the Shin Bet, Department of Internal Security and created a special anti-terrorist unit, the Wrath of God (Mitzan Elohim) composed of army and secret service personnel. 6 Sep 72, helicopters and armored patrol shelled fedayeen bases in S. Lebanon. 8 Sep 72, 50-80 Israeli jeffighters attacked al-Fatah bases in Lebanon. 14 Sep 72, PLO Central Committee declared that its group was not responsible for the Black September group linked to the Munich killings. The statement insisted that the PLO's objective "was only aimed at pressuring Israel to release detained guerrillas from Israeli jails." West German government set up a similar organization, GSG-9. The Bonn government also cracked down on Palestinian student and worker groups and barred the entrance of 1900 Arabs for a lack of proper papers or because of suspicious connections. 27 Sep 72, West Germany deported 9 Palestinians for suspected connections with terrorist organizations.
9 Sep 72	BSO	Britain	In London, an Israeli agriculturalist was killed by a letter-bomb	16-17 Sep 72, 3000 Israeli troops, tanks, and jets attacked Palestinian bases in S. Lebanon, killing 60 Arabs and destroying 150 buildings.
19 Sep 72	BSO	Britain	Israeli diplomat in London killed by a letter bomb. This was followed by the discovery of similar booby-trapped envelopes destined for Israeli officials in at least eight other cities, all with Amsterdam postmarks.	In London, the Israel branch of the Jewish Defense League (JDL) announced the formation of a anti-terrorist organization to combat Arab guerrilla groups and institutions in Europe and the U.S.
20 Sep 72	"	U.S., Europe, Canada, Israel	Additional letter bombs addressed to Israeli officials, were intercepted in New York, Montreal, Ottawa, Brussels and Jerusalem.	
21 Sep 72	Fatah	Syria	Received first Soviet arms shipment. Shipment was apparently arranged for in July 72 during Arafat's visit to Moscow.	22 Sep 72, Amsterdam and British police coordinated effort to investigate the letter bomb activities. U.S. backs Israeli position on terrorism. This followed an Israeli announcement that it would refuse to participate in further peace negotiations until all Arab terrorism was crushed. Sec of State Rogers informed the French Foreign Minister Schumann that the U.S. "will press hard for sanctions in the case of civil aviation and for other practical responses to terrorist acts."
23 Sep 72	PLO	Jordan	Amman post office intercepted and defused four letter bombs addressed to four Jordanian officials.	27 Sep 72, U.S. announced that all foreigners in transit through the U.S. would be required to have transit visas. 3 Oct 72, MOSSAD agents blew up the Palestinian library in Paris.
28 Sep 72		Cairo	Sadat called for a Palestinian government-in-exile.	
Sep-Oct 72	BSO		Wave of letter bombs see below.	

4 Oct 72	BSO	Italy	A letter bomb delivered to the Rome office of United Hias Service, a Jewish immigration office, was defused by Italian bomb experts.	US pushed to investigate all travelers from Arab countries, in accordance with President Nixon's promise to prevent terrorist attacks on Israelis in the US. West Germany announced that it had outlawed two Palestinian organizations: General Union of Palestine Students with 800 listed members and the General Union of Palestine Workers, with a 1000 members.
10 Oct 72	JDL	France	A bookstore in Paris serving as the French headquarters of the PLO was slightly damaged by a bomb blast, apparently initiated by the "Massada action and defense movement."	16 Oct 72, an Al-Fatah agent was shot to death in Rome: Fatah blamed Israel and the Italian authorities suspected the result to be a feud between the BSO and other Palestinian groups. (see April 27, 1973)
14 Oct 72	Fatah	Lebanon	Two female American Zionist activists opened envelopes containing explosive materials that failed to detonate; postmarked from Malaysia. A similar letter bomb was mailed to a Jewish family in Rhodesia.	*Israel's first attack on Al Fatah bases in Syria and Lebanon without immediate provocation: 15 Oct, 20 Israeli jets strafed al-Fatah bases in Syria and S. Lebanon.
24 Oct 72		Israel	Al Fatah clashed with a dissident group (anti-Lebanese-commando accord) engaging in a mortar and machine gun battle in the Bekaa Valley region of eastern Lebanon near the Syrian border.	25 Oct, a letter opened in Beirut exploded and injured the secretary of a trading company known to have arranged arms deals with Arab countries. A Beirut postman was blinded when one of the letters he was sorting exploded. PLO official Abu Khalil was injured in Algiers when he opened a booty-trapped parcel. Another PLO official, Mustafa Awad Abu Zeid, the organization's secretary in Libya, was blinded by a parcel opened in Tripoli, two other persons in the vicinity were less seriously hurt. A parcel bomb addressed to a PLO official was intercepted at the Cairo airport. On 26 Oct, three other letter bombs destined for PLO official were intercepted at Cairo airport. On 27 Oct, the Beirut office of the newspaper of the PFLP was the intended target of another letter bomb, which was intercepted at the city's post office and rendered harmless. 27 Oct 72, series of letter bombs posted in Belgrade arrived on desks of Palestinian leaders in Lebanon, Egypt, Libya, and Algeria
29 Oct 72	BSO	Lebanon	Lufthansa 727 enroute from Beirut to Ankara hijacked and flown to Munich. Threatened to blow up the plane if the two BSO members aren't released.	Two BSO members released by FRG.
31 Oct 72		Britain	A letter bomb received by the Egyptian embassy in London was rendered harmless.	
1 Nov 72		Malaya	15 letter bombs meant for Jewish groups in London, Rome, and the US had been discovered in the Kuala Lumpur post office and defused by army experts.	
2 Nov 72		Britain	London police defused a letter bomb destined for the British Technion Society, which was connected to the University of Haifa in Israel	
10-13 Nov		Britain	On 10 Nov, a letter bomb wounded an official of the London diamond trading company. 18 other letter bombs intended for Jews in London and Glasgow were intercepted by British authorities. Letter bombs were postmarked from New Delhi and Bombay, India.	13 Nov, opposition leaders in parliament criticized the Indian government for its failure to prevent the bomb dissemination (On 17 Dec 72, King Hussein had expelled the last unit of the Palestine Liberation Army from Jordan. The major part of the PLA was then in Syria.)

Nov 72	BSO	France	Syrian journalist killed for collaborating with Israelis.	Israeli's Wrath of God killings: 8 Dec 72, Mahmoud Hamshari, the PLO's representative in Paris, killed by a bomb attacked to his telephone; Wael Zwaiter, al-Fatah's representative in Rome, shot outside his apartment; 12 Dec 72, Mahmoud Hamshari killed by Israeli operatives in Paris.
28 Dec 72	BSO	Thailand	Israeli Embassy in Bangkok seized and held the six Israeli occupants hostage for 19 hours. Terrorist requested the release of 36 Palestinian hostages held in Israeli prisons.	Following negotiations with Thai and Egyptian officials the six hostages were released. The terrorist and their negotiators flew to Cairo and departed company.
8 Jan 73	BSO	France	Bomb destroys Paris office of Jewish Agency.	
11 Jan 73	BSO	W. Germany	Arabs attack foreigners in Kaiserslautern restaurant.	25 Jan 73, a representative of the PLO was killed by a bomb explosion in his hotel room at Nicosia, Cyprus.
26 Jan 73	BSO	Spain	Baruch Cohen, Israeli intelligence agent, assassinated in Madrid [revenge for the murder of Hamshari and Zwaiter, see 12 Dec 72].	
11 Feb 73	Fedayeen	Gaza	Chairman of the Shatti refugee council murdered	
15 Feb 73	Al-Fatah	Jordan	Plan to assassinate King Hussein and overthrow his government was thwarted by Jordanian security forces.	17 Palestinian guerrillas were arrested, including Abu Daoud a member of Al Fatah's executive unit--the Revolutionary Council. 6 March, the guerrillas were sentenced to death by King Hussein, but a plea by the Sheik of Kuwait spared their lives.
	Arabs	Gaza	Gaza Arabs protested the outbreak of Palestinian guerrilla violence in the Strip and six members of the Shatti refugee council resigned in protest of one of their members on the 11th.	
	Fedayeen	Gaza	Attempt to assassinate former Gaza Mayor Rashid Shawa failed. He escaped with minor injuries.	Gazans circulated a petition calling on the Arab world to help in curbing the Palestinian guerrilla attacks in the Gaza Strip.
21 Feb 73	Israeli Air Force	Sinai	Libyan Boeing 727 lost over the desert shot down by an Israeli jet, killing the 106 people on board.	Propaganda windfall for the Arab world, redressed the balance of world opinion. Qaddafi (55 victims) announced that "by all objective standards the deliberated shooting down of a civilian airliner cannot be allowed to pass unpunished." He further blamed the Egyptians for sending the airliner the wrong way.
1 Mar 73	Al-Fatah	Sudan	Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum seized, demanding the release of Arab prisoners in various countries, including Sirhan the convicted assassin of Robert F. Kennedy and members of the Baader-Meinhof gang.	2 Mar, President Nixon said that while the US would "do everything we can" to have the hostages released, it would "not pay blackmail." CIA became actively involved in operations against the Palestinians.

2 Mar 73	Al-Fatah	Sudan	Three diplomats, two US and one Belgian were murdered following a refusal to meet their kidnappers demands.	
4 Mar 73	BSO	Lebanon	Greek ship, <i>Sourion</i> , sunk in Beirut harbor.	4 Mar 73, terrorist surrendered to Sudanese authorities. Sudanese president denounced Libya and the Palestinians. The terrorist was convicted of murder and given life sentences by a Khartoum court June 24, 1974, but the Sudanese president commuted the sentences to seven-year terms and turned them over to the PLO. On 25 June 1974, the terrorists were flown to Cairo. Sudanese forces raided the PLO headquarters in Khartoum finding documents linking the Fatah to Black September, which corresponded with Abu Daoud's allegations (see below). King Hussein of Jordan ordered the executions of Abu Daoud and 16 other terrorists, but later rescinded the order.
6-7 Mar 73	BSO	U.S.	Time bombs found in (3) rental cars in New York.	
7 Mar 73	BSO	US	New York police discovered and defused three bombs in parked cars next to Israel's El Al Airlines terminal at Kennedy International Airport and near two Israeli-owned banks. The bombs were set to explode during Premier Golda Meir's visit to New York.	15 March, a US federal warrant was issued for a suspected Black September terrorist believed to have escaped the country after planting the bombs.
12 Mar 73	BSO	Cyprus	Israeli businessman killed, Nicosia.	
14 Mar 73	BSO	France	Two Arabs arrested at the Italian border with explosive equipment in their car. Upon questioning, the Arabs revealed a plot to blow the Jordanian and Italian embassies (see below).	
15-16 Mar	BSO	France	Plan to blow up the Jordanian and Israeli embassies in Paris was thwarted by French security officials. Two Palestinian members of the BSO were subsequently deported.	
24 Mar 73	Al-Fatah	Jordan	The Al-Fatah leader, Abu Daoud confessed that Black September was a "fictitious entity, a camouflage" for commando operations conducted by Fatah.	27 March 73, Daoud reiterated his claims that Black September was a cover for Al-Fatah during a television interview in Britain.
9 Apr 73	BSO+	Cyprus	Israeli ambassador's apartment and an El Al airliner in Nicosia attacked.	10 Apr 73, Israeli commandos attacked guerrilla bases in the center of Beirut and in the coastal town of Saïda in the south. Twelve persons were killed: four Palestinians, including three key PLO leaders, two Lebanese policemen, two Lebanese civilians, three Syrians and an Italian woman. Furthermore, documents found identified Palestinian contacts in Israel and the occupied territories. Significantly, this was the first anti-terrorist operation that the Israelis openly admitted.
21 Apr 73	Fatah	Israel	Israeli troops captured 3 fedayeen who had planned an attack on civilians at a bus station at Safed in order to "kill as many as they [we] could and not permit [our] themselves to be captured."	
27 Apr 73	BSO	Italy	El Al employee shot in Rome in retaliation for the 16 Oct 72 murder of a Fatah agent.	Accused assailant was arrested by Italian police

1 May 73	PLO	Lebanon	Palestinian guerrillas kidnapped two Lebanese officers in exchange for seven guerrillas arrested on 27 April for carrying explosives at Beirut International Airport. An army depot was set on fire by a rocket attack near the airport and an army barracks was raided.	Hostages were released after the days hostilities.
2 May 73	PLO	Lebanon	Palestinian guerrillas clashed with Lebanese army troops, beginning in Beirut and spreading to other parts of the country.	Arafat arranged a temporary cease-fire.
3 May 73	PLO	Lebanon	Truce broke down between the Palestinian guerrillas and Lebanese army troops, following a raid on a Beirut police barracks in which three policemen were killed and seven wounded.	Subsequent cease-fire was arranged on 4 May, but precipitated the resignation of Premier Amin Hafez and his Cabinet. With Arab mediation (Syria, Egypt, Iraq) there was a lull in the hostilities in and around Beirut, but in southern Lebanon incidents continued. Lebanese President Suleiman Franjich stated that he would not permit the guerrillas to terrorize and kidnap people. 8 May 73, Syria closed its border to Lebanon, accusing the Lebanese government of an anti-Palestinian plot of "foreign design." The same day, Libya pledged support for the guerrilla struggle against Lebanon.
9 May 73	PLO	Lebanon	Palestinian guerrilla force crossed from Syria into Lebanon and came under rocket and strafing attack from Lebanese planes.	10 May, following guerrilla attacks on three army positions, Lebanese jets bombed guerrilla positions. 12 May, Lebanese security forces arrested 35 including a number of Western Europeans and citizens of Arab states accused of provoking continued clashes between government troops and the guerrillas. By 17 May, when the final cease-fire was arranged, over 250 persons had been reportedly killed [refer: Sobel, p. 72-3: Lebanon-commando accord]. 8 Jun 72, Mohammad Boudin, organizer of the Rotterdam attacks and raids on West German factories, was killed by a car-bomb.
9 Jun 73	BSO	W. Germany	West German arms plant sabotaged.	28 June 73, Mohammad Boudia, a leading Arab terrorist in Western Europe, killed by a car-bomb in Paris.
1 July 73	BSO	US	Israeli air and naval attack was shot five times at his suburban home in Chevy Chase, Maryland. He was killed in retaliation for the murder of a Black September representative in Paris on 28 June 73.	21 July 73, two Israeli gunmen killed a suspected member of the BSO in Lillehammer, Norway. On 1 Feb 74, an Oslo court convicted five Jews and acquitted the six in the mistaken killing--the slain individual was not a BSO member.
19 July 73		Greece	A terrorist's failed attack on an El Al office in Athens turned into a hostage exchange. After holding 17 persons hostage for 5 hours in a local hotel, the terrorist exchanged his hostages for a flight from Greece to Kuwait.	Release of the hostages was negotiated with ambassadors of Egypt, Libya, and Iraq for two and a half hours.
20 July 73	Fedayeen PFLP/JRA	Israel Holland	An explosive device wounded five in the Mahane Yehuda market in Jerusalem. Japan Airlines 747 hijacked enroute from Amsterdam to Tokyo and was forced to land at a dirt airstrip in the UAE. On 24 July, the plane was flown to Libya where it was blown up minutes after the 137 passengers and crew evacuated the aircraft.	21 July 73, a Moroccan writer, mistaken for one of the leaders of Black September and planner of the Munich attack, killed in Lillehammer, Norway. Hijackers arrested by Libyan authorities and released to the PLO on 13 August 1974.

5 Aug 73	PFLP/BSO	Greece	3 passengers killed and 55 wounded during an grenade and machine gun attack on Athens airport, while awaiting a TWA flight to New York. This operation was admittedly BSO final act. Furthermore, this operation was conducted to avenge the death of Abu Youssef, 10 Apr 73 (Israeli raid on Lebanon).	Surrendered to Greek police after releasing 35 hostages they had seized following the killings. An Athens' court, 24 Jan 74, sentenced the terrorists (2) to death. 2 Feb 74, three Pakistanis seized a Greek freighter in Karachi and threatened to blow up the ship and kill its crew unless Greece freed the two Arabs. The Pakistanis released the ship following Greek assurances, which materialized on 5 May. The Arabs were handed over to Libyan authorities. US and Israel authorities were sharply critical of the Greek release, and the subsequent commuting of the terrorists' sentences. US State Department statement read "deporting individuals convicted of murdering innocent people is not the answer to deterring further terrorist activity."
10 Aug 73	Israeli Air Force	Israel	An Iraqi airliner was mistakenly intercepted by the Israeli airforce. The purpose of the action was to capture the PFLP's leader George Habash, who was assumed on board.	"15 Aug 73, UN Security Council meeting, at Lebanon's request, unanimously condemned the Israeli action.
"	PLO	West Bank	Palestine National Front established.	
18 Aug 73	PLO	E. Germany	Following an agreement between Yasir Arafat and East German Communist party secretary Erich Honecker, the PLO opened an office in East Berlin.	
5 Sep 73	Black June	France	Saudi Arabian Embassy in Paris attacked, seizing 13 diplomats and employees as hostages. After 28 hours of negotiations, the terrorists agreed to release all but four Saudi hostages, and left Paris on 6 September on a plane provided by Syria. Enroute the terrorists demanded the release of Abu Daoud held by Jordan. ("1st Anniversary of Munich")	Jordan and Saudi Arabia refused all demands. On 8 September the remaining hostages were freed and the terrorists were taken into custody by Kuwaiti officials.
5 Sep 73	BSO	Italy	5 Arabs arrested by Italian police who said they were planning to conduct a missile attack on an El Al plane with SA-7s.	Egyptians embarrassed due to their linkage to the SA-7s. Soviets furious because they provided the weapons, and the US was delighted because the Italian government gave the SA-7s to them. British fearing Heathrow International Airport was going to be a transit point for additional weapons staged a joint army and police cordon of the airport. Three of the terrorists were convicted and sentenced in a Rome court 27 Feb 74. They received prison terms of 5 years and two months each and were fined \$2500 each. Yet, the Italian dependence on Arab oil led to their subsequent release on bail. Arab opinion hardening toward terrorism.
7 Sep 73	BSO	W. Germany	Bomb destroyed Israeli exhibit at West Berlin.	
14 Sep 73	Fatah	Syria	The group's Voice of Palestine radio station on the Syrian border near Jordan was shut down and six staff members were arrested. The closure followed the station's attack the previous week on a Syrian-Jordanian-Egyptian agreement to adopt a common policy at the UN.	Syria arrested 16 more Fatah guerrillas on the 18th and closed Fatah's training bases and border trails used to infiltrate supplies into Lebanon
18-19 Sep 73		Jordan	The Jordan government released 1,500 political prisoners (including Abu Daoud) and granted amnesty 2,500 others outside Jordan who had been sentenced in absentia.	

28 Sep 73	al-Sai'qah	Europe	Jewish emigres enroute from Russia to Israel kidnapped. Kidnappers demanded that Austria close the Schoenau Castle as a transit camp.	129 Sep 73, Austrian government yielded to terrorist demands by refusing to allow the transit of Soviet Jewish emigrants through Austria and would close Israeli-run facilities for emigrants awaiting transfer to Israel. Israeli officials condemned Austria's decision. 17-nation Council of Europe voted unanimously to advise Austria that it considered no government bound by pledges obtained through blackmail. President Nixon said "we simply cannot have governments--small or large--give in to international blackmail by terrorist groups."
6 Oct 73	Egyptians Syrians	Israel	On the holiest day in the Jewish calendar, the Day of Atonement, the Arab armies attacked an unready Israel.	Israel vulnerable. Arab states revitalized. The PLO's Voice of Palestine stated "death to Americans."
18 Oct 73	SRO	Lebanon	Bank of America in Beirut seized.	
22 Oct 73	UN	New York	Security Council adopts Resolution 338 reaffirming the need to implement Resolution 242.	
25 Nov 73	ANYLP	Lebanon	Hijacked KLM 747 after it took off from Beirut.	26 Nov, Dutch government pledged not to "allow the opening of offices or camps for Soviet Jews going to Israel" and banning "transportation of weapons or volunteers for Israel." On 28 Nov, following attempts to gain landing rights and the release of hostages, the plane finally landed and surrendered to Yemeni authorities, who guaranteed the terrorists safe passage. 14 Dec 73, UN General Assembly adopted the text of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents--international law against violent crime, facilitating extradition.
26-28 Nov	Arab League	Algiers	Summit recognized PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians.	
8 Dec 73	Fedayeen	West Bank	Col. Eliezer Segev, the Israeli military governor of Nablus, and a soldier were wounded when their car was hit by a grenade.	9 Dec 73, Israeli security forces demolished 5 housing in the West Bank. 10 Dec 73, eight Palestinians from the West Bank and East Jerusalem were expelled to Jordan.
12 Dec 73	Fedayeen	West Bank	In Hebron, eight Arabs were wounded when a guerrilla threw a grenade into a crowd.	
17 Dec 73	Black June PFLP	Italy	Massacre at Leonardo di Vinci (Fiumicino) airport in Rome: a Pan Am Boeing 707 taxiing for takeoff was shot by machine-gun fire and then hit with phosphorus bombs that exploded, burning to death 31 (among the dead were 14 ARAMCO employees and four Moroccan government officials enroute to Tehran for a state visit) and wounding another 31. After short stopovers at Athens and Damascus, the terrorists released 12 hostages and shot one, finally surrendering in Kuwait on the 18th. Later hijacking a Lufthansa airliner and flying to Kuwait.	On 17 Dec, a PLO official said that the assault was against the interests "of our people." This was followed on the 18th by a statement stressing that the PLO would "do anything in [our] their power to stop such acts." Sadat noted "criminal and vicious aggression," and King Hassan of Morocco had similar language.
31 Dec 73	PFLP/IRA	Britain	Zionist Joseph Sieff wounded in his London mission.	British tighten security watch over prominent Jews

31 Jan 74	PFLP/JRA	Singapore	Royal Dutch Shell refinery burned and seized a ferryboat in the harbor with five hostages aboard.	After denying the terrorist's request for safe passage to an Arab country, Singapore authorities offered them sanctuary in any of the 42 diplomatic missions. (see 7 Feb 74)
1 Feb 74		France	Henry Haim, President of the Association of Honest Allies of Israel, attacked in Paris.	
7 Feb 74	PFLP/JRA	Kuwait	Japanese Embassy seized, taking hostage the ambassador and nine staff members. The terrorists refused to release the hostages unless the guerrillas in Singapore were freed and flown to Kuwait aboard a Japanese airliner.	Kuwait initially refused to land the Japanese airliner, but later yielded to a Japanese appeal. On 8 Feb, the four guerrillas landed from Singapore and picked up the other PFLP terrorists and flew to Aden, South Yemen.
Feb 74	ICO		Islamic Conference recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.	
3 Mar 74	ANYLP	India	British Airways VC-10 hijacked enroute from Bombay to London. The plane was forced to land at Amsterdam's Schiphol airport, where it was set afire after all 92 passengers and crewmen were allowed to evacuate the aircraft.	3 March, the PLO disavowed any connection with the hijacking. On 6 June, a Dutch court convicted the terrorists of air piracy and arms charges and sentenced them to five-year prison terms. The British Airline Pilots' Association criticized the sentences as "ineffectual." It favored the death penalty for hijacking.
Mar 74	PNF	West Bank	The Palestine National Front emerged, the core of which was the Jordanian Communist Party (outlawed by King Hussein).	
11 Apr 74	PFLP/GC	Israel	In Qiryat Shemona, an apartment building was attacked killing 18 persons, including eight children and five women. A subsequent attack on an adjacent apartment building resulted in the wounding of 16 others, mostly soldiers. The guerrillas were killed when there explosive-laden rucksacks exploded after being hit by Israeli fire.	Israeli Premier Golda Meir held the Lebanese government responsible for the murders. 12 April, the Lebanese premier insisted to ambassadors from the US, France, China, Britain, and the Soviet Union that the attack was launched from inside Israel. 12 April, Israel retaliated with a raid on six Lebanese villages.
22 Apr 74		W. Germany	Plot to blow up the West Berlin office of El Al and the city's police registration officer for foreigners foiled due the capture of two Arab operatives (released 10 June 74, see below)	
1 May 74	ANYLP		Tapline monitoring station damaged.	
8 May 74	SRO	Lebanon	USIS center in Beirut bombed.	
15 May 74	PDFLP	Israel	Ma'alot massacre. 25 Israelis, all but four of them teenaged school children, died in the Palestinian guerrilla attack and seventy others were wounded. Note: This day was the anniversary of the Arab invasion of Israel in May 1948.	Premier Golda Meir stated in a televised address that she "promised that the government--any government of Israel--will do everything in its power to cut off the hands that want to harm a child, a grown-up, a settlement, a town or a village." 16 May, Israeli jets bombed and strafed Lebanese villages from Mount Hermon to the coast. This was the heaviest air attack Israel had ever carried out against Lebanon, initial casualty figures indicated that 24 were killed and 134 were wounded.
22 May 74		Israel	Palestinian infiltrator killed near the Lebanese border.	Israeli authorities imposed a security alert on most of northern Israel and Jerusalem. 23 May, six guerrilla infiltrators killed and two captured. Armed civilian volunteers aided the Israeli forces search areas in northern Israel known to have housed guerrilla infiltrators.

29 May 74	PFLP	W. Germany	JAL office in West Berlin bombed.	
31 May 74			Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement on the Golan Heights.	
3-4 Jun 74	Fedayeen	Israel	Two Arab terrorists on a mission to kill persons at random in Haifa was thwarted by Israeli police after being tipped-off on 3 June by a taxi driver that reported the suspicious Arabs.	
10 June 74	PLO	"	Issued threats to launch raids on the World Cup.	10 June 74, West German authorities released two Arab terrorists. 13 June 74, 5 Palestinian terrorists arrested for the plotted assaults against the Israeli embassy in Bonn and Israeli passenger planes.
13 June 74	PFLP-QC	Israel	Three women were slain by four Palestinian terrorists, during an apparent attempt to seize hostages in exchange for 100 guerrillas in Israeli prisons.	18-20 June, Israeli planes raided suspected Palestinian guerrilla bases in southern Lebanon. These raids represented the first in a coming series of preemptive attacks on guerrilla bases in Lebanon in order to disrupt further infiltration efforts and persuade the Lebanese government to crack-down on the guerrillas. In a further move against guerrilla attacks, the Israelis began construction of a security fence along the northern frontier. Israel informed the UN that it planned to take all the necessary steps required to curb the guerrilla attacks. Lebanon refused to curb Palestinian activity. And Qaddafi cabled Arafat, stating that Libya "places all its capabilities at your disposal."
14 June 74	PFLP-QC	Soviet Union	London Sunday Times reported that the KGB and GRU had trained, equipped and financed the PFLP-QC.	4 July, reported that Syria was providing the Palestinians with shoulder-launched Strela SA-7 missiles.
23 June 74	PFLP-QC PDFLP	Lebanon	The PFLP-QC and the PDFLP clashed at three refugee camps, due to the previous weeks abduction of a PDFLP man and conflicting views towards Israel. The PFLP-QC favored all-out war against Israel to liquidate the state, whereas the PDFLP advocated establishment of a Palestinian state in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.	
24 June 74	Fatah	Israel	Raided a Nahariya apartment house killing three civilians: a woman and her two children. The three Fatah and an Israeli soldier were killed in the clash along with five wounded Israeli soldiers.	25 June, Israeli's retaliated by firing artillery shells at Palestinian targets in southern Lebanon. The same day, Israel filed a complaint with the UN Security Council claiming that Lebanon must be held responsible for the attack because it continued to allow the guerrillas to operate freely. 30 June, PLO reported to have informed the Lebanese government that it would stop using the country as a base for attacks against Israel.
3-4 July 74	Arab League	Cairo	Agreed to provide Lebanon and PLO with financial assistance to strengthen their defenses against Israeli air and ground attacks.	Lebanese government rejected PLO proposal to establish missiles and anti-aircraft guns in 15 refugee camps. 8 July, Israeli naval commandos raided three Lebanese ports sinking 30 fishing boats.
31 July 74	PLO	Moscow	Yasir Arafat met with Soviet officials.	
3 Aug 74	BSO/PFLP		2 anti-Arab newspapers and United Jewish Social Fund offices bombed.	7 August Israeli planes attacked two Lebanese towns, killing two civilians and wounding 30 others.

4 Aug 74	PLO	Soviet Union	The USSR announced that the PLO had been granted permission to open an office in Moscow and had apparently agreed to provide defensive weapons.	George Habbash, the PFLP's leader, assailed the Soviet linkage stating: "there is an imperialist American scheme for the region but the Soviet line is ineffective because Russians base their policies on Israel's right to exist." By 22 August 74, 896 West Bank Arabs with connections to the Communist PNF had been arrested on security charges. Of the total, 549 had been tried and were serving jail terms; 314 were awaiting trial; and 33 were being held under administrative detention.
6 Aug 74	PFLP	Israel	Kidnapped four Druse employed by Israel to build a security fence between Lebanon and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.	Israeli troops abducted six Lebanese civilians and initiated air strikes on nearby towns
9 Aug 74	Fedayeen	Med	Israeli patrol boat sank a guerrilla motorized dinghy in Israel's territorial waters.	Israeli jets bombed a guerrilla supply base in southern Lebanon. 13 August, Israeli gunboats shelled a coastal refugee camp said to have been the launch point of the 9 August craft. The same day, guerrilla units were withdrawn from a Lebanese town following the protest of 300 villagers against the government's inability to provide protection against the Israeli air strikes.
14 Aug 74	"	Israel	A drunken Libyan armed with two pistols hijacked a Boeing 707 of Lebanon's Middle East Airlines, which was forced to land by Israeli jetfighters at Lod.	Commandos assaulted the aircraft, but the drunken Libyan failed to resist.
24 Aug 74	ACO	Syria	US Pavilion at Damascus International Fair bombed.	
26 Aug 74	Fedayeen	W. Germany	Israeli tourist office, Frankfurt, bombed.	
2 Sep 74	PDFLP	Israel	Two guerrillas were killed in a clash with an Israeli border patrol.	
4 Sep 74	PDFLP	Israel	Plan to seize hostages in exchange for Palestinian guerrillas and the freedom of Archbishop Capucci (arrested 18 Aug 74 for collaborating with Al Fatah) was thwarted when an Israeli security patrol intercepted the guerrillas three miles south of the Lebanon border.	
8 Sep 74	ANYLP		TWA jet enroute from Lod to New York crashes into the Ionean Sea, killing 88 passengers and the crew.	
13 Sep 74	PFLP/JRA	Netherlands	French Embassy at the Hague seized.	
14 Sep 74	ACO	Syria	USIS site in Damascus bombed.	
16 Sep 74	PFLP	France	Grenade explodes outside Le Drugstore.	
26 Sep 74	PFLP	Lebanon	Announced withdrawal from the PLO's Executive Committee, accusing the PLO of "deviating from the revolutionary course" by seeking a compromise in the West Bank and Gaza.	The PDFLP, PFLP-GC, and the Iraqi-sponsored Arab Liberation Front also decided to withdraw from the Executive Committee.
26-29 Oct 74	Arab League	Algiers	Jordan recognized the PLO as representative of the Palestinian peoples at the Arab Summit.	

13 Nov 74	PLO	New York	Yasir Arafat addressed the UN General Assembly.	22 Nov 74, UN General Assembly recognized "the right of the Palestinian people to sovereignty and national independence" and invited the PLO to take part in its debates as an observer. PLO headquarters in Beirut received congratulatory letters from numerous terrorist and revolutionary organizations.
19 Nov 74	PDFLP	Israel	Four killed and eighteen wounded when the fedayeen took over a house in Beit Shean.	
22 Nov 74	PFLP/Black June	Tunisia	BOAC jet hijacked from Dubai to Tunis.	
11 Dec 74	Fedayeen	Israel	Four killed and 66 wounded in an explosion at a Tel Aviv theater.	
12 Dec 74	"	Israel	An explosive device wounded twenty passers-by in Zion Square, downtown Jerusalem.	
22 Dec 74	PLO	Israel	US tourist in Jerusalem injured by a grenade.	

Sources: Lester A Sobel (ed.), *Political Terrorism: Vol 1* (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1975), pp. 9-81; John W. Amos II, *Palestinian Resistance: Organization of a Nationalist Movement* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), pp. 335-341; Geoffreu M. Levitt, *Democracies Against Terror: The Western Response to State-Supported Terrorism* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988), *TVI Journal* "A Chronology of Significant Attacks on Israel and Israeli Reprisal Operations," (Spring 1985): pp. 26-29; Hanan Alon, *Countering Palestinian Terrorism in Israel: Toward A Policy Analysis of Countermeasures* N-1567-FF (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, August 1980);

TABLE B-2.^a
PALESTINIAN DIASPORA
(Population Distribution).

	1949 ^b	1970 ^c	1975 ^d	1981 ^e	1982 ^f
Israel	133,000	363,600	436,100	550,800	574,800
West Bank (org.) ^g	440,000	683,700	785,400	833,000	871,600
West Bank (ref.) ^h	280,000				
Gaza (org.)	88,520	345,600	390,300	451,000	476,300
Gaza (ref.)	190,000				
Lebanon	100,000	247,000	288,000	358,207	492,240
Syria	75,000	155,700	183,000	222,525	229,868
Egypt	7,000	33,000	39,000	45,605	35,436
Iraq	4,000	30,000	35,000	20,604	21,284
East Bank	70,000	591,000	644,200	1,148,334	1,189,600
Kuwait		140,300	194,000	229,710	308,177
Saudi Arabia		31,000	59,000	136,779	147,549
Rest of Gulf		15,000	29,000	113,643	64,037
Libya		5,000	10,000	23,759	23,759
U.S.		25,000	28,000	104,856	108,045
Other					
Countries				140,116	143,780
Other Arab					
Countries					52,683
Total	1,387,520	2,665,900	3,121,000	4,446,938	4,739,158

^aCited in Laurie A. Brand, *Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for State*. (NY: Columbia University Press, 1988), 9.

^bFigures for 1949 are taken from *United Nations: Report of the Economic Survey Mission of the Middle East* (New York, 1949), p. 22. However, the report lists the original population of the west Bank and the Gaza as one figure, 529,000. The figures presented here were derived from taking the figure 88,520 as the original figure for Gaza. See Muhammad 'Ali Khulusi, *Al-Tanmiyyah al-Iqtisadiyyah fi-Qita' Ghazzah, Filastin, 1948-1966* [Economic Growth in the Gaza Strip, Palestine] (Cairo: United Commercial Press, 1967), p. 51. This figure was then subtracted from 29,000 and rounded to give an original West Bank population of 440,000.

^cFrom Nakleh and Zureik, *The Sociology of the Palestinians*, table 1.4, p. 31.

^d*Ibid.*, chart 2, p. 27.

^eFrom the *Palestinian Statistical Abstract for 1981* (Damascus: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 1982). The figures for Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf appear high.

^fFrom the *Palestinian Statistical Abstract for 1983* (Damascus: Palestinian Bureau of Statistics, 1984). There has been no statistical abstract published since 1984. In 1987, estimates of the total population had reached five million. For a comparison of the US State Department and the PLO figures for 1982, see Helena Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power, and Politics*. (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1984) p. 9.

^gOriginal population.

^hRefugee population added as a result of the 1947-49 (first) Arab-Israeli War.

TABLE B-3
PALESTINIAN RESISTENCE CASUALTIES
 (An Organizational Cross-Section).

Period	<i>Fatah</i>	<i>Popular Front</i>	<i>al-Sai'qah</i>	<i>Popular Liberation Forces</i>
12 June-31 Dec 67	66	5	--	1
1968	450	54	9	39
1969	219	53	71	75
Jan - Mar 1970	40	10	13	13
	775	122	101	128

Source: Ehud Yaari, *Strike Terror: The Story of Fatah*, translated from the Hebrew by Ester Yaari, (New York: Sabra Books, 1970), p. 370.

TABLE B-4.
THE STRENGTH AND SUPPORT OF THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE
(as of 1970).

Organization	Armed Men	Major Sources of Aid	
		Regional	International
Al-Fatah (Palestine National Liberation Movement)	10,000	Libya, Syria, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, private Palestinians	China
PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine)	3,000	Iraq, Libya, China	Soviets, China, North Korea
PDFLP (Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine)	*1,500	Syria	
PFLP-GC (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command)	500	Syria, later Libya and Iraq	
Syria's Al-Sa'iqa (Vanguards of the Popular Liberation War)	*8,000	Syrian Ba'ath party	
Iraq's ALF (Arab Liberation Front)	3,000	Iraqi Ba'ath party	

Sources: **New York Times*, 19 September 1970 stated that the PFLP numbered 1,000 and Syria's Al-Sa'iqa 7,000. Ovid Demaris, *Brothers in Blood* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1977), p. 175. William B. Quandt, *Palestinian Nationalism: Its Political and Military Dimensions* R-782-ISA (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, November 1971) p. 26; and Bard E. O'Neill, *Armed Struggle in Palestine: A Political-Military Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), p. 253.

Note: *New York Times*, 11 February 1970 quoting Israeli sources indicated that the fedayeen could field only 5-6,000 fighters, the remainder of whom consisted of support and political elements.

TABLE B-5
THE NUMBER OF JAILED TERRORISTS WHOSE RELEASE WAS
DEMANDED IN HOSTAGE INCIDENTS PERPETUATED BY AL-FATAH
(May 1972-June 1974)

DATE	INCIDENT	Number of Jailed Terrorists Demanded
8 MAY 72	Hijacking of a Sabena airliner to Tel-Aviv Airport	317*
5 SEP 72	Takeover of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games	200*
28 DEC 72	Takeover of the Israeli embassy in Bangkok	36*
24 JUN 74	Takeover of an apartment house in Nahariya, Israel.	Demands not submitted

*These operations were carried out by Al-Fatah under the cover name of Black September Organization (BSO).

Source: Ariel Merari, "Government Policy in Incidents Involving Hostages," *On Terrorism and Combating Terrorism* (Maryland: University Publications of America, 1985), p. 169.

TABLE B-6.
ISRAELI CIVILIAN CASUALTIES
(1967-74).

Year	Total # of Incidents Against Civilian Targets	# of Incidents Involving Civilian Casualties (% of Total)		Civilian Casualties	
				Killed	Wounded
1967	296	4	1.35%	4	9
1968	600	20	3.3%	27	258
1969	592	19	3.2%	25	171
1970	500	11	2.2%	21	118
1971	232	5	2.1%	5	45
1972	85	12	12.9%	28	112
1973	125	6	4.8%	1	15
1974	174	19	7.3%	62	211
Total	2604	96	3.7%	173	939

Source: IDF Spokesman; quoted from Hanon Alon, *Countering Palestinian Terrorism in Israel: Toward a Policy Analysis of Countermeasures*, N-1567-FF (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, August 1980), p. 58.

TABLE B-7
MODE OF OPERATION IN TERRORIST STRIKES INVOLVING CIVILIAN
CASUALTIES,
BY NUMBER OF INCIDENTS AND CASUALTIES,*
(1967-1974).

Year	Mode of Operation					Total
	Mining	Explosives	Small Arms	Artillery Fire	Hostage Bargaining	
1967	1 (3K, 4W)	2 (1K, 4W)	--	1 (1W)	--	4 (4K, 9W)
1968	5 (13K, 33W)	8 (13K, 150W)	4 (62W)	3 (13W)	--	20 (27K, 258W)
1969	1 (1K, 21W)	11 (8K, 112W)	3 (13K, 16W)	4 (3K, 22W)	--	19 (25K, 171W)
1970	2 (5K, 2W)	1 (2K, 33W)	5 (13K, 61W)	3 (13K, 61W)	--	11 (21K, 118W)
1971	2 (2W)	--	2 (1K, 11W)	1 (4K, 32W)	--	5 (5K, 45W)
1972	3 (1K, 15W)	5 (19W)	3 (27K, 76W)	1 (2W)	--	12 (28K, 112W)
1973	1 (2W)	4 (12W)	1 (1K, 1W)	--	--	6 (1K, 15W)
1974	--	8 (4K, 95W)	7 (8K, 18W)	1 (1W)	3 (48K, 98W)	19 (62K, 211W)
Incidents.....	15	39	25	14	3	96
(Killed and Wounded).....	(23K, 79W)	(28K, 425W)	(63K, 245W)	(20K, 132W)	(48K, 98W)	(173K, 939W)
Total Casualties.....	102	453	380	152	146	1112

Source: Drawn from IDF spokesman chronologies; quoted from Hanan Alon, *Countering Palestinian Terrorism in Israel: Toward a Policy Analysis of Countermeasures* (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, August 1980), Rand Note N-1567-FF, 59.

*Figures in parentheses indicate killed (K) and wounded (W).

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